369 F.3d 319 | 3rd Cir. | 2004
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, GARTH, and BRIGHT [*] , Circuit Judges
__________ No. 03-2437 (Filed: May 26, 2004) __________
OPINION
JEFFREY LUI, DAVID LUI, and __________ FANTASIA RESTAURANT &
LOUNGE, INC.,
Lewis H. Robertson(Argued) a corporation of the State of Delaware Lewis H. Robertson, P.C. Appellants 116 Oceanport Avenue Little Silver, New Jersey 07739
v. Attorney for Appellants,
COMM ISSION ON ADULT
Jeffrey Lui, David Lui and
ENTERTAINMENT
Fantasia Restaurant & Lounge, Inc. ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, an entity within the State of Delaware Thomas H. Ellis(Argued) Department of Administrative Deputy Attorney General Services, Division of Business & State of Delaware Department of Justice Occupation Recreation, 820 North French Street, 6 th floor M. JANE BRADY, in her capacity as Carvel State Building Attorney General of the Wilmington, Delaware 19801 State of Delaware, STATE OF DELAWARE, and Attorney for Appellees, NEW CASTLE COUNTY, a political C o m m i s s i o n o n A d u l t subdivision Entertainment Establishments of of the State of Delaware the State of Delaware, M. Jane Brady, and State of Delaware
__________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware [*] Myron H. Bright, Circuit Judge, Civil Action No. 02-177 United States Court of Appeals for the District Judge: Honorable Kent A. Jordan Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. Mary A. Jacobson(Argued) the sole shareholder of Fantasia, and his son Jeffrey Lui is the general manager of Assistant County Attorney Fantasia. Lui desires to offer nude New Castle County Office of Law 87 Reads Way dancing at Fantasia. In order to do so, Lui must satisfy the zoning and licensing New Castle, Delaware 19720
requirements imposed by both New Castle County and the State of Delaware. Attorney for Appellee, New Castle County
New Castle County (the “County”) requires the owner or proprietor, in this Garth, Circuit Judge: case Lui, who wishes to offer nude Appellants Jeffrey Lui, David Lui dancing, to first obtain zoning certification and Fantasia Restaurant & Lounge, Inc. (a permit or license) from the County. To appeal from the District Court’s summary obtain County zoning certification, Lui judgment in favor of Appellees based on had to satisfy the New Castle County the abstention doctrine announced in Department of Planning that the location Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). of the proposed adult entertainment After Lui [1] filed the instant appeal, the establishment complied with the zoning Delaware Superior Court rejected on the and subdivision provisions of the New merits Lui’s motion to dismiss the Castle County Unified Development Code criminal prosecution pending against him, (the “County Code”). In particular, Lui which arose out of Lui’s failure to obtain was required to co mply with an adult entertainment establishment § 40-133(a)(13) of the County Code, license. For the reasons set forth below, which mandates that adult entertainment we will affirm the District Court’s establishment be 2,800 feet from a church decision to abstain under Younger, but we or other place of worship, and sets limits will remand the case to the District Court on proximity to schools, residences, and other adult entertainment establishments. [2] with direction to discharge the stay and dismiss the case with prejudice.
I.
[2] § 40-133(a)(13) states in relevant part: Fantasia Restaurant & Lounge, Inc. (“Fantasia”) is a bar and restaurant located Massage parlors which provide services at 1031 South Market Street (Route 13) in on and/or off premises, adult bookstores New Castle County, Delaware. Fantasia
and adult entertainment centers shall currently offers exotic dancing by women be permitted as follows: dressed in brief costumes. David Lui is (a) No such use shall be permitted within 500 feet of any property containing a Once zoning certification is secured cannot obtain a State license necessary to from the County, the requirements operate an adult entertainment imposed by the State of Delaware (the establishment in New Castle County “State”) pursuant to the Delaware Adult without first receiving a permit from the Entertainment Establishments Act (the County demonstrating compliance with “Act”), 24 Del. C. Ch. 16, must be the applicable provisions of the County satisfied. This Act required Lui to file an Code. See Amico v. New Castle County, application for an adult entertainment 571 F. Supp. 160, 163 n.3 (D. Del. 1983). establishment zoning certification with the Indeed, the Act prohibits all counties in Delaware Commission on Adult the State of Delaware from issuing permits Entertainment Establishments. Lui’s or licenses for adult entertainment application had to include a copy of the establishments unless their distance County’s zoning review results. The State restrictions match those decreed by the would then review the application to State. ensure that Fantasia’s proposed location
A.
