In 1965, appellant-plaintiff became a distributor of appellee-de-fendant’s products. There was never a written agreement between the parties. The oral agreement was only that the relationship would continue for an indefinite period. In February of 1983, appellee informed appellant that the relationship would be terminated and, several months later, it was. Appellant then filed the instant action, alleging a wrongful termination of its distributorship. Appellee’s motion for summary judgment was granted and appellant appeals.
“Generally, an agency is revocable at the will of the principal. ... If, however, the power is coupled with an interest in the agent himself, it is not revocable at will. . . .” OCGA § 10-6-33. “In the absence of some contractual provision to the contrary, an agency
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for a . . . corporation to distribute its products in a certain territory for commissions would not be irrevocable as a power coupled with an interest merely because the agent expends time, efforts, and money to increase the business of the agency. [Cits.]”
Wheeler v. Pan-American Petroleum Corp.,
Appellant invokes certain provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, OCGA § 11-1-101 et seq. However, the agreement underlying this suit was not one governed by the provisions of that statute. See
Dixie Lime & Stone Co. v. Wiggins Scale Co.,
Appellant also asserts that his action is nonetheless sustainable pursuant to OCGA § 13-3-44 (a): “A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” This statute is a codification of the principle of “promissory estoppel,” which principle relates to the sufficiency of the consideration to enforce a promise. See
Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. First Nat. Bank,
The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee.
Judgment affirmed.