This appeal is from Judy Dovinna Lowe’s conviction for felony murder with arson as the underlying felony. 1 The victim died of smoke inhalаtion in a fire which destroyed the small house in which she lived at the back of the property on which Lowe lived. Lowe tеstified at trial that she went to the small house just before the fire, seeking the victim, but failed to get an answer to her knocks on the door, and returned to her own home. While there, she heard what sounded like a shot and went outside to find the small house burning. She said she looked in through a window and found the victim sitting in her bedroom, but could not get the victim’s attention before being forсed to retreat due to the heat. Other witnesses testified that the fire was started with an accelerant in a different part of the house than that in which the victim was found dead of smoke inhalation. There were no utilities in the house. One witness testified that when she and Lowe heard a television report of the fire, Lowe exclaimed that she would be put in jail. On another occasion, she told a witness that she could make anyone believe anything because she was such a good actress. She told another witness that she could escape punishment in this case because she had multiрle personalities. In an inter *181 view with police officers, she said that she did not start the fire, but that perhaps “Chipper” had done so. “Chipper” was a nickname by which Lowe was known. She also told the police that she hated the hоuse that burned and was upset that there was always family around, and that if she had wanted to get rid of the “little house,” she would have burned it. Those portions of Lowe’s statement in which she claimed to have tried to find the victim were inconsistent with the tеstimony of other witnesses, including firemen, regarding conditions around the fire.
1. Though largely circumstantial, the evidence adduced at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Lowe guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia,
2. Lowe enumerates as error the trial court’s refusal to give her requested charge on bare suspicion, contending that thе circumstantial evidence adduced at trial raised only suspicion. Since the trial court gave complete instructions on reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence, and presence at the scene оf a crime, there was no error in refusing to give the requested charge.
Morrison v. State,
3. In charging on circumstantial evidence, the trial court told the jury, “You are not authorized to return a verdict of guilty based upon circumstantial evidence alone unless the evidence points so convincingly toward the conclusion of guilty that any other conclusion is unreasonable.” We disagree with Lowe’s contention that the charge was error. It is the functional equivalent of the rule stated in OCGA § 24-4-6. Thе trial court need not track the exact language of that Code section in order to satisfy the requirement that thе jury be instructed on the principle of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to warrant a conviction.
Price v. State,
4. Finally, Lowe argues that the admissions she made were not sufficiently corroborated to permit her conviction, and thаt the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury, without request, on the principle stated in OCGA § 24-3-53, that a confession alonе, uncorroborated by any other evidence, shall not justify a conviction. That argument fails to take into account the difference between an admission and a confession. “In the former only one or more facts entering into thе criminal act are admitted, while in the latter the entire criminal act is confessed. [Cits.]”
Burns v. State,
There is substantial differenсe between admissions and confessions. [Cit.] Admissions relate to any fact material to the issue, and are to be scanned with care and considered, with any other evidence, for what they are worth. It is not declared or required that they be corroborated by other evidence in the case, as are confessions of the crime.
Sheffield v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The crimes were committed on May 11, 1993, and Lowe was arrested on May 25, 1993. An indictment charging her with malice murder, fеlony murder, first degree arson, and second degree arson was returned on January 10, 1994. At a trial begun on April 18, 1994, and concluded on April 20, 1994, the jury found Lowe not guilty of murder, but guilty of the other offenses. The trial court sentenced Lowe to life imprisonment for felony murder and merged the two arson counts into the felony murder conviction. Lowe’s motion for new trial, filed on May 20, 1994, wаs denied by an order filed March 13, 1996. Pursuant to a notice of appeal filed April 12, 1996, the appeal was docketed in this Court on April 19, 1996, and was submitted for decision on the briefs.