complied with all local laws and ordinances, pursuant to 24 Del. C. Lui filed his first request for § 1610(a). [3] Effectively, an applicant County zoning certification on July 30
1996, before construction of Fantasia was underway. In his application, Lui stated
(b) No such use shall be permitted within that Fantasia would be located more than 2,800 feet of a school, church or other 2,800 feet from any house of worship. On place of worship. August 12, 1996, the New Castle County (c) No such use shall be permitted within Department of Planning granted Lui’s 1,500 feet of each other. request for zoning certification, but stipulated that because Fantasia had yet to [3] 24 Del. C. § 1610 provides, in be constructed, the “certification may relevant part: (a) No license issued under this chapter shall authorize the licensee to engage in 500 feet of any residence regardless of or carry on the business of operating an how such property is zoned, or within adult entertainment establishment in any 2,800 feet from a church or school . . . place other than the premises set forth in Distances shall be measured from said license. . . property line to property line.
* * * (d) Notwithstanding any provision of (c) No new adult entertainment law to the contrary, no municipal establishment as defined in § 1602 of corporation or county may adopt any this title shall operate in the same ordinance or charter amendment with building or in separate buildings less distance restrictions less than those than 1,500 feet from each other, within provided in this section. become null and void due to changing B. conditions in the future.” On August 23,
On November 22, 2000, Fantasia 1996, the County’s certification was opened for business. Lui concedes that revoked because Fantasia was, in fact, Fantasia offers live female exotic dancers located within 2,800 feet of a church. Lui dressed in brief costumes, which cover the appealed, and the revocation was affirmed genitals and the areola region of the by the New Castle County Board of breast, and that Fantasia is located within Adjustment. Lui appealed that 2,800 feet of a church. determination to the Delaware Superior Court. On December 31, 2001, Lui was
criminally indicted by the State of Lui filed a second request for Delaware on three counts of operating and County zoning certification on September conspiring to operate an adult 24, 1996. He argued that the church that entertainment establishment without was located within 2,800 feet of the obtaining an Adult Entertainment Fantasia site had ceased to operate as a Establishment zoning certification. On church, and that the County’s denial of April 30, 2002, Lui filed a motion to certification violated his due process dismiss the state indictment, challenging rights. The New Castle County the constitutionality of the Act and of Department of Planning again denied § 40-133(a)(13) of the County Code . [5] Lui’s application, and the Board of Adjustment affirmed. In State court, Lui argued that the
restrictions imposed by the State and Lui appealed to the Delaware County effectively deny adequate Superior Court, which consolidated Lui’s alternative avenues of communication for two appeals and denied both in a the presentation of adult entertainment. November 20, 1998 opinion. Fantasia Rest. & Lounge, Inc. v. New Castle County Bd. of Adjustment, 735 A.2d 424 (Del.
compliance with § 40-133(a)(13) of the Super. Ct. 1998). The Delaware Supreme County’s zoning code. In May 2002, Court affirmed. Fantasia Rest. & Lounge, counsel for Lui asked the State to Inc. v. New Castle County Bd. of withhold action on Lui’s application. Adjustment, 734 A.2d 641 (Del. 1999). [4] [5] As stated above, 24 Del. C. § 1610(d) directs that no “county may See State of Delaware v. Fantasia Rest. & (citing N.W. Enters v. City of Houston, Lounge, Inc., et al., Nos. 0112001060, 352 F.3d 162, 182 (5th Cir. 2003)). 0109002426, 0112000958 (Del. Super. Ct.
