24 Ga. 640 | Ga. | 1858
By the Court. delivering the opinion.
This-cause was tried in the Superior Court of Monroe county. Several points were made during the progress of the trial, the decisions of which by the Court below, were excepted to bj' counsel for the caveator of the will, and after a verdict in favor of the propounders, they were incorporated, with other grounds, in a motion for a new trial.
The Court refused .the motion, and his judgment thereon is assigned as error. As we put our judgment on a single point, it is scarcely necessary to go into an elaborate consideration of all the grounds presented in the record. We will, however, advert to them in a manner to narrow the points of controversy between the parties, on a future trial.
His will, as it then was, was not such as he desired it to be.. It was unequal. One of his his children would, by the accu
We overrule all the grounds of special exception made in the record to the charge of the presiding Judge to the Jury. We think that he laid down the law fairly and accurately^ and quite as favorably to the caveator as he was entitled to' have it, as far as he went, and it was a very full charge, with one exception. Indeed, the exception to the charge, set forth in the 7th ground of the motion for a new trial, is not borne out, by the evidence given on the trial. It is too much to assume, that the paper propounded as a will showed a total departure from former testamentary intentions long adhered o, without any adequate or rational motive or reason for the
The 4th ground dn the motion for a new trial, is a general exception as to the meaning of the terms “testamentary capacity” as applicable to this case.
The charge of the Court was, that if the deceased was laboring under a delusion of mind, on any subject, at the time of the execution of the will, and the will was the result of that delusion, then it is void, though he might have been sane on all other subjects; but unless the will was the result of such delusion, his will is not vitiated by partial insanity er delusion on a subject not affecting his mind when the will was made. The definition of the term “delusion,” is given correctly. But we think, that although the charge of the Court was correct as to the effect of delusion generally, yet as the caveat charged the will to be the result of a special delusion against the caveator, the attention of the jury ought to have been called specially to that issue. The deceased had been a lunatic. This was conceded on all hands. His lunacy
There is some evidence on both sides of the proposition, and we think that the mind of the jury ought to have been directed by the Court specially to the question whether the will was the offspring of delusion or the result of antecedent intentions of the deceased when he was unquestionably sane. Because it was not done so explicitly as in our judgment it ought to have been done, we reverse the judgment of the Court below and order a new trial.
In regard to the other grounds in the motion for a new trial, I will say that my brother Benning entertains a very decided opinion that the verdict of the jury is contrary to the evidence in the case. He thinks that it was not sufficiently established that the will was executed during a lucid interval; that the weight of the evidence is decidedly against it; and, further, that in the weak condition of the mind of the deceased, the evidence justifies the conclusion, that the will was the result of undue influence. This, however, is not the
It is with great distrust of my own judgment that I ventured to differ with my brethren in matters of law or fact, but I must say that I differ from them in this instance. If the son had been disinherited by the father, I should most unhesitatingly have concluded that an act so inconsistent with the strong affection and partiality of the deceased, expressed through his life,.when he was unquestionably sane, for his obedient and faithful child, must have been the offspring of a disordered mind, or of a sinister and over-powering influence.
But such is not the case. He is put on a footing of equality with other children of the testator. There is evidence of the.declarations of the testator, when there was no question -of his sanity, that he intended to make just such a will, with the exception that no mention was made of his wife. But it is not to be presumed that he intended to disinherit her. There is evidence on both sides of the question, of a lucid interval at the time of the execution of the will, which, together with all the testimony in respect to extrinsic influence exerted over the testator, was submitted to the jury. The will is in accordance with the natural affection and parental duty of the deceased. These are circumstances which bear strongly on my mind, in forming a judgment in this case.
On the other hand, it is said, and I admit that it is entitled to much consideration, that there are provisions in the first will which are not found in the last, and which seem to have been favorite projects with the deceased. First, to make his grand-children as nearly equal as possible ; and secondly, to secure to the separate use of his married daughters the property he gave to them. But his intention, in that respect, may have undergone a change, and this discrepancy in the
These matters are all to be reviewed by the jury, under the exposition of the law by the Court, and we have said as-much as it is proper to say under these circumstances.
Judgment reversed.