52 Cal. 53 | Cal. | 1877
Lead Opinion
The power to make and take a lease of a railroad is expressly given by the statute under which the respondents were incorporated. The language of the statute is as follows: “ Any railroad corporation organized under the act to which this is amendatory, shall have the right to lease the whole or any portion of their road to any other corporation organized under this act, or to grant to any such corporation the right to use in common any portion of their road.” (1 Hittell, art. 838.)
In exercising the power to lease, respondents are vested with all the powers and privileges which private individuals and natural persons enjoy. The third section of the statute under which the respondents were organized, among other things, declares that a corporation organized under it “ * * * shall be a body politic and corporate, * * * and shall be capable in law to make all contracts * * * necessary for the construction, completion, and maintenance of such railroad, * * and generally to possess all the powers and privileges, for the purpose of carrying on the business of the corporation, that private individuals and natural persons now enjoy.” (1 Hittell, art. 828.) Hence, if a natural person can take a lease, and, in part consideration thereof, guarantee a debt of the lessor, a corporation having the power to take a lease may also doit. {The Chicago Sc. R. R. Co. v. Howard et al. 7 Wall. 1; Smead v. Indianapolis Sc. R. R. Co. 11 Ind. 104, 111; Taiman v. Rochester City Ranh, 18 Barb. 123; Angelí & Ames on Corporations, sec. 271.)
“ A corporation, in order to attain its legitimate objects, may deal precisely as an individual who seeks to accomplish the same ends.” (Green’s Brice’s Ultra Vires, 121, note; Stewart v. Erie Sc. Transportation Co. 17 Minn. 372.)
The covenants on the part of the lessee, the Central Pacific Eailroad Company, contained in the lease made by the California Pacific Eailroad Company, the lessor, as set forth in the fifth paragraph of the agreed case, are that the lessee will pay to the lessor a specified sum of money semi-annually, keep the road in repair, pay taxes, legal expenses, etc., and guarantee the payment, both principal and interest, of the bonds of the lessor, mentioned in the lease. The lease of the road, the covenants on the part of the lessor mentioned in the lease, and the implied covenant to pay to the lessee the moneys which the lessee may pay upon the bonds, over and above the portion of the semiannual payments which may be applied thereto, constitute the consideration for the covenants on the part of the lessee; and, in our opinion, they constitute a sufficient, valid, and legal consideration therefor.
There can be no question that the lessee had competent power to bind itself, in consideration of the lease, to pay an amount
Such an agreement would not be any the less obligatory, or in any respect beyond the power of the lessee, by reason of the fact that the third persons to whom the payment is to be made are the holders of the bonds of the lessor.
The question, therefore, is whether the lessee, being a railroad corporation organized under the laws of this State, has power, upon a sufficient consideration, to guarantee the payment of the bonds of the lessor mentioned in the agreed case. The power on the part of the lessor to make, and on the part of the lessee to accept, the lease of the railroad is not denied; and we have seen that, in consideration of the lease, the lessee might have covenanted to pay the rent to third persons, upon the bonds of the lessor. But it is urged that a railroad corporation does not possess the power to enter into a contract of guaranty, because such power is not granted by the statute providing for the formation of those corporations. The third section of the act under which the lessee was incorporated provides that the corporation “ shall be capable in law to make all contracts * * * necessary for the construction, completion, and maintenance of such railroad, * * * and generally to possess all the powers and privileges, for the purpose of carrying on the business of the corporation, that private individuals and natural persons now enjoy.” (Stats. 1861, p. 608.) A provision substantially to the same effect is contained in the Civil Code, sec. 354, but it is unnecessary to determine whether it is applicable to the corporations in this case, they having been organized before the adoption of the Code. Had a natural person taken this lease and made the contract of guaranty now before us, there is no room to doubt that it would be held valid ; and this being so, the exercise of the power by the corporation must be upheld, unless, by its very nature, it is a power which a corporation cannot exercise. There is no sufficient reason deducible from the character of such a corporation, and the business in which it engages, why
J udgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
I dissent. The California Pacific Eailroad- Company issued, certain bonds, on each of which, and over the signature and seal of the Central Pacific Eailroad Company, was written the. following:
“ Whereas, the California Pacific Eailroad Company, maker of the foregoing bond, has leased its railroad, and the branches thereof, to the Central Pacific Eailroad Company; now therefore, in consideration of said lease, and of other valuable considerations thereunto moving, the said Central Pacific Eailroad Company hereby guarantees the payment of the foregoing bond, both principal and the interest, to the holder thereof, according to the terms of said bond and the coupons thereto attached.”
It is admitted that a corporation can exercise no powers ex*61 cept such as are conferred on it by its charter. The statement of this proposition has sometimes been made more elaborate (without changing it in substance or effect)—by adding, “ and such incidental powers as are necessary to carry out the powers expressly conferred.”
The clause of the third section of the Act of 1861, which declares that the corporation shall be held “ generally to possess all the powers and privileges, for the purpose of carrying on the business of the corporation, that private individuals and natural persons now enjoy,” gives no additional primary powers to the corporation.
