Ludwig v. HillLudwig v. Hill
Presently before the Court is Respondent James Hill‘s Motion to Dismiss (“Mot.,” ECF No. 4) Petitioner Kenneth James Ludwig‘s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to
BACKGROUND
Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr.‘s Report and Recommendation contains a thorough and accurate recitation of the factual and procedural history underlying Respondent‘s Motion. (See R&R at 2–7.) This Order incorporates by reference set forth therein.
LEGAL STANDARD
When a magistrate judge issues a report and recommendation on a motion pending before a district court judge, the district court must “make a de novo determination of those portion of the report . . . to which objection is made” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.”
ANALYSIS
To begin, Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. recommends dismissing all claims in the Petition because Petitioner‘s claims do not raise a federal issue. (See R&R at 9–16.) Petitioner objects arguing that the R&R “improperly reframes” his claims as state-law disputes, “ignoring their federal nature.” (Obj. at 1–2.) Petitioner‘s objection is improper because, as Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. stated, Petitioner “cannot create federal jurisdiction simply by citing the federal Constitution.” (R&R at 12–13 (collecting cases).)
Next, Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. recommends dismissing all claims because none lie at the core of federal habeas corpus. (See R&R at 16–18.) Petitioner objects arguing that Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr.‘s conclusion is legally incorrect. (Obj. at 2.) In support of this objection, Petitioner raises three specific grounds:
First, Petitioner contends that success would accelerate release by compelling a resentencing hearing, which “directly affects the duration of [his] custody.” (Id. (citing Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2004)).) But the authority Petitioner relies on was expressly overruled by the Ninth Circuit, which in 2016 adopted “the correlative rule
Second, Petitioner contends Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. applied the incorrect standard of whether release is guaranteed, when the correct standard is “whether success would necessarily accelerate consideration of release[.]” (Obj. at 2 (citing Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011)).) But the authority Petitioner cites explains that “[h]abeas is the exclusive remedy . . . for the prisoner who seeks ‘immediate or speedier release’ from confinement. Where the prisoner‘s claim would not ‘necessarily spell speedier release,’ however, suit may be brought under § 1983.” Skinner, 562 U.S. at 525 (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005)). Thus, Petitioner‘s second ground fails.
Third, Petitioner contends Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. ignores the Mixed-Claim Doctrine by recommending dismissal of the entire Petition rather than severing or converting the non-habeas portions. (See Obj. at 2 (citing Nettles, 830 F.3d).) But Petitioner misstates the rule. As the Ninth Circuit held in Nettles, “a district court may construe a petition for habeas corpus to plead a cause of action under § 1983 after notifying and obtaining the informed consent from the prisoner.” 830 F.3d at 936 (adopting Seventh Circuit rule holding the same). But conversion of the petition requires that the complaint be “amenable on its face” to conversion, meaning “it names the correct defendants and seeks the correct relief.” See id. (citing Glaus v. Anderson, 408 F.3d 382, 388 (7th Cir. 2005)) (additional citations omitted).
Problematically for Petitioner, his Petition is not amenable on its face to conversion. To begin, Petitioner names James Hill, Warden of the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility, as the Respondent. (See ECF No. 1.) While naming the individual responsible for Petitioner‘s confinement is proper in a habeas corpus action under
Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. further recommends dismissing all claims because, even if federal habeas jurisdiction existed, Petitioner‘s claims are “impermissibly vague and conclusory” and thus violate Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases.1 (See R&R at 18.) Petitioner objects and argues that Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. failed to apply the required liberal construction of pro se habeas petitions. (See Obj. at 2 (first citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and then citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)).) But the authorities Petitioner relies on both concern the pleading standards for a pro se litigant who seeks relief pursuant to a civil action under Section 1983—not habeas relief. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94–95; Haines, 404 U.S. at 520–21; see also McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994) (explaining “[h]abeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading requirements” and “[f]ederal courts are authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face) (citing
Additionally, Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. recommends dismissing all claims because “although federal law authorizes federal courts to grant compassionate release to federal prisoners when ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ warrant a reduction in sentence, . . . Petitioner is not a federal inmate serving a federal sentence and that provision does not apply to state prisoners.” (R&R at 20–21 (citing
First, as to Petitioner‘s argument regarding
Finally, Petitioner‘s Objection raises two additional grounds. First, he argues that Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. misapplied Equal Protection standards because, at the pleading stage, Petitioner‘s allegation that similarly situated inmates were referred for compassionate release is satisfactory to state a claim. (See Obj. at 3 (citation omitted).) But again, there is no constitutional right to conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7. Thus, regardless of whether Petitioner sufficiently plead that he is similarly situated to other inmates who were referred for compassionate release, his argument fails. Second, Petitioner argues that Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. improperly weighed evidence and made factual findings by opining that a favorable ruling from a state court is “highly speculative” considering the nature of Petitioner‘s convictions. (Obj. at 3.) Regardless of how speculative Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr. believes such a ruling may be, the fact that Petitioner alleges only a violation of state law is what ultimately dooms his claim. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67–68.
Having reviewed the R&R in its entirety, the Court finds that it is thorough, well-reasoned, and contains no clear error. The Court therefore OVERRULES Petitioner‘s Objection, ADOPTS Judge Rodriguez, Jr.‘s Report and Recommendation in its entirety, and DENIES the Petition.
A petitioner may not appeal “the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court” except where “a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.”
The Court finds that no reasonable jurist would find it debatable whether the Court was correct in its determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief. Thus, the questions presented by the Petition do not warrant further proceedings. Accordingly, the Court DENIES a Certificate of Appealability.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Rodriguez, Jr.‘s Report and Recommendation in its entirety, GRANTS Respondent‘s Motion, DENIES the Petition, and DENIES Petitioner a Certificate of Appealability. The Court does so, however, without making a decision on the ultimate merits of the case and without precluding Petitioner from refiling under the proper legal label. See Glaus, 408 F.3d at 389–90.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 31, 2026
Honorable Todd W. Robinson
United States District Judge