139 F. 816 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of South Carolina | 1905
William E. Lucas was at the time of the commencement of this suit the president of the Laurens Cotton Mills. He was mainly instrumental in securing subscriptions to the capital stock, and since the organization, in 1895, has been its
S. M. Milliken for some years previous to April had been the owner and holder of 273 shares of stock in the Laurens Mills. G. H. Milliken was the holder of 24 shares, and S. D. Brewster of 92 shares. The parties named composed the firm of Deering, Milliken & Co., and S. M. Milliken, Jr., a physician, of New York, a son of S. M. Milliken, Sr., but not a partner in the firm, had for four or five years been the owner of 224 shares. After the breach with Lucas, S. M. Milliken began to purchase stock of the Laurens Mills, obviously for the purpose of obtaining control in co-operation with other stockholders who were friendly to him, and it appears from the affidavit of the secretary of the company that by May 15th he had bought and had transferred to him something over 600 shares of stock, in addition to that previously held. The plaintiff, Lucas, thereupon commenced a suit in the court of common pleas for Laurens against S. M. Milliken, S. M. Milliken, Jr., G. H. Milliken, S. D. Brewster, and Laurens Cotton Mills, setting forth, among other things, that the Laurens Cotton Mills is a corporation under the laws of South Carolina, having a capital stock of $350,000, represented by 3,500 shares, of the par value of $100 each, and that the plaintiff is the president of said corporation; that the defendant S. M. Milliken is a leading copartner in the firm of Deering, Milliken & Co. of which firm G. H. Milliken and S. D. Brewster are partners, and that S. M. Milliken, Jr., is the son of the leading partner; that on the 28th of March, 1905, the Darlington Mills was indebted to the firm above named in the sum of $300,000 and that in pursuance of negotiations between the plaintiff and said Seth M. Milliken, acting for the firm of Deering, Milliken & Co. the latter entered into a legal, lawful, and binding agreement with the plaintiff that in consideration of the payment in cash by the said Darlington Company, within 30 days, of the amount so owing, the said Seth M. Milliken would sell and deliver to the plaintiff 500 shares of the capital stock of the Laurens Cotton Mills at and for the price of $150 per share; that on the 12th of April said Lucas, acting as the president and the treasurer of the Darlington Company, did pay to the said firm the full amount due; that on the same day, to wit, the 12th of April, the plaintiff notified the defendant S. M. Milliken that he accepted the offer made by him for his shares of stock, and requested him to send the same to the City National Bank of Green-ville, and he would remit promptly upon receipt of the same; that up to a recent period the said firm had been the agents of the Laurens Cotton Mills for the sale of its products, charging and receiving therefor a commission of 3 per cent, on the gross sales of print cloth, and 4 per cent, upon the gross sales .of other products; that
Upon this complaint an order was made by his honor Judge Klugh, May 17th, enjoining and restraining S. M. Milliken from transferring or in any way disposing of the said 500 shares of stock specifically, and voting the same at any meeting of the stockholders of the defendant company. Said Milliken and all of the other defendants were also enjoined from voting any and all shares of stock held by them, and the Laurens Cotton Mills was enjoined from al
On the Motion to Remand.
1. The parties in the suit are W. E. Lucas, plaintiff, a citizen of South Carolina; the Millikens, citizens of New York; Laurens Cotton Mills a citizen of South Carolina; and F. J. Pelzer and others, citizens of South Carolina, who, upon their own petition, 'were made parties defendant. The first question to be considered is the nature of the controversy, and whether it can be wholly determined between Lucas, on the one side, and the Millikens, on the other, without the presence of the other parties defendant, or, in the event that it should be considered that the others are necessary parties, whether their interest in the controversy is so far identical with the interest of the plaintiff, Lucas, that they will be grouped together on one side, without reference to their status in the pleadings. Examination of the complaint shows that it is framed with a double aspect. First, it is a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of 500 shares of stock to Lucas by Milliken at a price named; and coupled with that is a claim for damages to Lucas of $50,000 because of nonfulfillment. This is a controversy wholly between Lucas and the Millikens. The Laurens Cotton Mills, as a corporation, can have no possible interest in it. It can receive no benefit, and suffer no detriment, however it may be determined, and could not appeal from any judgment entered, , if the real parties are satisfied. 1 Dan. Ch. Pl. & Pr. *230, states the rule in suits for a specific performance: “It is a general rule that none but parties to the contract are necessary to the suit;” and on page 296: ° “In a suit to ascertain the property in a certain share in a banking company, litigated between two claimants, the company is not a necessary party.” Frye, on Specific Performance, § 79, says: “The general rule is that the parties to a contract are alone to be parties to the suit.” Cook on Corporations, § 338, says: “In a suit by the claimant of stock to obtain the stock from another person, the corporation is a proper, but not a necessary, party.”