The State prosecution against Lui is filed Mar. 9, 2004). On March 9, 2004, presently pending. the Delaware Superior Court denied Lui’s motion to dismiss, holding that the State C. and County zoning laws at issue
On March 11, 2002, Lui filed a constituted reasonable time, place and four count Complaint pursuant to 42 manner regulations of protected speech U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District because (1) they are content-neutral; (2) Court for the District of Delaware. He they are narrowly tailored to serve a filed an Amended Complaint on April 24, substantial government interest; and (3) 2002. The Complaint echoed the they leave open adequate alternative areas arguments Lui raised in his motion to of communication. See id. dismiss the State court indictment. He Specifically, the Superior Court made the following four allegations: determined that the laws are content- Count 1: that the Act and County neutral because they do not constitute a Code violate the First Amendment; total ban on adult entertainment, but merely “ban adult entertainment Count 2: that the County’s establishments from some parts of the requirement that he pay a $500 application state and county based upon location.” Id. fee (while a fee of $50 is typical), and the at 12. The laws, which set the minimum State’s requirement that he include the distance between an adult entertainment results of his County zoning review in his establishment and a church or school, are State application, violate the Equal narrowly tailored to serve a substantial Protection Clause; government interest because they “are
Count 3: that the State prosecution particularly aimed at protecting those of of Lui was motivated by his race [6] and tender age and/or seeking spiritual violated his Due Process and Equal guidance from exposure to the negative Protection rights; and effects o f a d u l t e n te r t a in ment establishments.” Id. at 13. And they leave Count 4: that the Act is open adequate alternative areas of unconstitutionally broad. communication because Lui has
Lui sought declaratory and injunctive acknowledged that twelve available relief, monetary damages, and fees and potential adult use locations exist within New Castle County, a number which the S u p e r i o r C o u r t f o u n d t o b e costs pertaining to Count One; declaratory In its January 31, 2003 order, the and injunctive relief, monetary damages District Court held that: from the County only, [7] and fees and costs
(1)Lui’s claims for equitable relief on Count Two; and declaratory and are dismissed without prejudice; injunctive relief and fees and costs from the State only on Counts Three and Four. (2) Lui’s claims for monetary
damages against the State of Delaware, M. Lui moved for partial summary Jane Brady, and the Commission on Adult judgment on Count One (violation of the Entertainment Establishments of the State First Amendment), and alternatively for a of Delaware are dismissed with prejudice; preliminary injunctio n preventing enforcement of the State Act, 24 Del. C. (3)Partial summary judgment is § 1610, and the County Code, § 40- entered for New Castle County against Lui 133(a)(13). He argued that the restrictions on the issue of the County’s liability for imposed by the State and County damages under Count One of Lui’s effectively deny adequate alternative Amended Complaint; and avenues of communication for the
(4)Further activity is stayed until presentation of adult entertainment. The the final resolution of Lui’s criminal County cross-moved for summary prosecution by the State of Delaware, now judgment, and both the State and the pending in Delaware Superior Court. County filed motions to dismiss Lui’s Amended Complaint. The District Court’s order did not
identify each Count in its disposition. We Both the State and County argued have been able to cure that deficiency by that the District Judge was required to reference to the proceedings and the abstain from exercising jurisdiction under District Court opinion, to the following the doctrine announced in Younger v. effect: The equitable claims made in Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), because of the Count One were dismissed without ongoing criminal prosecution of Lui in prejudice under Younger. The District state court. The County also argued that it Court determined that the State and could not be held liable for enforcing a County were immune to money damages zoning restriction imposed upon the under the Eleventh Amendment and state County by State law. law. Accordingly, the claim for money damages against the State and County were dismissed with prejudice. As to [7] Lui conceded that the State was Count Two, the equitable claims immune to Lui’s claims for damages pertaining to Equal Protection were under the Eleventh Amendment. Lui dismissed without prejudice, and the also withdrew all claims against
claims for monetary damages and fees and defendant M. Jane Brady, Attorney costs were stayed. At oral argument, General of Delaware. counsel for Lui stipulated that all of Count dismiss Lui’s appeal for lack of appellate Two should be regarded as having been jurisdiction. dismissed with prejudice. Counts Three
We address jurisdiction of this and Four sought only equitable relief, and Court at the outset. Although the were dismissed by the District Court timeliness of Lui’s appeal was questioned without prejudice. In his appellate brief, by the County, our independent analysis Lui conceded that Counts Three and Four shows that the County’s claim of were properly the subject of Younger untimeliness is without merit for two abstention. reasons. First, the order which the County Thus, what remains for us to decide identified as being “final” was, in fact, is whether the District Judge erred in interlocutory, as it was “without applying Younger abstention to Count prejudice.” See Borelli v. City of Reading, One, and whether he erred by retaining 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976) (per jurisdiction over Lui’s claim for fees and curiam). Second, the District Court costs brought in the same Count. [8] retained jurisdiction over the fees and
costs claimed by Lui under Count One, Lui filed a timely appeal from the thereby ostensibly leaving its order non- District Court’s orders of January 31, 2003 final. and February 27, 2003. This latter issue, which we discuss
II.
