Lowe v. TarbleLowe v. Tarble
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Meyer
Lead Opinion
The question presented by this appeal is whether our prejudgment interest statute,
I.
The plaintiff, Bobby Vestal Lowe, was injured in an automobile accident on 4 May 1981 involving the defendant, Samuel Ingham Tarble. On 20 August 1982 plaintiff filed suit against Tarble. Plaintiff later amended his complaint to include an additional plaintiff, his wife, her claim for loss of consortium, and an additional defendant, ARA Services, Inc. On 2 September 1983, a jury returned a verdict awarding Bobby Vestal Lowe $85,500.00 for personal injuries and his wife Betty Lowe $1,000.00 for loss of consortium. Plaintiffs moved for prejudgment interest from the date of the filing of the complaint in accord with
The portion of all money judgments designated by the fact-finder as compensatory damages in actions other than contract shall bear interest from the time the action is instituted until the judgment is paid and satisfied, and the judgment and decree of the court shall be rendered accordingly. The preceding sentence shall apply only to claims covered by liability insurance. The portion of all money judgments designated by the fact-finder as compensatory damages in actions other than contract which are not covered by liability insurance shall bear interest from the time of the verdict until the judgment is paid and satisfied, and the judgment and decree of the court shall be rendered accordingly.
*469II.
Defendants first contend the statute violates the Law of the Land and Equal Protection Clauses of Article I, section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Defendants’ contentions regarding these federal and state constitutional provisions are answered by our decision in Powe v. Odell, 312 N.C. 410, 322 S.E. 2d 762 (1984), in which we hold that
III.
Defendants next argue that
[impossible standards of statutory clarity are not required by the constitution. When the language of a statute . . . prescribes boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries to interpret and administer it uniformly, constitutional requirements are fully met. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 [1947].
In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 531, 169 S.E. 2d 879, 888 (1969).
IV.
Finally, defendants object that
Exclusive Emoluments. No person or set of persons is entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services.
Defendants argue, in essence, that by assessing prejudgment interest only against those defendants covered by liability insurance,
By distinguishing between defendants who carry liability insurance and those who do not, and assessing prejudgment interest only against the former,
Our case law, however, teaches that not every classification which favors a particular group of persons is an “exclusive or separate emolument or privilege” within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. In State v. Knight, 269 N.C. 100, 152 S.E. 2d 179 (1967), this Court held that a statute exempting certain individuals from jury duty did not violate the constitutional prohibition against separate emoluments or privileges. There the Court said, id. at 107-08, 152 S.E. 2d at 183-84:
Obviously, this provision does not forbid all classifications of persons with reference to the imposition of legal duties and obligations.
Therefore, the limitation . . . does not apply to an exemption from a duty imposed upon citizens generally if the *471purpose of the exemption is the promotion of the general welfare, as distinguished from the benefit of the individual, and if there is a reasonable basis for the Legislature to conclude that the granting of the exemption would be in the public interest. Here, as in questions arising under the exercise of the police power pursuant to the requirement of due process of law, the principle to be applied is that declared by Moore, J., for the Court, in State v. Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 114 S.E. 2d 660 [1960], where it is said:
‘The presumption is that an act passed by the Legislature is constitutional, and it must be so held by the courts unless it appears to be in conflict with some constitutional provision. [Citations omitted.] The legislative department is the judge, within reasonable limits, of what the public welfare requires, and the wisdom of its enactments is not the concern of the courts. As to whether an act is good or bad law, wise or unwise, is a question for the Legislature and not for the courts — it is a political question. The mere expediency of legislation is a matter for the Legislature, when it is acting entirely within constitutional limitations, but whether it is so acting is a matter for the courts. [Citations omitted.]’
In Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 439, 302 S.E. 2d 868, 879 (1983), we held that even if
As we have already demonstrated, the classifications in G.S. 1-50(5) are based on what the legislature could reasonably determine were valid distinctions between the groups protected by the statute and those not protected. The legislature could reasonably adjudge that the public welfare would be best served by the classification it chose to make. Therefore, the classification does not create a special emolument or privilege within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition.
*472 Id.
As we concluded in dealing with the appellants’ equal protection arguments in Powe v. Odell, supra, the legislature could reasonably have concluded that the classification scheme established by
The judgment of the superior court is
Affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent for the reasons expressed in my dissent in Powe v. Odell, 312 N.C. 410, 322 S.E. 2d 762 (1984).
Justices Copeland and Mitchell join in this dissent.