'Reeves v. Corning (C. C.) 51 Fed. 778, cited with approval in Dillon on the Removal of Causes, is to the effect that where one of the defendants is a mere stakeholder, or has interest on the same side with the plaintiff, the fact that he is a citizen of the same state
Numerous cases have been cited by counsel for plaintiff to show that the corporation is an indispensable party. I have carefully examined them, and in my opinion the facts in each case differentiate them from that now under consideration.
In Kendig v. Dean, 97 U. S. 423, 24 L. Ed. 1061, the complainant was the owner of 184 shares of stock. During the Civil War the defendant obtained possession of the books of the company, and it was'charged in the bill of complaint that, being so in possession,, he wrongfully and fraudulently transferred upon the books of the company to his own name, as owner, the shares of complainant’s stock. The relief asked was the restoration of the stock on the books of the company to the name of the complainant, and its recognition of his rights. The suit was brought against Dean, and the company was not made a party and the court held that the gaslight company was an indispensable party to the relief sought by this bill.
In St. Louis, etc., Railway Company v. Wilson, 114 U. S. 60, 5 Sup. Ct. 738, 29 L. Ed. 66, suit was brought by Wilson against the railway company and the Seligmans to compel the company to transfer to Wilson on its books certain shares standing in the name of the Seligmans, and to issue to him certificates therefor. The petition stated that Wilson had purchased the stock at a sale under an execution in his favor against the Seligmans, and that he had exhibited to the company his certificate of purchase, and demanded that it should cause his name to be entered on the stockbooks as the owner. The prayer was for the transfer of the stock, the cancellation of the certificates to the Seligmans, and the issue of new certificates to Wilson. The court held that the sole purpose of the suit was to establish the duty of the railroad company to transfer to Wilson the stock standing in the name of the Seligmans, and to enforce its performance; that the Seligmans were made parties only in aid of the principal relief which was asked for.
In Crump v. Thurber, 115 U. S. 56, 5 Sup. Ct. 1154, 29 L. Ed. 328, suit was commenced by Crump against Wilson and the dairy company; the complaint alleging that Crump had, under a contract with Wilson, assisted him in selling rights under a patent, by the terms of which Wilson was to receive $12,000 for the rights for Kentucky, and $8,000 for the rights for Indiana, and all received above those sums for either state was to be divided equally between Crump and Wilson; that the rights for Kentucky and Indiana were disposed of to the dairy company, and 1,000 shares of its capital stock, out of 2,000, were issued to Wilson in payment for the rights; that he refused to give to Crump any part of the money, but a large amount of the stock still stood on the books of the corporation in Wilson’s name, and that Crump was entitled to 300 shares thereof ; the petition praying that Crump should be adjudged to be the owner of this stock; that the corporation be ordered to cancel on its books the stock standing in Wilson’s name, and to issue to
In Wilson v. Oswego Township, 151 U. S. 56, 14 Sup. Ct. 259, 38 L. Ed. 70, the plaintiff was a citizen of Missouri, and the defendant a citizen of Kansas, and the controversy was between the plaintiff and defendant relative to the right of possession of certain bonds that were in the custody of the bank, which was a corporation'of the State of Missouri. The court held that, the bank being a necessary party, the suit could not be removed to the federal court by its codefendant.
In Patterson v. Farmington (C. C.) 111 Fed. 262, Patterson, a. citizen of Connecticut, brought a suit against a street railway company of that state, Coykendall and Soop, citizens of New York, and Greeley, a citizen of Connecticut, alleging an agreement with Coykendall to sell him certain mortgage bonds of a Connecticut corporation, the foreclosure of the mortgage, the purchase by the three parties named as trustees, the organization of the street railway company by subscription by them as trustees for the persons-entitled to the bonds, which bonds were then represented by stock in the railroad company, and that no certificates had been actually issued by the street railway company, and that these parties intended to transfer the stock, and prevent plaintiff from obtaining his-due portion of the same. He sought a decree against the trustees- and an injunction, etc. The District Court held that the corporation was a necessary party.
