94 Ala. 616 | Ala. | 1891
— The suit is in detinue. The caption to the complaint when filed was “Minnie Hardy, as the administratrix of J. W. Hardy, deceased, plaintiff v. Ransom L. Lucas, defendant.” The complaint itself is as follows : “The plaintiff claims of the defendant the following personal property viz.,” describing the property, “with the value of the hire or use thereof during the detention,” &c. The proof shows that plaintiff relied upon the title of his intestate for a recovery. The court gave the general affirmative charge in favor of the plaintiff. The first question presented is to determine whether the complaint sets forth a cause of action in the name .of Minnie Hardy individually, or in her representative capacity.
In the case of Gibson v. Land, 27 Ala. 117, the plaintiff, Land, styled himself in the caption, or commencement of the complaint, “as trustee for his wife, Elizabeth Land;” and it was held these words were mere descri/ptio personae, and the action was in his individual cajiacity. In the case of Crimm's Adm'r v. Crawford, the caption was “Crawford, adm'r de bonis non of Nancy Cullens v. Thomas Crimm.” The complaint itself proceeded as follows: “The plaintift, as administrator de bonis non of Nancy Cullens, deceased, claims” &c.; and the court held that the complaint sufficiently showed the action was by plaintiff in his representative character, and authorized plaintiff to recover on the title of his intestate.
There seems to be uncertainty and confusion in the authorities, as to what is necessary to distinguish when an action is brought in the name of the individual, and when in his representative character. We hold the pfoper rule to be, that when the plaintiffs name appears in the caption, followed by the words “administrator,” “guardian,” &c. and there is no statement or averment in the body of the complaint to indicate differently, the words “administrator,” “guardian,” &c. are mere words of desoriptio persones', that if the name of the plaintiff in the caption to the complaint is followed by the use of such words “as administrator,” or íías guardian,” or “who sues as,” or words of equivalent import, these words are sufficient to show that the plaintiff sues in a representative capacity when the complaint proceeds in the usual form, such as, “The plaintiff claims of the defendant,” &c. In the latter case, the words in the complaint, “The plaintiff,” will be referred to the character of the plaintiff as expressed in the caption. We further hold that where the words in the caption are mere words of description, yet if in the body of the complaint there is a sufficient statement or averment to show that the suit by plaintiff is in his representative character, the body of the complaint must govern the caption. — Tate v. Shackelford, 24 Ala. 510; Watson v. Collins, 37 Ala. 588; Espalla v. Richards, 10 So. Rep. 137. From these conclusions it follows, that the case of Montgomery County v. Barber, 45 Ala. 237, and authorities in that line, must be overruled.
The plaintiff introduced in evidence an instrument in writing signed by his intestate and the defendant; and plaintiff’s title and right to recover depends upon the construction to be given to this contraer. It is exceedingly indefinite. W hether the parties intended the contract to be a sale of the property so as to pass the title, or whether a sale on condition was intended, the title not to pass until the payment of the purchase-money, or a sale with a reserved lien, is imperfectly manifested by its terms. There are certain rules of law applying to contracts for the sale of personal property, to which the courts must resort to aid them in their construction of contracts of this, character. The proof shows that, at the date of the contract, the property was then in the possession of the defendant, as a teamster in the employment of Hardy. No further actual delivery or change of possession could be made. It is evident, however, the possession of Lucas, after the making of the contract, was not that of an employé, but that of a purchaser. Nothing remained for the seller to do. The property was-specified, and the price ■ definitely fixed, and the manner of payment agreed upon ; and possession delivered, and the right of possession transferred to the purchaser. Mr. Justice Clifford, in the case of Hatch v. Oil Co., 100 U. S. Rep. 131, states the law as follows :• “Where the specific goods to which
That the contract created a liability upon Lucas to pay Hardy three hundred dollars for the property sold and purchased, is manifest from the contract itself. That this was the understanding of the parties themselves is equally clear, not only from the payments made and credited as such, but the demand upon the defendant that he complete the payment by further work and labor, or in cash. There is but one clause in the contract from which any contention can arise, and that is this: “such balance being paid by Ransom Lucas, then J.. W. Hardy has no further claim on said team.” Applying the general principles of law applicable to sales of personal property, we hold that the sale was complete, that the title passed to the purchaser, and all that plaintiff reserved was a mere equitable claim to or lien upon the property for any balance that might remain unpaid. There is no reservation of title by the seller under this contract, nor any terms or provisions which show a conditional sale, by which the parties intended the title to pass at some future time, or'upon the payment of the purchase-money. Under such circumstances, there must be a clearly manifested intention by the agreement itself, or attending circumstances, that the parties did not intend a sale and transfer of title, to overcome all the presumptions of law which arise in cases of sales of personal property where the property is definitely specified, the price fixed - and agreed
A mere equitable title or claim will not authorize the plaintiff to recover in an action of detinue.
The plea of defendant, to present the general issue, should have been “non detinetP
Reversed and remanded.