108 A. 554 | Conn. | 1919
The plaintiffs are for all practical purposes of this case one person. James H. Loverin's presence as a party is as one substituted for his father as a beneficiary of the transaction in controversy. The controversy is really the father's, and it will simplify statements somewhat if, in our discussion, we treat the father as the plaintiff and refer to him at times at least as such.
There are two defendants, husband and wife. Each filed a demurrer to the complaint. In so far as the husband's demurrer is concerned, the averments of the complaint will be found to show fraud and deceit on his part, with resulting damages to the plaintiff. A good cause of action against him, therefore, is stated, unless it be that the incidental fact that title to real estate was the subject-matter of the representations forming the basis of the fraud, takes the situation out from the operation of the ordinary rule. Culver v. Avery, *223 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 380, 384. It is the defendant's contention that the existence of our land recording system accomplishes this latter result, through the means of knowledge of the true state of land titles it supplies, and the constructive knowledge of such titles which the law attributes to its disclosures.
The claim in this regard is a two-fold one. It is, in the first place, that as the plaintiff had in the land records of Woodbury the means of obtaining full and reliable information concerning the title to the property which Kuhne offered and agreed to convey, he is precluded from complaining that he was deceived and defrauded by any false statements of Kuhne; and, in the second place, that as the plaintiff would be presumed to have had knowledge of the fact which the records disclosed, that Kuhne had only an undivided interest in the property, he was not justified in relying on the latter's representations to the contrary.
The law touching the resort to available means of knowledge for the ascertainment of the truth, in the face of positive assertions of an existing fact, made by one in a position to know to one seeking guidance for his action, is well settled. It is stated by Pomeroy in his Equity Jurisprudence (Vol. 2, 3d Ed.) in § 891, as follows: "It may be laid down as a general proposition that where statements are of the first kind [i. e. statements of fact], and especially where they are concerning matters which, from their nature or situation, may be assumed to be within the knowledge or under the power of the party making the representation, the party to whom it is made has a right to rely on them, he is justified in relying on them, and in the absence of any knowledge of his own, or of any facts which should arouse suspicion and cast doubt upon the truth of the statements, he is not bound to make inquiries and examination for himself. It does not, under such circumstances, *224
lie in the mouth of the person asserting the fact to object or complain because the other took him at his word." In Mead v. Bunn,
Two of our own cases plainly indicate our approval of this principle, although in neither is there an attempt to make a full statement of it. Watson v. Atwood,
Let us turn now to the defendants' alternative contention, that the plaintiffs cannot found an action of fraud upon Kuhne's representations, although false, since the law will presume that they had knowledge of the true state of the title as it appeared upon the land records. It is true, as counsel for the defendants urges, that we have held, notably in Beach v. Osborne,
The demurrer of the defendant's wife was properly sustained. The complaint contains no allegation of misrepresentation, concealment. or other fraudulent *227 conduct by her or by her authority, participation or acquiescence. The most that it charges against her is that she refused to yield up her rightful property in response to the plaintiffs' demands. She simply asserted her rights as she was clearly entitled to do. It did not militate against her right to pursue the course she did, that she had become aware of the terms upon which the suit was settled and withdrawn, and of the misrepresentations made by her husband in the course of the negotiations of settlement. She was not bound to surrender her property to another for no other reason than that her husband had made false statements concerning its title.
There is no error in the sustaining of the demurrer of the defendant Sarah E. Kuhne, and error in the sustaining of that of William H. Kuhne, and the cause is remanded to be proceeded with against the last-named defendant according to law.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.