Lowe v. Town of FairlandLowe v. Town of Fairland
- Reporters:
- , , , , ,
- Before:
- Baldock, McWilliams, Ebel
D. Gregory Bledsoe, Tulsa, Oklahoma, (Ronald Main, Tulsa, Oklahoma, with him on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Marthanda J. Beckworth, of Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Boudreaux, Holeman, Phipps & Brittingham, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellants.
Before BALDOCK, McWILLIAMS, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge,
Plaintiff is the former police chief of the Town of Fairland, Oklahoma. She was terminated from her position on April 6, 1995. The individual Defendants were members of the Fairland Board of Trustees when Plaintiff was terminated. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated her First Amendment right to free speech by terminating her employment because she criticized, and recommended the termination of, a police officer, and that Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause by terminating her on the basis of gender. She also claims that Defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by terminating her without cause and without a hearing.1
In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity only as to Plaintiff‘s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. Plaintiff, however, in her response to the motion to dismiss, addressed the qualified immunity defense in regard to all three of her federal claims. Then, in Defendants’ reply to
I.
Although an order denying a motion to dismiss is generally not immediately appealable, an order denying qualified immunity is immediately appealable as a “final decision” under
In this case, Defendants raised the defense of qualified immunity, but the district court did not address it in regard to two of Plaintiff‘s federal claims. The parties assume that the district court denied qualified immunity as to all the federal claims.4 However, a review of the district court‘s order reveals that the court did not address qualified immunity in regard to Plaintiff‘s First Amendment and equal protection claims. Because the district court did not deny qualified immunity, we may lack jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. Although the parties have not raised this issue, we have an “independent duty” to inquire into our jurisdiction. See Phelps v. Hamilton, 113 F.3d 1309, 1315-16 (10th Cir. 1997). We must, therefore, address sua sponte whether we
We have previously concluded that we have jurisdiction over an appeal from an order postponing a decision on qualified immunity. Workman v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 332, 336 (10th Cir. 1992). In Workman, we reasoned that unless such orders are immediately appealable, a defendant loses his right to be free from the burdens of discovery and trial. Other circuits have concluded that orders failing or refusing to consider qualified immunity are also immediately appealable. Helton v. Clements, 787 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1986); Craft v. Wipf, 810 F.2d 170, 173 (8th Cir. 1987); Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736, 741 (2nd Cir. 1988) (denial of summary judgment motion immediately appealable even though district court failed to address qualified immunity defense). We agree with this approach. Regardless of whether a district court merely postpones its ruling or simply does not rule on the qualified immunity defense, if we deny appellate review, a defendant loses the right not to stand trial. See Workman, 958 F.2d at 336. Accordingly, we may properly exercise jurisdiction over this appeal.
II.
We now turn to the merits. First, we must determine whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to convert Defendants’ motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted must be converted into a motion for summary judgment whenever the district court considers matters outside the pleadings.
In the present case, the district court stated that it was not considering matters outside the pleadings and therefore would not convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.5 Defendants argue that the district court did in fact consider matters outside the pleadings. In support of this assertion, Defendants point to the following statements in the district court‘s order: (1) that the Town of Fairland had a “board of trustees form of government“; (2) “that the actions taken by the individual members of the Board of Trustees in terminating the Plaintiff . . . were based upon legal advice in regard to the then existing law of the State of Oklahoma and of the United States“; (3) that Plaintiff was an “at-will” employee; and (4) that Plaintiff made
Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff‘s two remaining federal claims. We decline to decide the issue of qualified immunity because the district court failed to consider it. As a general rule an appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below. Workman, 958 F.2d at 337. Accordingly, this matter will be remanded to the district court for a proper determination in the first instance of whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff‘s First Amendment and equal protection claims.
AFFIRMED IN PART and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.