D. Cеcil LUCAS, Petitioner v. Parker EVATT, Commissioner, S.C. Department of Corrections, and the Attorney General of South Carolina, Respondents.
23651
Supreme Court
Submitted Jan. 21, 1992; Decided Apr. 27, 1992.
Reh. Den. May 19, 1992.
(416 S.E. (2d) 646)
There is evidence in the record indicating thаt it would not be economically feasible for the County to construct a landfill that complies with the ordinance and the requirements of the Environmental Protection Agenсy. Consequently, the ordinance prevents the County from solving its waste disposal problems by contracting with private sources for the operation of landfills in the County. Additionally, there is evidentiary support for the conclusion that the goal of protecting the environment, which the County sought to achieve by enacting the ordinance, could havе been achieved by less restrictive alternatives. Expert testimony in the record indicates that the specific capacity limitations of the ordinance are unnеcessary because proper design and management of the landfill could prevent severe detriment to the environment.
We find that the ordinance unconstitutionally impairs the contract and is rendered invalid and unenforceable as to such contract.
Accordingly, this Court affirms the ruling and judgment of the circuit court dismissing the first two Causes of Actions of appellants’ Amended Complaint and declaring the ordinance invalid and inapplicable as it pertains to the contract between Lee County and MAWS.
Affirmed.
HARWELL, C.J., CHANDLER and TOAL, JJ., and Aсting Associate Justice JOHN P. GARDNER, concur.
Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, and Chief Deputy Atty. Gen. Donald J. Zelenka, Columbia, for respondents.
CHANDLER, Justice:
Petitioner D. Cecil Lucas (Lucas) appeals an Order denying postconviction relief (PCR). We affirm.
On July 25, 1983, Lucas was sentenced to death for the murders of Bill and Evelyn Rayfield. His sentence was affirmed by this Court and the United States Supreme Court on both direct appeal and PCR.1
Subsequent to his conviction and sentence, the United States Supreme Court held in Booth v. Maryland2 and
While his petition was pending, the United States Supreme Court issued Payne v. Tennessee4, explicitly overruling Booth and Gathers, supra.
Lucas argues that, notwithstanding Payne, both Booth and Gathers should remain the law of South Carolina.
We disagree. In State v. Johnson, - S.C. -, 410 S.E. (2d) 547 (1991), we adopted as state law the Payne decision. Payne holds that “for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant‘s moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant.” 501 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2608, 115 L. Ed. (2d) at 735. Thus, victim impact evidence, as any other relevant evidence, is admissible so lоng as it is not “so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair....” 501 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2608, 115 L. Ed. (2d) at 735.
Adverting to the record, we hold that here the Solicitor‘s reference to the victims and the impact of their murdеrs upon their family is sanctioned by Payne. In closing, the Solicitor argued:
I submit to you that the pendulum has swung back toward good honest God fearing people to give them some rights in this country and in this state, and not have the rights sitting аll on one side. I will tell you and ask you if you know and decide Bill Rayfield and Evelyn Rayfield, good honest hardworking God fearing people. They had a right to live. He was 65 I think and she was 63 or 64. At thаt age they had raised three fine children. Even this night of having the pleasure of having the grandchildren and playing with them. The prime of life. They worked hard all their life and finally got what they wanted. They got the children what they wanted.
You saw Billy [Rayfield] up here. You will have all this stuff with you. Seven grandchildren. Here is the bracelet she wore. The silhouette of each individual grandchild. You don‘t think that family had a lot of love, a lot of love. You have your pictures over here. Grandchildren. They had every right in this world to live. Who in the world have they harmed? Nobоdy.