later in this opinion, did not affect the The District Court had jurisdiction finality of the District Court’s order, over Lui’s federal action pursuant to 28 however, because a ruling which orders U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3) and (4). Younger abstention transfers the entire Lui asserts that this Court has jurisdiction proceeding to the State court for over the instant appeal pursuant to 28 adjudication, including all of its collateral U.S.C. § 1291. The County moved to aspects – in this case, fees and costs. We
have therefore held that a district court’s Younger abstention order constitutes a final, appealable order under 28 U.S.C. [8] In its February 27, 2003 opinion, § 1291 because, under Younger v. Harris, the District Court denied Lui’s motion the effect of such an order is to surrender for reargument without prejudice to a jurisdiction of the federal action to a state later filing of a motion to reconsider, court. By doing so, the Younger which the District Judge restricted to the abstention order becomes immediately issue of the availability of fees and costs appealable. See Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d pursuant to § 1988. In effect, the 101, 105 (3d. Cir. 1989); Moses H. Cone District Court retained jurisdiction over Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., the fees and costs, as they pertained to 460 U.S. 1, 10 (1983). As we said in Count One (violation of the First Schall: Amendment). Because we are convinced (3d Cir. 1992). that ‘the object’ of the
IV.
district court’s [order and] stay was ‘to require all or an We now turn to the question at the essential part of the federal heart of this appeal – was the District suit to be litigated in a state Court’s decision to invoke Younger forum,’ Moses H. Cone, 460 abstention proper? Lui asserts that the U.S. at 10 n. 11, we District Court erred in applying Younger conclude that the district in this case. court’s stay order was an
We have had a longstanding public abstention order that is final policy against federal court interference within the meaning of 28 with state court proceedings. Younger has
U.S.C. § 1291.
taught us that federal courts should not act 885 F.2d at 105. [9] to restrain a criminal prosecution where the appellant here, has an adequate remedy
III.
at law in state court and will not suffer This Court exercises plenary review irreparable injury if denied equitable over the District Court’s legal relief. Moreover, this principle, Younger determination that the requirements for teaches, Younger abstention have been met.