In all of that line of cases where the corporation is held to be an indispensable party, either the principal relief sought is against the corporation for some wrong done by it, or the action is for the purpose of having the ownership of the stock in question recognized by the corporation, and the stock transferred on its books. Except in the Connecticut case, none are for specific performance, and in that case the stock had not been issued by the corporation, and the defendants therefore had no evidence of ownership which could be delivered to plaintiff if he succeeded in his suit.
In Celia, Adler & Tilles v. Brown (C. C.) 136 Fed. 439, Judge San-born reviews most of the-cases above cited in a case where the complainants brought suit for specific performance against Brown Bros. & Co. and certain corporations — among them, the National Bank of Commerce, who had been appointed by Brown Bros, their agent to receive contributions of all the stockholders in a certain reorganization plan. The bill prayed that the proceedings in the at
In this case there is but one controversy, and that is between Lucas and Milliken, growing out of an alleged breach of contract between the two. The bill seeks specific performance, and demands damages against Milliken. There is no cause of action against the corporation, and no relief is sought against it. Therein it differs from all of that class of cases considered by the court in Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company v. Dixon, 179 U. S. 131, 21 Sup. Ct 67, 45 L. Ed. 121, where the complaint charged joint negligence of the defendant company and others, or the familiar cases of suits for joint trespass or for breach of a joint contract, where the court holds, as in Railroad Company v. Ide, 114 U. S. 52, 5 Sup. Ct. 735. 29 L. Ed. 63, Little v. Giles, 118 U. S. 596, 7 Sup. Ct. 32, 30 L. Ed. 269, and Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 169 U. S. 92, 18 Sup. Ct. 264, 42 L. Ed. 673, and Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U. S. 406, 11 Sup. Ct. 819, 840, 35 L. Ed. 442, that defendant cannot make an action several which the plaintiff elects to make joint; that, while a separate defense may defeat a joint recovery, it cannot deprive the plaintiff of his right to prosecute his own suit to final determination in his own way, and that the cause of action is the subject-matter of the controversy; and that, for all the purposes of the suit, is whatever the plaintiff discloses it to be in his pleadings. In other words, in considering the plaintiff’s cause of action on motion to remand, the court, in determining whether or not a separable controversy exists, will look only at the allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint, and, in determining that question, will not consider matters of defense, and, if the complaint states a joint cause of action, either as joint negligence or joint trespass or breach of a joint contract, it cannot allow the defendant to make the action several which the plaintiff has elected to make joint; but the mere joinder of a party as a party defendant does not of itself show that a cause of action is joint where the allegations of the complaint show a cause of action against one defendant only. It is not contended here that the plaintiff has a cause of action against the Laurens Mills.
There is no allegation that the Millikens are insolvent, nor is there any doubt that the plaintiff will obtain the full fruition of any decree to which he may show himself to be entitled. The case might be otherwise if the complaint alleged that the defendants were about to dispose of their stock, and it was necessary to enjoin a transfer in order to prevent the stock being put beyond the control of the defendants or of the court, but the gravamen of'the complaint is that the defendants have bought the stock for the purpose of controlling the company. If the plaintiff should succeed in his suit, and obtain a decree for specific performance of the contract for the transfer to him of 500 shares, he is the president of the company, and it is idle to say that he would not obtain the fruits of his victory. The only prayer in the bill against the corporation is that it be enjoined from receiving and counting any votes of the Millikens at the stockholders’ meeting, but, as the bill seeks to enjoin the Millikens from voting, any decree against the company would be a matter of form, and not of substance. This was decided in Higgins v. B. & O. R. Co. et al. (C. C.) 99 Fed. 640, which was a bill filed by citizens of New York in the Circuit Court of Pennsylvania against a Maryland and a Pennsylvania corporation, and, the case having been removed to the United States Court, a motion was made to remand. It was alleged in the bill against the Baltimore & Ohio Company that its ownership of stock in the Pitts-burg & Western Company, was ultra vires, and the prayer was that such stock be sold, and pending the sale the Baltimore & Ohio Company enjoined from transferring it and from voting it. The court says:
“It will tiras be seen, if these prayers be granted, the full measure of the relief sought will be obtained by a decree against the Baltimore & Ohio Company alone. It is not sought to include or join the Pittsburg Company in such decree, and its corporate rights or property are not affected thereby. It will therefore seem clear that both by the subject-matter of the bill, and the specific relief sought thereunder, a separate controversy is presented. * * * It is true, the fourth prayer seeks a decree against the Pittsburg & Western Railway Company, but the bill shows no complaint or cause of action against that corporation. It is evident its relation to the case is merely formal. A decree against it would be a formal sequence to the third provision of the decree sought against the Baltimore & Ohio Company for, clearly, if the Baltimore Company were enjoined from voting the stock, the further enjoining the Pittsburg Company from receiving or voting already enjoined would be a matter of form, not substance, and would neither add to nor detract from the all-sufficient decree against the Baltimore Company.”
