158 Mo. App. 196 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1911
By this suit plaintiffs contest the last will and testament of John Henry Lnebbert, deceased. The jury found the issues for plaintiffs and against the will, and defendants prosecute the appeal.
The will and codicil thereto in contest were respectively executed by John Henry Lnebbert, a man more than ninety years of age, within six and three months prior to his death, and by the provisions thereof the major portion of his estate was bestowed upon defendants, John H. Brockmeyer and wife, to the exclusion of the testator’s two sons and daughter who contest the same. The petition declares against the alléged will and codicil attached upon two grounds: First, that the testator was not possessed of sufficient mind and memory at the time of the execution of those instruments to dispose of his property; and second, upon the ground that he was unduly influenced thereabout by defendants, John H. Brockmeyer and wife, Wilhelmina, both of which grounds were submitted to the jury by instructions. It is argued the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment on either score and it will therefore be necessary to set forth the facts with some detail.
It appears the testator, John Henry Lnebbert. had resided in the city of St. Louis for about sixty years prior to his death, which occurred in October, 1906. He was a German, but entirely familiar with the English language, though uneducated; a boss plasterer by trade and a man of considerable force. His family consisted of a wife, who departed this life about eighteen months before he did, somewhere near eighy-five years of age, and two sons and two daughters. One of his daughters, Mrs. Walters, died about 1902 and his other daughter, Mrs. Bell, formerly Hanson, re-sides in the west where she has been for twenty or
It appears in 1886 the old gentleman loaned $8000 to a church congregation and held a note executed by some of his old time friends therefor. Though this money was loaned for a specified term and the note 'renewed occasionally, he was paid, besides the interest semi-annually, the sum of $100 or $200 or $300 at a time as he needed money, during all of the years from 1886 to the time of his death in 1906. By such small payments, the note had been reduced to about $1200 at the time of his death. The old gentleman could not read or write and therefore trusted the treasurer of the church implicitly during all of these years until within a year of -his death when he became somewhat suspicious without any cause therefor whatever. About the time he made the will in April, 1906, he called upon the church treasurer for some explanation touching this fund and a new note given with respect of the sum, recently before. Of course, this matter amounts to nothing save as a slight circumstance tending to show his mental condition compared with that which obtained during the entire course of transactions had theretofore. During the seven months the testator resided at Brockmeyer’s before his death, his son John Henry called to see him but twice and his son Edward once only, Edward came in company with his wife in a carriage a few days before the old gentleman died and endeavored to persuade him to return to his home, but the testator refused and said he was happy and comfortable there and intended to remain. Upon Edward’s insisting fie should return to his house, the old gentleman became positive as usual and spoke with such emphasis as to suggest that he had a
Unless we are able to say as a matter of law that it appears from these facts the old gentleman was, at the time of executing the will and codicil (th‘e one about six and the other three months before his death), capable of comprehending all his property and all of the persons who reasonably came within the range of his bounty and that he possessed sufficient intelligence to understand his ordinary business affairs and to know and understand what disposition he was making of his property, the verdict of the jury should not be disturbed on this score, for such are the requisite qualifications as to mental capacity for the testamentary disposition of property. [Maddox v. Maddox, 114 Mo. 35, 21 S. W. 499; Riggin v. Westminster College, 160 Mo. 570, 61 S. W. 803; Holton v. Cochran, 208 Mo. 314, 410, 106 S. W. 1035.] We are unable to so declare, for all of these matters, when considered together with the fact that the testator was an old' man more than ninety years of age at the time the will was made and that he practically disinherited the natural objects of his bounty without apparent cause and purported to confer the major portion of his estaté upon strangers of blood, are for the consideration of the jury. Especially is this true in view of the uncontradicted proof that, notwithstanding the pleasant relations which had always existed in the family, the old gentleman suddenly revealed a harsh and cruel side during the last sickness of both his daughter and his wife. Such conduct is' so extraordinary, when considered' in connection with all of the proof touching his .prior kindly intercourse with his family, that it suggests an entire change of mental condition. It seems that,
Though the evidence suggests the mind of the testator in the instant case to be a fertile field for the influence of designing persons, no substantial evidence of undue influence appears in the record. After having twice read the entire evidence, we have been unable to discover anything more than the ministrations of kindness on the part of defendants toward an old friend which induced him to make them the recipients of his bounty. Influence which is gained alone through kindness and springs from the fondness of affection is not of that character which the law condemns as undue and because of which a last will and testament may be set aside. [Campbell v. Carlisle, 162 Mo. 634; In the matter of Gleespin’s Will, 26 N. J. 523; Mackall v. Mackall, 135 U. S. 167.] The character of influence which the law denounces as undue and on account of which the will of the testator is invalidated is that which one exercises through persuasion, coercion, force or fraud, to the end of overcoming the free agency or will power of the testator so as to substitute in part at least his will or wish in the matter for that of the testator. It is because of such influence alone, as contradistinguished from that which is acquired through mere kindness, affection or attachment, that the law denounces an instrument not the last will and testament of the testator. [Winn v. Grier, 217 Mo. 420, 117 S. W. 48; Teckenbrock v. McLaughlin, 209 Mo. 533, 550, 551, 108 S. W. 46.] There is not a particle of proof in the record that either defendant Brockmeyer or wife ever made any suggestion to , Mr. Luebbert
It will be unnecessary to notice other errors complained of as new instructions will essentially be drafted on a retrial. For the error of submitting the question of undue influence to the jury, the- judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded. It is so ordered.