96 F. Supp. 918 | E.D. Pa. | 1951
Plaintiff seeks to set aside an award of death benefits made by the Deputy Commissioner of the United States Employees Compensation Commission, under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq., requesting a trial de novo on the issues of jurisdiction, i. e. the place of the injury and whether there was the master-servant relationship. The Deputy Commissioner moves to dismiss the complaint.
The right to a trial de novo on the jurisdictional facts is claimed under the doctrine of Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598. Without lengthy comment on this widely discussed case, the Court has observed that in cases under the Longshoremen’s Act, the doctrine has displayed an endurance remarkable in view of its fate in other fields of administrative law. See Schwartz, “Does the Ghost of ‘Crowell v. Benson’ Still Walk?”, 98 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 163 (1949). The case has not been specifically overruled by the Supreme Court, cf. Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Estep v. U. S., 327 U.S. 114, 142, 66 S.Ct. 423, 90 L.Ed. 567; N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 64 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed. 1170; and it remains as a strange anachronism under the Longshoremen’s Act. Nevertheless, although Crowell v. Benson did construe that Act to empower the district court to try de novo the issues of jurisdictional fact, see Lowe v. Central R. Co., of New Jersey, 3 Cir., 113 F.2d 413, 414, the Act was not construed to compel the-