“The said defendant, further answering, says that it has for a number of years been paying excessive and unnecessary commissions on the sale of its goods, amounting to about $15,000 per annum; that within the last few months it has succeeded in getting the output of its mills sold for about one half of the former rate paid; and that said arrangement is now in existence.”
In the Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 468, 25 L. Ed. 593, the court held that:
“Either party to the controversy may remove the suit to the Circuit Court, without regard to the position they occupy in the pleadings as plaintiffs or defendants. For the purpose of the removal, the matter in dispute may be ascertained, and the parties to the suit arranged on opposite sides of the dispute. If, in such arrangement, it appears that those on one side were all citizens of different states from those on the other, the suit may be removed. Under the old law the pleadings only were looked at, and the rights of the parties in respect to removal were determined solely according to the position they occupied as plaintiffs or defendants in the suit. Under the new law the mere form of the pleadings may be put aside, and the parties placed on different sides of the matter in dispute according to the facts.”
In Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S. 214, 26 L. Ed. 514, the court, considering a removal case where the plaintiffs were citizens of Minnesota, and defendants citizens of New York and other states, and a corporation of Minnesota, held that the mere form of the pleadings was immateriál and was to be disregarded; that in that case the land company, as a corporation, had no necessary connection with the controversy, and, although it might be a proper, was not an indispensable, party to the relief asked; and in Harter v. Kernochan, 103 U. S. 566, 26 L. Ed. 411, in a suit which involved the liability of a township in the state of Illinois, the court says:
“Disregarding, as we may do, the particular position, whether as complainants or defendants, assigned to the parties by the draftsman of the bill, it is apparent that the sole matter in dispute is the liability of the township upon the bonds; that upon one side of that dispute are all of the state, county, and township officers and taxpayers that were made parties, while upon the other is Kernochan, the owner of the bonds whose validity is questioned by this suit. He alone of all the parties is in a legal sense interested in the enforcement of liability upon the township. It is therefore a suit in which there, is a single controversy, embracing the whole suit, between citizens of different states, one side of which is represented alone by Kernochan, a citizen of Massachusetts, and the other by citizens of Illinois.”
These cases arose under the removal act of 1875. The acts of 1887-88 does not affect this question. There have been numerous decisions since its date repeating the same doctrine. It is useless to cite them all. The latest decision is that of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit, March 4, 1905 (Boatmen’s Bank v. Fritzlen, 135 Fed. 658), where Judge Sanborn says:
“The positions assigned to parties in a suit by the pleader are immaterial in determining the removability of the cause. It is the duty of the national court to ascertain the real matter in dispute, to arrange the parties on opposite sides of it according to the- facts and their respective interests, and then to determine whether or not a controversy exists between citizens of different states which involves the jurisdiction of that court.”
It has been strongly pressed upon me that, inasmuch as there may be a question of doubt whether this cause was properly removed, it is the duty to remand it to the state court. If I had .grave doubts as to my jurisdiction, I would not assume it, for I do not covet jurisdiction, and there are many reasons why I would prefer not to be compelled to decide this case, and had well hoped to avoid that necessity by giving the parties opportunity to adjust their controversies; but the Constitution and laws of this country give to its citizens the right to a hearing in the courts of the United States of certain controversies which arise between the citizens of different states, and the parties here are entitled to the protection and preservation of that right.