That clause follows after an enumeration of certain powers specifically conferred, and is but declaratory of the rule that powers incidental to the expressed powers conferred may be employed by a corporation. It is a legislative enunciation of the rule always recognized by the Courts that the implied or incidental powers which may be exercised by a corporation shall be ascertained by reference to the case of an individual upon whom should be conferred limited powers like those expressly granted to the corporation by its charter. If the clause quoted means more than this, what does it mean less than a grant to the corporation of every power which may be employed by an individual carrying on a private business for his personal emolument? lío Court has heretofore decided, nor has counsel contended, that the last was the proper construction.
The language of a section of the statute under which the defendants were operating is: “ Any railroad corporation organized under the act to which this is amendatory, shall have the right to lease the whole or any portion of their railroad to any other corporation organized under this act.”
There is no pretense that the power which the defendant, the Central Pacific, attempted to employ was expressly granted by its charter, or that it can be derived from any portion of the statute under which it was created, except the section last recited.
The only question presented, therefore, is whether by virtue of a power to rent a railroad a railroad company has the right to guarantee the bonds of another corporation ?
It has been urged that a corporation may employ any appro
By the laws of Iowa a railroad corporation was authorized to issue its own bonds to raise money for the construction of its railroad, and was also authorized to receive the bonds of cities and counties donated to it to aid in the construction of the same railroad. In The Railroad Company v. Howard, (cited in the prevailing opinion herein) it was held that the railroad company might guarantee the bonds of a city so donated. It would seem that a bare statement of the facts would show the broad difference between that case and the present. Smead v. The Indianapolis., etc., R. Co. 11 Ind., (also cited in the prevailing opinion) was a case in which the Supreme Court of Indiana held (under a charter which authorized the defendant to connect with any other road in an adjoining State, and “ to make such contracts and agreements with any such road constructed in an adjoining State for the transportation of freight and passengers, or for the use of its road, as to the Board of Directors may seem proper,”) that the company could agree to pay the foreign company for widening its track, and other proper considerations. Whether decided properly or not, I cannot admit that case to be analogous to the one before us. In Stewart v. Erie and Western Transportation Company, 14 Minn., (also cited in the prevailing opinion) it was simply held that it was competent for a railroad company, if not restrained by its charter, to enter into contracts with connecting carriers for the purpose of providing for through transportation over its road and the routes of such carriers.
Nor, in my, view, is it correct to say, as insisted by counsel,
Ordinary corporations, under our laws, are subject to the same rules of construction as are individual citizens. The directors have no right to exercise any power as conferred by implication, or by the section declaratory of what would have been implied, except such as is incidental to and leads up to the principal power; such as, in accordance with the law applicable to individuals clothed with special authority, can be declared to be included within the principal power granted. Neither a corporation nor an individual can exceed the power granted, by assuming a right to construe the power for itself or himself. It is always a question of law for the Courts (the facts being found) whether a special, limited power conferred on a person, natural or artificial, has been exceeded; the discretion to be indulged by the person as to the means to be employed in exercising the power must be confined to the selection of such as— in accordance with established legal principles, and in view of the ends for which the express power was granted—are included within the express power.
I dissent from the statement that, under our system, the directors of a corporation are the corporation. The artificial person can, of course, act only through agents; but it is a mistake to say that these agents of the corporation are in no sense the agents of nor responsible to the stockholders. If the directors go
If this were a question between two ordinary persons I suppose there would be little diffiulty in deciding it. If an agent, simply authorized to rent property for the use of an individual,should undertake to indorse, in the name of his principal, the promissory notes of the landlord, would any Court in the land hesitate to declare that he had exceeded his power ? If, after providing in the lease for a quarterly or annual rent, he had inserted a clause that the contingent liability for a large amount of the landlord’s paper, sought by him to be guaranteed in the same instrument, should constitute a part of the consideration for the use of the premises leased, would this be any the less an attempt on the part of- the agent to do that which he had no power to do ? In such a case the power would be construed with reference to the object for which it was given, and to the legal effect of the language employed.
The powers referred to in the clause of the statute (which are the same as those which would be implied in the absence of that clause) are such as are incidental to the principal powers conferred. A principal power cannot be exercised because another principal power has been conferred; otherwise there are no bounds to the powers which may be exercised by a corporation, and the whole doctrine of limited agency would be at an end. The corporation is as absolutely prohibited from exercising the powers not granted, when this is sought to be accomplished under the pretense of exercising a power which has been granted, as when it is attempted boldly without such pretense.
If, after having provided in a lease for the payment of am annual rent, the trustees may impose a contingent liability of vast amount upon their beneficiaries by guaranteeing the bonds of the lessor, payable in twenty years — “ both principal and in
I do not understand that the Courts, in dealing with this class of questions, are to ignore the common understanding of ordinary terms, or to give an interpretation to the language of a statute—in itself simple and direct—which neither accords with its natural meaning, nor with the legal principles applicable to transactions of the same character between individuals.
Mr. Justice Crockett expressed no opinion.