212 F. 383 | 6th Cir. | 1914
(after stating the facts as above).
However, we cannot think that this is the natural or reasonable construction of this disclosure; and we say so for two reasons : The first is that the date of the service of the garnishment upon them seems to be the date which the garnishees would naturally have in mind in mak
“They exercise jurisdiction, it is true, within the same territory, but not in the same plane; and when one takes into its jurisdiction a specific thing, that res is as much withdrawn from the judicial power of the other, as if it had been carried physically into a different territorial sovereignty. To attempt to seize it by a foreign process is futile and void.”
This Was said regarding an actual seizure of physical property, but it must be no less true regarding the only kind of seizure which can be made of intangible property. The thing here involved, the debt from Rowenstein to Folz, could be seized or appropriated at Memphis only by the service of process like a summons on Rowenstein; but the same thing had already been impounded in the same way by the Supreme Court in New York. This consideration of the reasons involved sufficiently distinguishes the converse situation, and cases like Barnsdall v. Waltemeyer, 142 Fed. 415, 418, 73 C. C. A. 515 (C. C. A. 8), where it has been held that the pendency of a prior garnishment in another jurisdiction did not bar a suit by the principal defendant therein against his debtor, the garnishee defendant therein, in a court having jurisdiction of the latter’s person. In such case the jurisdiction of the court in the second suit is complete by personal service upon defendant, while in cases like the present, the challenged jurisdiction rests only on a supposed seizure of property which had already been taken by.another court, and so could not be seized in the second case. This court held, in Mack v. Winslow, 59 Fed. 316, 8 C. C. A. 134, that the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Wallace v. McConnell, 13 Pet. 136, 10 L. Ed. 95, reached a case essentially like the present one, and we see- no occasion to doubt the correctness of that ruling. See, also, Clark v. 505,000 Feet of Rumber, 65 Fed. 236, 240, 12 C. C. A. 628 (C. C. A. 7), and cases cited in Menees v. Matthews (D. C.) 197 Fed. 633, 635.
The decree is reversed, with costs, on both appeals, but appellants will recover only one docket fee. Folz’s motion should be granted, and the garnishee proceedings be dismissed. This conclusion makes unimportant the question of- equity jurisdiction. The case is remanded accordingly.