Appellee Charter Medical-Bibb County, Inc., (Charter Medical) applied to the State Health Planning and Development Agency (SHPDA) for a certificate of need approving the construction of a new hospital in the Macon area. Under the State Health Planning and Development Act, OCGA § 31-6-1 et seq. (Code Ann. § 88-3301 et seq.), the hospital could not be built without such a certificate. Appellants, two low-income residents of Macon, opposed the construction of the new hospital. They participated in the SHPDA proceedings and submitted their comments and objections concerning the proposed facility. Nevertheless, SHPDA determined that the requested certificate would be issued to Charter Medical. Pursuant to the law then in effect, former OCGA § 31-6-47 (former Code Ann. § 88-3318), appellants sought an administrative review of SHPDA’s decision before the State Health Planning Review Board (Review Board). The Review Board raised the issue of appellants’ standing to seek such review. An evidentiary hearing was held, and the Review Board determined that appellants did not have the requisite standing to institute a review of the issuance by SHPDA of а certificate of need.
Appellants then timely filed a petition in the superior court *851 seeking a judicial review of the Review Board’s ruling. The petition named SHPDA as the respondent. Charter Medical was subsequently allowed to intervene as an additional respondent. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed appellants’ petition on two grounds. First, the court ruled that the petition for judicial review was fatally defective because it failed to name an indispensable party, the Review Board. This failure was further found to be a nonamendable defect. Second, the court ruled that appellants were not “parties” or “persons aggrieved” under the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, so that they lacked the requisite standing to сhallenge the decisions of SHPDA. This appeal is from the trial court’s order dismissing appellants’ petition.
We note at the outset that, while this appeal was pending, the statutory law govеrning certificates of need, OCGA Title 31, Chapter 6 (Code Ann. § 88-3301 et seq.), was repealed in its entirety and replaced by a new Chapter 6 (Code Ann. § 88-3301 et seq.). Ga. L. 1983, p. 1566. The claims of the parties herein must be determined in light of the new law, as no vested rights are involved. See
Alexander v. Blackmon,
1. The original determination that appellants lacked standing to challenge SHPDA’s decision was made by the Review Board. For that reason, appellees assert that the Review Board, rathеr than SHPDA itself, was the proper party respondent to appellants’ petition for judicial review. This argument is premised upon the assertion that the Review Board was separate from and independent of SHPDA. As appellees point out, the two bodies were created by different statutes (former OCGA §§ 31-6-25 (Code Ann. § 88-3304) and 31-6-47 (b) (Code Ann. § 88-3318)), employed entirely different personnel, served different purposes, and rendered separate and *852 independent decisions. Moreover, since the Review Board could and did reverse decisions made by SHPDA, appelleеs contend that the two entities could not be viewed as one for purposes of appealing a decision made by either. Accordingly, appellees assert that the Reviеw Board, as the body which made the decision by which appellants allegedly are aggrieved, was necessarily an indispensable party to the instant proceedings. Since the Board was not named as a party or served with process within the time limits prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act (OCGA § 50-13-19 (Code Ann. § 3A-120)), appellees contend that the applicable statute of limitations has expired, and the courts are now without jurisdiction to allow appellants to amend their petition to name the proper respondent.
Contrary to appellees’ contentions, and notwithstanding the different purposes and functions of SHPDA and of the Review Board, a view of the Review Board as a separate and distinct entity which is itself subject to participation in judicial appeals does not comport with the entire statutory scheme enacted to coordinate health services. Under both former OCGA § 31-6-47 (former Code Ann. § 88-3318) and сurrent OCGA § 31-6-44 (Code Ann. § 88-3310), the Review Board is an appellate body whose function is
solely
adjudicatory. Since it is a quasi-judicial entity, “it would seem to be an inappropriate party to an apрeal of its ruling in the superior court.”
Judd v. Valdosta/Lowndes County Zoning Bd.,
We hold that SHPDA, and not the Review Board, was the proper party respondent tо a petition seeking judicial review of a determination which, although made by the Review Board, became “the final agency decision” by virtue of former OCGA § 31-6-47 (b) (former Code Ann. § 88-3318). This determination is not affected by the enactment of the new health planning law. Even though OCGA § 31-6-44 (a) (Code Ann. § 88-3310) now refers to the Review Board as an “agency” separate and apart from the Health Planning Agency created by OCGA § 31-6-21 (a) (Code Ann. § 88-3304), the sole function of the Review Board remains the hearing of appeals from decisions of the planning agency. The decision of the Review Boаrd is the “final administrative decision for purposes of judicial appeal.” OCGA § 31-6-44 (g) (Code Ann. § 88-3310). Moreover, OCGA § 31-6-44 (i) (Code Ann. § 88-3310) provides that “[a]ny party to the appeal hearing [before the Review Boаrd], including the planning agency, may seek judicial review of the [Review Board] panel’s decision . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) The Review Board, as an adjudicatory body, does not participate in judicial appeals of its rulings.
In the instant case, the trial court erred in ruling that the Review Board was an indispensable party to the proceedings. Appellants filed their petition and served SHPDA in a proper and timely manner in compliance with the procedure prescribed in OCGA § 50-13-19 (b) (Code Ann. § 3A-120). The petition was not fatally defective for failure to name an indispensаble party. Accordingly, any issue concerning the propriety of permitting an amendment to the petition to name the correct respondent is moot.
2. The trial court also ruled thаt appellants did not have standing to seek review of a decision of SHPDA under former OCGA § 31-6-47 (a) (former Code Ann. § 88-3318). That statute provided that “any person who qualifies as a ‘party’ or ‘person аggrieved’ under the ‘Georgia Administrative Procedure Act’ ” had the right to a hearing before the Review Board to contest an agency decision to grant or deny a certificate of need. On appeal, appellants contend that they are “persons aggrieved,” and thus have the requisite standing.
Regardless of the merits of appellants’ argument under the former law, “рersons aggrieved” no longer have standing to appeal under the 1983 State Health Planning and Development Act. Under OCGA § 31-6-44 (b) (Code Ann. § 88-3310), standing to appeal to the Review Board is limited to “[ajny аpplicant for a project, or any *854 competing applicant, or any competing health care facility that has [given prior notice to the planning agency], or any county or municipal government in whose boundary the proposed project will be located.” Since it is clear that appellants do not have standing to appeal to the Review Board under the applicable law, the ruling of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.