15 F. Cas. 1027 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Arkansas | 1878
The plaintiffs in the original bill have the right, as a matter of course, at any time before decree, to dismiss their bill at their own costs. 1 Barb. Ch. Prac. 225, 228; 1 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 792. The cause is not at issue on the original bill — no replication to the answer having been filed — and the defendants in that bill, under rule 66, might have obtained an order, as of course, for a dismissal of the suit for this reason.
The motion of plaintiffs to dismiss their bill is granted, and the same will be dismissed at their costs. The motion of plaintiffs in the cross-bill for a decree pro con-fesso thereon against the defendants therein named is denied. If the defendants in the cross-bill had been served with process, or had voluntarily entered their appearance to the cross-bill, the jfiaintiffs therein would have been entitled to a decree pro confesso after the lapse of the time allowed defendants by the rules to answer.
The bill and cross-bill in equity do not necessarily constitute one suit, and, according to the established practice in equity, the service of a subpoena on the defendants in the cross-bill, although they are parties in the original bill, and in court for all the purposes of the original bill, is necessary to bring them into court on the cross-bill, unless they voluntarily enter their appearance thereto, which is the usual practice. And the general chancery rule is, that service of the subpoena in chancery to answer a cross-bill cannot be made upon the solicitor of the plaintiff in the original bill. 1 Hoff. Oh. Prac. 355, and note 4.
In the chancery practice of the circuit courts of the United States there are two exceptions to this rule — (1) in case of injunctions to stay proceedings at law, and (2) in cross-suits in equity, where the plaintiff at law in the first and the plaintiff in equity in the second case reside beyond the jurisdiction of the court. In these cases, to prevent a failure of justice, the court will order service of the subpoena to be made upon the attorney of the plaintiff in the suit at law
It not unfrequently occurs that the facts constituting defendant’s defences to an action or judgment at law are of a character solely cognizable in equity; and in suits in equity it often happens that the defendant can only avail himself fully and successfully of his defence to the action through the medium of a cross-bill. In suits in these courts the plaintiff is usually a citizen of another state, and hence beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and in such cases defendants who desire to enjoin proceedings at law, and defendants in equity cases who desire to defend by means of a cross-bill, would, but for this rule of practice, be practically cut off from their defences by reason of their inability to make service on the plaintiff in the action. It would be in the highest degree unjust and oppressive to permit a non-resident plaintiff to invoke the jurisdiction of the court in his favor, and obtain and retain, as the fruits of that jurisdiction, a judgment or decree to which he was not in equity entitled, by remaining beyond the jurisdiction of the court whose jurisdiction on the very subject matter, and against the very party, he had himself first invoked. The reason of the rule would seem to limit it in equity cases to cross-bills either wholly or partially defensive in their character, and to deny its application to cross-bills setting up facts not alleged in the original bill, and which new facts, though they relate, as they must, to the subject matter of the original bill, are made the basis for the affirmative relief asked. The cross-bill in this case is of this latter character, and, without deciding that this fact alone would preclude the court from directing service of the subpoena on the solicitors of the plaintiffs in the original bill, such an order will not be made after plaintiffs have filed their motion to dismiss their bill — a motion grantable as of course.
Whether the dismissal of the original bill carries with it the cross-bill depends on the character of the latter. If the cross-bill sets up matters purely defensive to the original bill and prays for no affirmative relief, the dismissal of the latter necessarily disposes of the former. But where the cross-bill sets up, as it may, additional facts not alleged in the original bill, relating to the subject matter, and prays for affirmative relief against the plaintiffs in the original bill in the case thus made, the dismissal of the original bill does not dispose of the sross-bill, but it remains for disposition in the same manner as if it had been filed as an original bill. Worrell v. Wade’s Heirs, 17 Iowa, 96; 2 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 1556.
The cross-bill in this case is of this character, and it will remain on the docket, and the plaintiffs therein can take such action in relation thereto as they may be advised, but no steps can be taken in the case until defendants are brought into court
Ordered accordingly.