The case presents the unusual spectacle of a party representing a little more than one-third o’f the capital stock of a corporation controlling absolutely its affairs, and excluding from all participation therein the owners of nearly two-thirds of its stock. Prior to 1860 there were in South Carolina various checks and safeguards designed to prevent, in its political affairs, the control of a mere ■numerical majority, and the same principle obtained with respect to corporations. Nearly all of the charters granted up to that time provided that stockholders should be entitled to vote according to a scale which was so arranged that no holder was entitled to more than a certain number of votes, but for the last 40 years the fixed policy of the state has been to give to the majority of stockholders the right to control the affairs of a corporation in which they are interested, each share of stock representing the right which the owner has in the management, profits, and ultimate assets •of the corporation, and the certificate held by him is prima facie evidence of his title and ownership. Nothing, therefore, can be more clear than that at this date in South Carolina the holders of a majority of the stock of a corporation are entitled to control it. The right to vote one’s stock is a right of property, and should be as sacred .as any other property right. Now, it is undisputed that the Millikens and their friends own nearly two-thirds of the stock of this corporation, and they would be in control of it to-day if an order •of injunction obtained without notice upon the ex parte affidavit •of the plaintiff two days before the meeting, service of which was designedly withheld until the meeting to which they were invited as stockholders was organized, and in which their presence as stockholders was necessary to make a quorum. In these circumstances, a deputy sheriff, lying in wait until the moment of election •arrived, served the order of injunction which restrained not onh the voting of the 500 shares about which there was a dispute, but .all of the stock held by the defendants, some of which had been
“I have arranged to accept your offer for your holdings in the Laurens Mills; at the price asked by you, namely, $150 per share. I will taire also the holdings of Messrs. S. M. Milliken, Jr., G. H. Milliken, S. D. Brewster and Mrs. Hatch at the same price. I will ask you to please send this stock to the City-National Bank, Greenville, S. C., and they will remit you promptly on receipt of same.”
In the correspondence that ensued there is no mention anywhere of -any agreement to sell 500 shares of stock. Lucas insists-upon Milliken’s standing by his agreement, and Milliken replies that he does not make offers to stand open unless it is so agreed at the time; but, to ascertain what the offer was, we must turn to Lucas’ letter, above cited, where is found the only reference in writing to the alleged contract. The offer, as therein stated, is, “your holdings,” which were 273 shares; and then follows an offer by Lucas, not accepted by the parties, for the holdings of Messrs. SM. Milliken, Jr., G. H. Milliken, S. D. Brewster, and Mrs. Hatch,at the same price. If the holdings of S. M. Milliken, Jr., and Mrs. Hatch are added to those of the firm, there would be more than 500 shares. So far as appears in the papers before me, it was not until May I5th, when the bill was filed, that any claim was made
One of the counsel for plaintiff, apparently recognizing this difficulty, seems to rest the case upon the doctrine that Lucas has an equitable title to the stock. If he had paid for it, he would have an equitable title which would enable him to restrain the holder of the legal title from the exercise of any of the rights of ownership, but that is not the case. He has paid nothing on account of the purchase of the stock. All that he claims is that he has an agreement which gives him an equity for specific performance, and a court might very well conclude that he has made out such a prima facie case as would entitle him to enjoin the Millikens from selling
A case frequently cited'is Hilles v. Parrish, 14 N. J. Eq. 390, where a bill was filed to restrain certain stockholders from selling ■or assigning their stock, or from voting upon it at an election which wras to be held within three days from the date of the filing of the bill. The court held that inasmuch as the probable effect of the injunction would be to change the result of the election and control of the affairs of the company, without allowing the stockholders sought to be restrained to be heard in their own defense, the injunction ought to be denied. Precedents may be found where elections are enjoined until questions relating to the ownership of stock can be determined, but no case has been cited, and after exhaustive search I have been unable to find any, where on the eve of an election a minority has, on an ex parte application, obtained an injunction tying the hands of a majority, with the result of giving such minority control of the corporation. None of the cases cited in behalf of the plaintiff give support to any such doctrine. It would prolong this opinion to undue length if these cases were critically analyzed to show how far they fall short of giving color even to such a pretension. The only ground upon which it is sought to •support it is that, if Milliken and his friends secure control of the corporation, they will abrogate the contract with Stevens & Co., and secure for themselves the business of the company at exorbitant rates of commission. Nobody knows better than the counsel who make this contention that a court of equity would not hesitate to enjoin a transaction of such nature. There is nothing better settled 1han that a majority of stockholders controlling a corporation will not be allowed to make a contract with themselves for undue profit at the expense of the corporation. There is nothing to justify the
