748 N.E.2d 1176 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2000
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *682
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *683
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *684
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *685
In each of the four workers' compensation claims, LTV sought to depose the claimants' treating physicians, physicians who examined the claimants on behalf of the commission, and vocational consultants who submitted employability assessment reports concerning the claimants. Pursuant to its interpretation of Ohio Adm. Code
LTV filed a declaratory judgment action in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, seeking a declaration that Ohio Adm. Code
Each of the four claims has a lengthy factual and procedural history. The following brief summaries pertain to LTV's requests to take the specific depositions at issue. *686
Claimant Glen Thornton filed an application for PTD on March 21, 1996, supported by a March 8, 1996 report from Thornton's physician, Dr. DeChellis. Following a hearing on May 22, 1997, an Industrial Commission staff hearing officer granted the claim for PTD. On June 25, 1997, LTV requested to take the deposition of Dr. DeChellis. The Industrial Commission denied the request on the grounds that Dr. DeChellis had examined Thornton at Thornton's request.
Claimant Ted Wacht filed an application for PTD on March 19, 1996, based on a February 27, 1996 report from his physician, Dr. Frangopoulus. On June 10, 1996, Wacht was examined by an Industrial Commission physician, Dr. Hunter, who opined that Wacht had a fourteen percent impairment. Following a hearing on October 31, 1996, an Industrial Commission staff hearing officer granted the claim for PTD. On November 26, 1996, LTV requested to take the depositions of Drs. Frangopoulus and Hunter. A hearing officer denied the requests as untimely. On June 18, 1997, the Industrial Commission issued an order granting PTD based on the report of Dr. Hunter and reports submitted by vocational evaluators, Mr. Simone and Ms. Pearson. On July 24, 1997, LTV requested to take depositions of Dr. Hunter, Mr. Simone and Ms. Pearson. The commission denied the requests on October 31, 1997.
Claimant Peter Bernardich applied for PTD on September 20, 1996, based on an August 23, 1996 report from his physician, Dr. Mersol. On behalf of the commission, Dr. Demeter examined Bernardich on January 8, 1997, and Dr. Perry examined Bernardich on January 13, 1997. On February 19, 1997, LTV asked to take the depositions of Drs. Demeter and Perry. The hearing officer granted LTV's request to depose Dr. Demeter but denied the request to depose Dr. Perry. On July 3, 1997, the commission granted the claim for PTD based on the reports of Drs. Perry and Mersol. On July 22, 1997, LTV asked to depose Bernardich's physician, Dr. Mersol, and asked again to depose Dr. Perry. On August 26, 1997, the commission denied LTV's request to depose Dr. Mersol because he examined Bernardich at his request. The commission also denied the request to depose Dr. Perry on the basis of res judicata.
Claimant Howard Van Horn applied for PTD on April 30, 1996, attaching a March 4, 1996 report from Dr. Lagoutaris, a March 7, 1996 report from Dr. Lee and a March 28, 1996 report from Dr. Novosel. On behalf of the commission, Dr. Perry examined Van Horn on September 13, 1996, and Dr. Harris examined Van Horn on September 19, 1996. On October 28, 1996, LTV asked to depose Van Horn's physicians, Drs. Lagoutaris, Lee and Novosel and the commission's physicians, Drs. Perry and Harris. On December 12, 1996, the commission denied LTV's motions to depose Drs. Lagoutaris, Lee and Novosel on the grounds that they were Van Horn's doctors. On July 8, 1997, the commission *687 also denied the request to depose Drs. Perry and Harris. On September 30, 1997, a hearing officer granted Van Horn's PTD claim.
On appeal, LTV raises the following five assignments of error:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
ASSIGNEMENT OF ERROR NO. 2THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SELF-INSURED EMPLOYERS IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS HAVE NO DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SELF-INSURED EMPLOYERS IN THE ADJUDICATION OF PTD APPLICATIONS DO NOT HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE PHYSICIANS WHO HAVE SUBMITTED WRITTEN REPORTS BEING USED AGAINST IT.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OHIO ADM. CODE §
4121-3-09 (A)(6) IS INVALID AS 1) IT IS AN USURPATION OF LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION; 2) IT EXCEEDS THE AUTHORITY CONFERRED BY STATUTE; 3) IT MODIFIES, CONFLICTS WITH, AND CONTRAVENES THE GOVERNING STATUTE; 4) IT IS ARBITRARY, VAGUE, AND HAS NO REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TO THE STATUTE; AND 5) ITS CONDITIONS ARE INCONGROUS AND UNREASONABLE.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OHIO ADM. CODE §
4121-3-09 (A)(6), AS IT WAS APPLIED BY THE COMMISSION IN THESE CLAIMS, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF ITS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO CONFRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OHIO ADM. CODE §
4121-3-09 (A)(6) AND ITS APPLICATION TO APPELLANT IN THESE CLAIMS CONSTITUTES A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Constitutional issues of due process and equal protection relating to workers' compensation are questions of law and this court's review is plenary. See Planet Earth Entertainment, Inc. v. Ohio Liquor ControlComm. (1998),
For clarity, we consider LTV's first and second assignments of error together. In its first assignment of error, LTV contends that that trial court erred in holding that self-insured employers have no due process rights in workers' compensation administrative proceedings. By its own election, LTV is self-insured *688 under Ohio's workers' compensation system. In its opinion, the court of common pleas stated:
* * * In Ohio, once an employer has paid the premium into the fund, the fund becomes the property of the state and thus employers have no inherent due process rights as to this fund. Because an employer does not have a due process right to the fund, there is no constitutional right to cross-examine doctors at administrative proceedings that relate to the fund. Accordingly, LTV's argument is without merit.