* * * * * * *
Mr. Givens [defense counsel] said-I couldn‘t believe it-‘Mrs. Lucas, hadn‘t it been tough on you for the last eight weeks?’ How about this Rayfield family over here? Has it been tough on Mrs. Lucas? Of coursе it had been tough. Did they say anything about the Rayfield family and these seven grandchildren? Do you know how many tears have been shed since then and how many will be shed from here on out? Sitting uр here, ‘Has it been tough on you?’ They will cry the rest of their life time. ‘Has it been tough on you?’ Sure it has been tough on her, but not like them. Think about the Rayfields. Think about what has been taken awаy. Just think about it, and they ask for mercy. Look at what has been taken away from these seven grandchildren. What in the world did Mr. and Mrs. Rayfield do wrong? Nothing, nothing.
We find nothing in this argument so egregious as to render the trial “fundamentally unfair.” As in Payne, the Solicitor‘s argument here was responsive to Lucas’ mother‘s tearful testimony that she loved her son and his arrest and trial had been very hard on her. It described to the jury the consequences of Lucas’ criminal act, the impact of the murders upon the Rayfield family and personal characteristics of Bill and Evеlyn Rayfield, which Payne held to be relevant evidence for jury‘s consideration.
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of PCR and affirm Lucas’ sentence of death.
Affirmed.
HARWELL, C.J., and TOAL and MOORE, JJ., concur.
FINNEY, J., dissenting in separate opinion.
I dissent from the holding of the majority which denies postconviction relief to the petitiоner on the grounds that Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 115 L. Ed. (2d) 720 (1991), and State v. Johnson, - S.C. -, 410 S.E. (2d) 547 (1991) (Finney, A.J. dissenting), accord to the state, carte blanche, the right to present victim impact evidence without regard for the unique facts of the partiсular case.
As I read its decision, the majority‘s conclusion is premised primarily upon two factors; 1) that in capital sentencing proceedings, Payne v. Tennessee, supra, allows the state virtually unlimitеd discretion in introducing evidence or making argument; and 2) that State v. Johnson, supra, adopted the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Payne as South Carolina law.
The United States Supreme Court took thirty pages of majority-concurring and dissenting opinions to arrive at one principle of constitutional law in Payne; namely, that there was no per se violation of the
This conclusion is further supported by the observation of Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, in explaining the basis of the decision in Payne. He said:
The present case is an example of the potential for such unfairnеss. The capital sentencing jury heard testimony from Payne‘s girlfriend that they met at church, that he was affectionate, caring, kind to her children, that he was not an abuser of drugs or alcohol, and that it was inconsistent with his character to have committed the murders. Payne‘s parents testified that he was a good son, and a clinical psychologist testifiеd that Payne was an extremely polite prisoner and suffered from a low IQ. None of this testimony was related to the circumstances of Payne‘s brutal crimes. In contrast, the оnly evidence of the impact of Payne‘s offenses during the sentencing
phase was Nicholas’ grandmother‘s description-in response to a single question-that the child misses his mother and baby sister. Payne argues that the Eighth Amendment commands that the jury‘s death sentence must be set aside because the jury heard this testimony. * * * * * * *
... [J]ustice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true.
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2608-9, 115 L. Ed. (2d) 720 (1991).
It is clear that in Payne, the Court was striving to keеp evenly balanced the concept of fairness to both the state and to the accused. In my view, the opinion of the majority in the present case misconstrues the thrust of Payne.
With regard to the issue of whether Payne was adopted as state law in State v. Johnson, supra, a majority of this Court agreed that there was no federal
During the penalty phase, Johnson‘s sister testified that she would visit him at the penitеntiary for Christmas. In response, the Solicitor stated that the trooper‘s family could not go to see him, they could only visit him at the grave.
* * * * *
We hold that the argument made by the solicitor in this regard is relevant to the jury‘s decision...
State v. Johnson, - S.C. -, 410 S.E. (2d) 547, 555 (1991).
Apparently, the majority misapprehends the rationale and intent of Payne and Johnson as it expands the scope of both decisions. There is grаve concern on my part that such an expansion will open a Pandora‘s box of federal and state constitutional violations as well as contravene both the letter and
I would hold that under the facts of the case at issue, admission of the victim impact evidence violated the