We come now to the consideration of the rights of the plaintiff individually. The purpose and effect of the injunction was to secure the re-election of Lucas as president of the Laurens Cotton Mills. Can the great powers of a court of equity be properly invoked for such an object? It is scarcely necessary to say that the president of a joint-stock company has no indefeasible title to his office beyond the term for which he has been regularly elected, whatever may be his merits. The majority of the stockholders have the right, at the expiration of his term, with reason or without reason, to refuse to re-elect him; and courts have no right to inquire into the motives of such stockholders, or to interfere with their discretion.' Lucas well knew about the middle of April, after the breach between himself and Milliken, that the latter denied that he was under any obligation to sell his stock in the Laurens Mills. He refused absolutely to do so, and shortly afterwards began to purchase additional stock. There was apparently no concealment of such purchases, and it must have been obvious to Lucas, as to all the world, that there would be a contest for the control of the company at the annual meeting, May 19th, and the issue of that contest would necessarily depend upon the preponderance of the holdings on one side or the other; and it appears that by May 15th Milliken had added to his holdings by purchase something over 600 shares of stock, which, with the holdings of the local stockholders in Spartanburg and Laurens, the Messrs. Cleveland, Montgomery, Dial, Fleming, and others, gave to the opposition to the Lucas management a large majority of the stock — nearly two-thirds, in fact. If the object of this suit and of the injunction was to test the legal rights of the plaintiff under the alleged contract and claim for specific performance, no good reason is shown or is conceivable why the order of injunction should not have been served immediately after it was made. The party upon whom it was ultimately served was in the state, within reach of process, at the time the order was obtained. It was designedly withheld, and nothing was done to indicate to Milliken and his friends that the annual election would be anything other than the normal proceeding whereby a majority of the stockholders would be enabled to exercise the indubitable right of the majority to elect a board of directors in consonance with their views. After the service of the injunction in the
The jurisdiction of a court of equity to grant preliminary injunctions or injunctions pendente lite is well settled. It is not a matter of strict right, and the limitations of this power are tolerably well defined. The general rule is stated in Pelzer v. Hughes, 27 S. C. 415, 3 S. E. 781, as follows:
“The sole object is to preserve the subject of controversy in the condition in which it is when the order is made until an opportunity is afforded for a full and deliberate investigation. It cannot be used to take property out of the possession of one person and put it into that of another.”
In 16 A. & E. Ency. of Law, 347, numerous cases are cited, and there is a summing up which correctly states the rule:
“(3) The power to grant preliminary injunctions should be exercised with great caution, and an injunction should not be granted except in cases of the most urgent necessity. Interference by injunction rests on the principle of a clear and certain right to the enjoyment of the subject-matter in question, and an injurious interruption of that right, which, on just and equitable grounds, ought to be prevented. The rule that great caution should be exercised is especially applicable in the granting of preliminary injunctions on an ex parte hearing, as experience shows that an ex parte statement seldom presents the full truth.”
And again, on page 360 of the same volume:
“To warrant the allowance of a writ of injunction, it must clearly appear that some act has been done or is threatened which will produce irreparable injury to the party asking an injunction.”
Applying these well-settled principles to this case, it seems to me that the injunction should not have been granted, for the following reasons:
(1) Plaintiff’s right to claim specific performance is, to say the least, doubtful. The agreement is disputed, the number of shares covered by it is uncertain, and its legality is impeached. “An injunction will not usually be granted where the complainant’s right is doubtful. Where the right of the party is doubtful an injunction
(2) There was no danger of irreparable damage to plaintiff, or of any injury which could not be compensated by damages. The plaintiff’s loss of the presidency of the company is not such an irreparable injury, for, if he should succeed in his suit, and show that he was entitled to sufficient stock to have given him control and secure his re-election, he could recover from the defendants, as damages, not only for his loss of salary, but for any other loss as stockholder which he has suffered by reason of a change of management; and the law is well settled that an injunction will not lie in any case where the plaintiff can obtain adequate pecuniary compensation for the injury complained of. It is not disputed that the defendants are amply solvent and able to respond in damages. If they had obtained control of the Laurens Mills they could not have removed it beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or have inflicted upon it or upon the plaintiff any injury for which they would have been unable to respond in damages.
