48 S.E.2d 365 | Ga. | 1948
Where an unmarried man procures a life-insurance policy on his own life in which his mother is named beneficiary, and the policy gives the insured the right to change the beneficiary at any time, and subsequently as a consideration for marriage he agrees to substitute his wife as beneficiary in the insurance policy and tells his wife that he has made the change, but later dies without ever having attempted to have the beneficiary changed, the mother is vested with title to the proceeds of the policy upon the death of the insured, and nothing that the insurer can do thereafter can destroy or impair the mother's title thereto; and a court of equity is required, in a contest between the mother and the wife, to award the proceeds of the insurance policy to the mother.
The insurer filed an answer, attaching a copy of the policy, in which answer the insurer admitted that the petitioner was named as beneficiary under the policy and that she survived the insured, that the amount of the policy was that stated in the petition, and that the petitioner was claiming the benefits of the policy by reason of her being named beneficiary therein; but that the defendant, Gracie Loyd, was also claiming the proceeds of the policy, because she contended that she married the insured upon his promise, as an inducement and consideration for the marriage, that he would make her the beneficiary in the policy, that he had told her that he had made her the beneficiary therein, and that she had paid a part of the premiums on the policy. The insurance company alleged that, because of these conflicting claims, it was in doubt as to which claimant was entitled to be paid, and that the claimants should be required to interplead and set up their respective claims. The insurer prayed to be allowed to pay into court the proceeds of the policy and be absolved from any and all liability upon the policy, that the policy be canceled and surrendered to it, that the claimants be enjoined from prosecuting any action upon the policy, and that they *777 be required to assert in this action whatever claim they had to the fund.
By the judgment of the court the insurance company was allowed to pay the proceeds of the policy into the registry of the court, thereupon releasing the insurer from all liability, canceling the policy, and directing the claimants to interplead and set up any and all claims either of them had to the proceeds of the policy. Another order of the court on the same day recited that the insurer had paid the proceeds of the policy into court, and it was discharged from all liability and dismissed as a party to the case. This order was consented to by all the parties.
On the same day Mrs. Gracie Loyd filed pleadings, in which she in effect admitted that Mrs. Julia F. Loyd was the mother of the insured, that the mother was originally named as beneficiary of the policy, the proceeds from which were $2500, but she denied that the mother was entitled to the proceeds, and she claimed the same for herself upon the ground that when the insured took out the policy in 1927 he was an unmarried man, that several years later she married him, and as an inducement to their marriage he agreed that, if she would marry him, she would be made the beneficiary in all of his insurance policies, and that in reliance upon his promise and agreement she married the insured. Thereafter the insured told her that he had made arrangements to have her named the beneficiary in all of his insurance policies, and that in the event of his death she would receive the proceeds of such policies. She and her husband maintained a joint bank account, in which both deposited their salary checks, and out of their joint account all of their expenses, including premiums on his insurance policies, were paid. She did not learn until the insured's death that he had not carried out his express intention of changing the beneficiary in his policies, substituting his wife for his mother. The policy contained a provision authorizing the insured to change the beneficiary by written notice to the company at its home office at any time. She also set up a cross-action against Mrs. Julia F. Loyd, seeking to recover the proceeds from another insurance policy, insuring the life of the petitioner's husband for $2500, which proceeds had already been paid to the named beneficiary, Mrs. Julia F. Loyd. In this claim substantially the same facts relating to the marriage contract *778 and the obligation of the insurer to substitute the wife as beneficiary in the policy were alleged. It was alleged that Mrs. Julia F. Loyd was a resident of New Mexico, but that she had submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court. Judgment against her for $2500 was prayed. A copy of these pleadings was delivered to the attorney for Mrs. Julia F. Loyd.
Mrs. Julia F. Loyd filed a motion to dismiss the cross-action upon the ground that the court was without jurisdiction over the person of the movant, who was a nonresident of the State. Subject to the motion, which was on the jurisdictional ground, demurrers both general and special to the answer and the cross-action of Mrs. Gracie Loyd were filed by Mrs. Julia F. Loyd. Mrs. Julia F. Loyd also filed a pleading in response to the order of the court, in which she virtually reiterated the allegations of her original petition and claimed the proceeds from the insurance policy.
On January 7, 1948, the court sustained the motion to dismiss the cross-action, upon the ground that the court was without jurisdiction, and dismissed the cross-action in so far as it related to any matter except the insurance policy involved in this action. The court sustained the general demurrer to the answer of Mrs. Gracie Loyd, in which she made claim to the proceeds of the insurance policy paid into court by the insurance company; and thereupon passed an order reciting that the insurance company had paid the proceeds of the policy into court, and that the insured never made any effort to change the beneficiary named in the policy, and decreeing that Mrs. Julia F. Loyd was entitled to the proceeds of the insurance policy, and ordering the clerk to pay the same to her. Mrs. Gracie Loyd filed a bill of exceptions to this court, assigning error upon the judgment sustaining the motion and dismissing the cross-action upon the jurisdictional ground, and upon the judgment sustaining the demurrer to her answer and the final judgment awarding the proceeds of the insurance policy to Mrs. Julia F. Loyd.
In Smith v. Locomotive Engineers c. Ins. Assn., *779
There are decisions of this court which in the absence of clear analysis might be erroneously construed to be in conflict with what we have held above. In Nally v. Nally,
However wrongful the insured's treatment of his wife may have been, and however much compensation for damages the law might exact of him, or his estate therefor, the wife's injury can not be repaired by allowing her to excuse him and his estate, and by this procedure collect for such damages from the mother, who took no part in his wrongdoing. We think that lawful contracts are still binding upon the parties, and that courts should uphold them unless the conduct of the contracting parties has been such that in equity and good conscience they have forfeited their rights thereunder. Courts take long risks of doing an injustice when by judgment they allow mere verbal statements to nullify written documents, by substituting the unwritten for the written contract.
For the reasons stated the court did not err in dismissing the answer of Mrs. Gracie Loyd claiming the fund in court, and in awarding that fund to Mrs. Julia F. Loyd. This ruling makes it unnecessary to rule upon the exception to the dismissal of the cross-bill of Mrs. Gracie Loyd, in which it was sought to recover judgment for the proceeds of another policy upon precisely the same grounds that the claim to the proceeds here was prosecuted.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.