It is clear from their appellate briefs that the parties are not sure what the trial court meant by this statement or about the applicability of the trial court's ruling to the instant action, which involves a self-insured employer that does not pay a premium into the fund.1
In an effort to address any confusion generated by the statement from the trial court, we clarify that employers have certain due process rights in workers' compensation administrative proceedings. See State exrel. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1991),
Although we conclude that LTV has due process rights in workers' compensation administrative proceedings, however, we must also determine the type of process that LTV is entitled to under the federal and Ohio constitutions. Generally, due process rights guaranteed by the
In its second assignment of error, LTV contends that it has a due process right to cross-examine all physicians who have submitted written reports that support a claimant's application for PTD. LTV argues that, because the physicians do not attend the administrative hearings, LTV has a due process right to take the physician's depositions. We disagree.
Procedural due process as applied to administrative hearings before the Bureau of Workers' Compensation includes the rights to: (1) reasonable notice of the hearing; and (2) a reasonable opportunity to be heard.State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1995),
A balance of the three factors articulated in Mathews weighs against finding a constitutional due process right for an employer to depose physicians who render reports regarding a workers' compensation claimant. First, although an employer has a financial interest at stake that can amount to thousands of dollars, either in direct payment by self-insured employers or in indirect payment by an employer who chooses to participate in the state fund, the amount of money at issue is set by statute pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act. See R.C.
A review of the facts in the instant action indicates that LTV was given reasonable notice of the hearings at issue. Even without the chance to cross-examine all physicians, LTV also had reasonable opportunity to be heard at the hearings. LTV had the opportunity to review the claimants' experts' reports in advance of the hearings. LTV had the opportunity to submit its own medical and vocational evidence. LTV was represented by counsel at each of the hearings, and there is no indication that LTV's counsel was prevented from arguing any alleged infirmity in the claimants' medical reports. Constitutional procedural due process simply does not afford LTV the additional right to take the depositions it sought. We, therefore, overrule LTV's second assignment of error.
By its third assignment of error, LTV argues that Ohio Adm. Code
Ohio Adm. Code
In claims filed before the industrial commission or the bureau of workers' compensation by injured employees and the dependents of killed employees on account of injury or death sustained by such employees in the *691 course of their employment, the commission and bureau may cause depositions of witnesses residing within or without the state to be taken in the manner prescribed by law for the taking of depositions in civil actions in the court of common pleas. [Emphasis added.]
LTV contends that the administrative rule limits depositions to state physicians and thereby usurps R.C.
LTV's argument fails for a variety of reasons. R.C.
The permissive nature of R.C.
The industrial commission shall not be bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of evidence or by any technical or formal rules of procedure, other than as provided in sections
4123.01 to4123.94 , inclusive, of the Revised Code, but may make an investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of such sections. [Emphasis added.]
R.C.
Finally, "discovery generally as provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure in court proceedings is not available in administrative proceedings." Bell v. State Medical Bd. of Ohio (June 13, 1986), Lucas App. No. L-85-441, unreported. "The extent of discovery that a party engaged in an administrative hearing is entitled to is primarily determined by the particular agency." Id. *692
Ohio Adm. Code
In its fourth assignment of error, LTV argues that, as applied to the four workers' compensation claims at issue, Ohio Adm. Code
By its fifth assignment of error, LTV contends that, as written and applied, Ohio Adm. Code
The Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions prevent the government "from treating people differently under its laws on an arbitrary basis." State v. Williams (2000),
"This rational basis analysis is discarded for a higher level of scrutiny only where the challenged [provision] involves a suspect class or a fundamental constitutional right." Williams, at 530. "A suspect class is one `saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.'" Id. Employers are not a suspect class. Nor does the rule at issue regarding depositions implicate a fundamental right. "Recognized fundamental rights *693
include the right to vote, the right of interstate travel, rights guaranteed by the
Under the rational basis standard, "the challenger must negative every conceivable basis [for the distinction] before an equal protection challenge will be upheld." Id. at 531. The provision at issue in the instant matter draws the following distinction between employers and claimants with regard to the procedure for obtaining depositions of state physicians:
* * * If the request is made by an employer the hearing administrator shall also determine whether the relied-upon medical report(s) considered non-allowed conditions.
Ohio Adm. Code
The challenged portion of the administrative rule pertains to a factor that would ordinarily motivate an employer, not a claimant, to request a deposition. A claimant would have little reason to request a deposition of a physician who argues in favor of a determination of disability on the basis of a non-allowed condition, as such a position would not impair a claimant's application. A determination of disability based on a non-allowed condition, however, may provide an employer with a reason to request a deposition, and the rule simply allows the hearing officer to consider this factor. None of the factors listed in Ohio Adm. Code
For the foregoing reasons, LTV's first assignment of error is sustained, LTV's second, third and fifth assignments of error are overruled, and LTV's fourth assignment of error is overruled as moot. The judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
LAZARUS and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.