is reinforced by an even University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick more vital consideration, the Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265, 270 (3d Cir. notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a 1991). If the requirements for abstention proper respect for state have been met, this Court reviews the functions, a recognition of District Court’s decision to abstain under the fact that the entire Younger abstention principles for abuse of country is made up of a discretion. Gwynedd Properties, Inc. v. Union of separate state Lower Gwynedd Tp., 970 F.2d 1195, 1199 g o v e r n m e n t s , a n d a continuance of the belief t h a t t h e N a t i o n a l [9] We also had concerns as to Government will fare best if whether we had jurisdiction to entertain the States and their this appeal because Count Two was institutions are left free to dismissed by the District Court without perform their separate prejudice. As noted in text, when we functions in their separate raised this question with counsel for Lui ways. at oral argument, he conceded that Count Two should be dismissed with prejudice,
401 U.S. at 44. Accordingly, Younger and he forwarded a letter to us states that “it has been perfectly natural for acknowledging that fact. our cases to repeat time and time again defending a pending criminal prosecution that the normal thing to do when federal in State court. Second, the District Court courts are asked to enjoin pending Judge concluded that the State’s criminal proceedings in state courts is not to issue prosecution of Lui implicated important such injunctions.” Id. at 45. State courts State interests – namely, the State’s effort are every bit as competent to deal with the to control the negative effects of adult claims of the appellant (in this case, the entertainment establishments through the defendant in the criminal proceeding) as enforcement of its zoning laws. Third, the are the federal courts and this, of course, District Court Judge held that Lui had includes the ability to address claims failed to carry his burden of showing that under both the State constitution and the he could not present his constitutional Federal constitution. Thus, we have been claims as a defense in State court. See instructed that the concerns of comity and Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, federalism which underlie the Younger 14 (1987) (“the burden on this point rests doctrine command the federal courts to on the federal plaintiff to show that state respect the independence and functioning procedural law barred presentation of its of the state courts. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 claims.”). Furthermore, as we noted U.S. 362, 380 (1976). above, Lui had already filed a motion to
dismiss the State indictment which Following Younger, this Court has challenged the constitutionality of the set out a three-prong test to determine State zoning statute. Thus the District whether courts should abstain from Court concluded that Lui had the addressing the merits of a federal action in opportunity to raise all of his the face of ongoing state criminal constitutional claims in State court. litigation. Abstention under Younger is appropriate only where: (1) there are On appeal, Lui argues that Younger ongoing state proceedings that are judicial abstention was not proper because Count in nature; (2) the state proceedings One of his federal claim does not implicate important state interests; and (3) implicate important state interests, and the state proceedings afford an adequate because the State proceedings might not opportunity to raise the federal claims. afford him an adequate opportunity to Gwynedd Properties, Inc. v. Lower raise his federal claims. Reviewing the Gwynedd Tp., 970 F.2d 1195, 1200 (3d District Court’s Younger analysis under a Cir. 1992). plenary standard, we reject both of Lui’s
arguments. First, Count One implicates In the instant case, the District the State’s valid and important interest in Court Judge determined that all three regulating the location and effect on the prongs of the Gwynedd Properties test community of adult entertainment were met, and Younger abstention should establishments, particularly their effect on therefore be invoked. First, it was individuals attending school or a house of undisputed that Lui was – and still is – unconstitutional. [10] But here, as in worship. See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 121 (1982) (zoning Younger, a criminal proceeding raising the laws may be validly used to regulate the same issues and affording Lui an environment around schools and churches, opportunity to assert all of his given the legitimate interest in insulating constitutional claims was pending in State them fro m certain commercial court. As Younger teaches us, any injury establishments). to which such a defendant may be exposed
is solely “that incidental to every criminal Second, it is beyond dispute that proceeding brought lawfully and in good the State court prosecution has afforded faith.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 49 (internal Lui an opportunity to raise his sole quotations omitted). remaining federal claim – Count One (Lui’s First Amendment claim). By the We are satisfied that the record and time Lui filed his federal action, he had the principles we have related clearly already brought a motion to dismiss the demonstrate that there is no merit to the charges filed against him by the State, and arguments that Lui has advanced. The that motion, among other things, District Court Judge did not abuse his challenged the constitutionality of the discretion when he determined that all State Act. See State v. Fantasia Rest. & three prongs of the Gwynedd Properties Lounge, Nos. 0112001060, 0109002426, test were met, because (1) Lui is 0112000958 (Del. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 9, defending a pending criminal prosecution 2004). Indeed, the submissions made by in state court, (2) the prosecution Lui in defense of the State criminal implicates the State’s interest in charges are identical to the Amended controlling the negative effects of adult Complaint which he filed in Federal court entertainment establishments, and (3) Lui and from which the District Court has actually did raise, albeit unsuccessfully, abstained. Thus it is not surprising that his constitutional claims as a defense to the District Court concluded that Lui has his prosecution in State court. The the opportunity to raise his Federal constitutional claims in State court. District Court did not err in abstaining awards to the party who prevails on the pursuant to Younger v. Harris, supra. merits of the federal claim. See Healy v.
Town of Pembroke Park, 831 F.2d 989
V.