(3) As the sole object of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the subject-matter of the controversy in the condition in which it is until the merits can be heard, an injunction should never be granted upon an ex parte application, the effect of which is to deprive the party enjoined of his right of property to the thing in dispute. The object of this suit is to determine the right of property in certain stock held by the defendants. Until that right is decided adversely to them, they are unquestionably entitled to the possession of the stock, with all of its incidents, among which is the right of voting it. The effect of this injunction is to deprive them of such possession. Not only that, but the right to other stock, the title to which was not disputed, was taken away from them. The subject-matter of controversy, which it is the sole object of the preliminary injunction to preserve in the condition in which it is until the merits can be heard, is not left in statu quo. To all intents and purposes, this injunction ties the hands of defendants as completely as would be the case if there had been a final decision against them on the merits. They are deprived of their property for all purposes of
(4) There was no case of urgent necessity which required that a court should, upon an ex parte application, make an order, the effect of which was to allow a minority of stockholders to obtain control of property against the will of the majority. The case would be different if the election had been enjoined until the question of the right to vote the disputed stock could be heard. In such case the old administration would have held over until defendants had a hearing. Or, even after the injunction had been served, common fairness required acquiescence in the motion of Mr. Cleveland and Mr. Dial to adjourn the meeting for two weeks, in order that defendants might be heard, before all their rights were taken from them. But the plaintiff and his friends, having obtained their vantage ground by such use of the court’s process as merits severest condemnation, securing thereby a nominal majority, and having as their motto, '■'Beati possidentes,” were determined not to surrender the advantage thus unfairly obtained, and to take their chances in the lottery of litigation to maintain it. The numerous, astute, and industrious counsel for plaintiff have cited no case which sustains this injunction, or which comes near it, and there is no support for it in principle. It remains, therefore, to take brief notice of the appeal urged with some vehemence, that the plaintiff should be supported because he had made a fight in behalf of the Southern mills against Northern commission houses, or, as one of the counsel given to military metaphors has expressed it, that this is the first battle in the war for Southern industrial independence. These are considerations that might very well have been addressed by Lucas to the stockholders of his company — that it was their duty to stand by him in the contest which he alleges he was making in their interest — but such appeal does not appear to have been effective. The Clevelands, Montgomerys, Flemings, Dial, Todd, and others, all of whom are interested in Southern mills, are aligned with the defendants in the desire for a change in the management of the Laurens Mill, and considerations of this nature surely have no place -in a court of law, as furnishing motives of decision.
In reaching the conclusion that this injunction should be dissolved, I have not considered the charges of misconduct set forth in the affidavits as reasons why the defendants do not regard the plaintiff a safe man for the presidency of this mill. Stockholders are not required to give reasons for a desire for a change of management. Nor has it been necessary to consider the charges made by Lucas that the defendants had been receiving exorbitant commissions. Where both parties are free to choose, the amount paid for personal service is a matter of bargain, or regulated by the usages of the trade, and generally beyond the cognizance of the courts, unless the charges are so unconscionable as to shock the conscience. As a rule, the character and standing of a commission house, its probity and financial responsibility, its experience, its clientage, its ability to find purchasers where others not so well known would fail, are all elements which enter into the determination of the question
It is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the order of injunction of May 17, 1905, restraining the defendants from voting the stock held by them, and restraining the Laurens Cotton Mills from receiving the votes of said defendants, be, and it hereby is, dissolved. It is further ordered and adjudged that the defendants S. M. Milliken, G. H. Milliken, and S. D. Brewster, members of the firm of Deering, Milliken & Co., be, and each and every one of them is, hereby restrained and enjoined from selling or otherwise disposing of any and all shares of stock in the Laurens Cotton Mills held by the firm of Deering, Milliken & Co. or by said parties individually, on April 13,1905, until the further order of this court.