David R. Koopsma (appellant) appeals from an order of the circuit court dated May 12,1980, dirеcting that he pay Kathlyn Luedtke (appellee) $75.00 per month for the support of their minor child, Lisa M. Koops-ma (Lisa). We affirm.
The parties were married on October 27, 1972, in Mountain Home, Idaho; approximately four months later on February 6, 1973, Lisa was born. On the 8th day of November, 1973, appellee obtained a judgment, in Idaho, granting her a divorce. Appellant voluntarily chose to make no appearаnce in the divorce action. The Idaho court granted appellee custody of Lisa and оrdered that appellant pay child support of $75.00 per month.
On January 14, 1980, appellee, who now resides in Wisconsin, filed in that state a “Petition for Support,” and pursuant to the “Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act” (URESA), a hearing on this petition was held on May 12,1980, in the South Dakota Circuit Court at Canton. At this hearing appellant (who is a South Dakota resident) sought to contest paternity. Appellаnt’s argument is predicated upon a petition for termination of parental rights which appellee filed in Wisconsin on October 10,1979. Therein, appellee alleges that one Phillip Taylor is the natural father of Lisa and that appellant is merely the father through marriage. This petition was never pursuеd beyond the initial filing; however, appellant urges that in light of this sworn petition he should be allowed to contest paternity in the URESA proceeding.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the original judgment of divorce was res judica-ta in the URESA action on the issue of paternity. The authorities uniformly indicate that it is. Sеe
Baum v. Baum,
Although the record contains no findings by the Idaho court there is an Idaho judgment which refers to Lisa as thе “minor child of the parties .... ” Logic and reason dictates that the Idaho court found that Lisa was aрpellant’s child. We also note that there is a rebuttable presumption that children who are born during wedlock are the legitimate issue of the marriage. *114 * Moreover, the Idaho court ordered appellant to provide child support of $75.00 per month. “[A] support order, although uncontested, constitutes an adjudication of paternity in regard to the [appellant’s] duty of support.” Baum, supra, at 747.
Appellant cites
Carr v. Preslar,
The doctrine оf res judicata ... rest[s] on two maxims, viz., “A man should not be twice vexed for the sáme cause” and “it is for the public good that there be an end to litigation.” ... To permit the present use of the doctrine does more than protect [appellee] from being twice vexed. It makes it possible for him to succeed in defeating [appellant] in [his] efforts to secure a fair opportunity to place [his] claim in litigation on its merits. In our opinion neither justice nor sound public policy would be served by such a ruling.
The salient language in
Carr,
for purposes of this appeal, is the statement requiring that parties have “a fair opportunity to placе their claim in litigation.” Here, appellant had every opportunity to contest paternity in the 1973 divorce action, which he voluntarily chose to forego. He now, however, attempts to raise this issue that was settled by the Idaho court over seven years prior to this appeal. We find that “[w]hile this [Idaho judgment] remains, the question of the legitimacy of [Lisa] cannot be presented for judicial investigation by the parties to this action.”
Dornfeld v. Dornfeld,
supra,
If appellant had shown that the Idaho judgment was obtained by fraud on apрel-lee’s part, a substantially different question might be presented. See
Johns v. Johns,
supra. That, however, is not the сase presented. Appellant merely claims that appellee’s statement in the petition seeking termination of appellant’s parental rights is sufficient to estop enforcement of thе judgment of divorce and its holding that Lisa is the minor child of the parties. The rule in such a case is that, “[although stаtements of fact in other pleadings are inconclusively admissible .. . they cannot be used for the purpose of establishing the defense of es-toppel.”
Mich. Health Care, Inc. v. Flagg Industries, Inc.,
Generally the only defenses the defendant сan make to a judgment obtained in another state when the judgment is sued upon in this state are that the cоurt did not have jurisdiction ... or that the judgment has been paid, satisfied, or released .... No defense may be sеt up which goes to the merits of the original controversy, or which might have been imposed in the original аction.
Bahr v. Bahr,
We find that appellant had an opportunity to contest paternity in the original action, but failed to do so. He also has not alleged fraud in appellee’s obtaining of the original judgment. Hе therefore should not be heard to complain that he has been precluded from presenting this issue to the courts. Paternity in such a situation is not properly raised in an action to enforce child support obligations.
Accordingly, we affirm.
Notes
SDCL 25-5-1 provides:
All children born in wedlock are presumed to be legitimate. Idaho Code 7-1119 provides:
The presumption of legitimacy of a child born during wedlock is overcome if the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests, show that the husband is not the father of the child.