(11th Cir. 1987). Defense of a State Having determined that the District criminal prosecution is not a proceeding Court correctly analyzed Lui’s claims in for which fees and costs can be awarded accordance with the principles and under § 1988. See Venuti v. Riordan, 702 instruction of Younger v. Harris, we are F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1983); see also Greer v. obliged to hold that the District Court did Holt, 718 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1983). Thus, not correctly implement its order because even a successful defense of the State it retained jurisdiction over Court One as criminal charges would not entitle Lui to it pertained to fees and costs, and we now seek fees and costs in federal court, and address that issue. In Moses H. Cone, the the stay of those claims was therefore in Supreme Court observed that where “a error. stay of the federal suit pending resolution
VI.
of the state suit meant that there would be no further litigation in the federal forum; Having held that the District Court [then] the state court’s judgment on the did not err in abstaining from deciding the issue would be res judicata . . . [and the] merits of Lui’s federal complaint, we have stay order amounts to a dismissal of the no occasion to address the merits of Lui’s suit.” Moses H. Cone, 400 U.S. at 10. In constitutional arguments. These were Schall, this Court extended the holding in properly transferred to the Delaware Moses H. Cone, which was a Colorado courts, and are not the subject of our River abstention case, to the Younger analysis. Indeed, the opinion of the abstention context. Thus, as we noted Delaware Superior Court, which was filed above, a Younger abstention stay requires during the pendency of Lui’s federal a dismissal with prejudice of the federal appeal, reflects that the Delaware Superior suit. Court, addressing the exact same
constitutional claims made by Lui here, The District Court’s February 27, rejected on the merits all of the issues 2003 order, see note 8, supra, implies that which Lui sought to have us decide. This if Lui were successful on the merits in being so, if for no other reason, the State criminal court he could then revisit a doctrines of res judicata on the one portion of his federal claims to seek fees hand, [11] or Rooker-Feldman on the other, [12] and costs from the State and County ostensibly under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and thus a stay of those claims was [11] Res judicata bars suit where appropriate. We cannot agree. Section there was (1) an earlier decision on the 1988(b), which governs fee and cost issue, (2) a final judgment on the merits, awards for § 1983 claims, allows such
and (3) the involvement of the same would militate against our deciding the merits of the federal claim in any event.
One thing more needs to be said. The stay which the District Court imposed on the request for fees and costs in Count One must, as a matter of law, be discharged. As we have pointed out, the abstention order transferred the whole “kit ‘n caboodle” of Count One to the state court to be adjudicated. Thus the fees and costs, as well as all the other elements of Count One, no longer remained in the federal court, and the District Court could not under any circumstance rule on those issues.
Thus, we will affirm the District Court in all respects except one – we are obliged to reverse and remand to the District Court the stay which was improviden tly and consequentl y erroneously entered pertaining to the fees and costs. The District Court is instructed to correct its judgment accordingly, so that all matters that remained in the District Court are now remitted to the Delaware Superior Court for adjudication. parties, or parties in privity with the original parties. Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 17, 24 (1982). [12] The Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests a federal district court of jurisdiction if the plaintiff’s claim was either (1) actually litigated in state court or (2) if the claim is inextricably intertwined with the prior state court ruling. See Desi’s Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir. 2003).
NOTES
[1] Appellants will collectively be dwelling or other residence located referred to as “Lui.” within any residentially zoned district.
[4] In late March or early April adopt any ordinance or charter 2002, Lui submitted a third application amendment with distance restrictions for zoning certification. This time, Lui less than those provided in this section,” applied directly to the State Commission thus subjecting Fantasia to the relevant – he did not first secure zoning portions of New Castle County’s Unified certification from the County in Development Code.
[6] The record indicates that Jeffrey “constitutionally sufficient for purposes of and David Lui are of Chinese-American the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 23 descent.
[10] See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 We have previously noted that the U.S. 66 (1971) (holding that declaratory District Court dismissed all of Lui’s relief is improper when a prosecution equitable claims, which included a request involving the challenged state statute is for an injunction to prevent enforcement pending in state court at the time the of the State Act and the County Code federal suit is initiated, and the same against him, and a declaratory judgment principles that govern the propriety of that the State Act and the County Code are federal injunctions of State criminal proceedings govern the issuance of federal declaratory judgments in connection with such proceedings).
