LOVELADIES HARBOR, INC. and Loveladies Harbor, Unit D, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 91-5050.
United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.
May 24, 1994.
28 F.3d 1171 | 1545
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED as to the Swanns and AFFIRMED as to Raburn. The case is REMANDED for a new trial as to the Swanns. We deem it unnecessary to reach the other issues raised by Allstate.
Kevin J. Coakley, Connell, Foley & Geiser, Roseland, NJ, argued for plaintiffs-appellees. With him on the brief were Stephen D. Kinnard and Ernest W. Schoellkopff.
Robert L. Klarquist, Attorney, Lands & Natural Resources Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellant. With him on the brief were Lois J. Schiffer, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Environmental & Natural Resources Div., John A. Bryson, Fred Disheroon and Gary S. Guzy.
James S. Burling, Ronald A. Zumbrun and Robin L. Rivett, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, CA, were on the brief for amicus curiae, Pacific Legal Foundation.
Roland L. Skala, Weeks & Skala, Yakima, WA, was on the brief for amicus curiae, Cascade Development Co., Inc.
Paula K. Smith, Asst. Utah Atty. Gen., and Jan Graham, Utah Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, UT, and Cheri Jacobus, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Anchorage, AK, and Charles E. Cole, Alaska Atty. Gen., Juneau, AK, were on the brief for amicus curiae, States of Utah and Alaska.
Richard Dauphinais, Native American Rights Fund, Washington, DC, and Yvonne T. Knight and Patrice Kunesh, Native American Rights Fund, Boulder, CO, were on the brief for amicus curiae, Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma.
Charles F. Lettow, Michael R. Lazerwitz and Michael A. Mazzuchi, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, Washington, DC, were on the brief for amicus curiae, Dico, Inc.
Thomas H. Shipps, Maynes, Bradford, Shipps & Sheftel, Durango, CO, and Scott B. McElroy and Alice E. Walker, Greene, Meyer & McElroy, P.C., Boulder, CO, were on the brief for amicus curiae, Southern Ute Indian Tribe.
George W. Miller, Walter A. Smith, Jr., Jonathan L. Abram and Jonathan S. Franklin, Hogan & Hartson, Washington, DC, were on the brief for amicus curiae, Whitney Benefits, Inc. and Peter Kiewit Son‘s Co.
Daniel J. Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar, Washington Legal Foundation, and W. Lawrence Wallace and Carolyn M. White, Vinson & Elkins, Washington, DC, were on the brief for amicus curiae, Washington Legal Foundation, The Allied Educational Foundation, Senator Steve Symms, Senator Conrad Burns and Senator Jesse Helms.
Thomas D. Searchinger, Environmental Defense Fund, New York City, was on the brief for amicus curiae, Environmental Defense Fund.
Before ARCHER, Chief Judge,* and RICH, NIES, NEWMAN, MAYER, MICHEL, PLAGER, LOURIE, CLEVENGER, RADER, and SCHALL, Circuit Judges.
* Judge Archer assumed the position of Chief Judge on March 18, 1994.
PLAGER, Circuit Judge.
This case first came before the court as a regulatory takings case. The United States Government (Government) appealed from the
BACKGROUND
The facts of the case, insofar as they аre relevant to the jurisdictional question, may be summarized as follows.1 Plaintiffs Loveladies own a wetlands tract located on Long Beach Island, Ocean County, New Jersey. Loveladies sought a fill permit, pursuant to
Loveladies appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which affirmed the judgment for the Government.5 Loveladies then proceeded with a suit in the Court of Federal Claims which they had filed the year before.6 (By consent of the parties, prosecution of the suit had been stayed pending the outcome of the district court litigation.) In their Court of Federal Claims suit, Loveladies maintained that the permit denial constituted a taking of private property, and that the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution required the Government to compensate Loveladies. The Court of Federal Claims agreed, and awarded Loveladies compensation of $2,658,000 plus interest.7 The Government appealed the award to this court.
After a panel of the court heard oral argument in this case, but before an opinion was issued, the full court sitting in banc decided UNR Industries, Inc. v. United States, 962 F.2d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (UNR). That case was taken on certiorari by the Supreme Court and affirmed. Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 113 S. Ct. 2035, 124 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1993) (UNR/Keene). In UNR this court undertook a comprehensive review of the jurisprudence surrounding
The United States [Court of Federal Claims] shall not have jurisdiction of any claims for or in respect to which the plaintiff or his assignee has pending in any other court any suit or process against the United States....
Based on our decision in UNR, but prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in UNR/Keene, the Government moved in this court to vacate the judgment in favor of Loveladies. The Government in its motion argued that UNR compelled the conclusion that, since the suit in the Court of Federal Claims had been filed while the appeal in the earlier district court suit was still pending,
In opposition to the Government‘s motion, Loveladies argued that UNR did not compel that conclusion for several reasons, including that the same claims were not involved and that Casman v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 647 (1956) and like cases, distinguishing claims on the basis of the relief sought, supported jurisdiction.
Because of the importance of the issue, and the fact that other pending cases raise the same issue,8 this court, sitting in banc, by order dated September 28, 1993, called for briefs and subsequently heard oral argument regarding the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims, and by derivation the jurisdiction of this court, over this matter. After considering the briefs and arguments of the parties, and those of the several amici,9 we conclude that the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction over the cause, and the appeal on the merits of that court‘s decision is properly before this court. The Government‘s motion to dismiss is denied.
DISCUSSION
I.
As a preliminary matter, we observe that our decision in UNR does not constrain our decision today. Appellants in UNR, asbestos manufacturers, filed suit against the United States in the district court seeking money damages based on tort claims. They then filed in the Court of Federal Claims for money damages based on certain contracts they had with the Government. Both suits arose оut of the same underlying events. Appellants challenged the longstanding rule that suits involving the same operative facts and seeking the same relief were the same “claims” for purposes of
Appellants in UNR raised another issue. Appellants’ contractual claims had been filed, but not acted upon, when their district court claims were dismissed. Thus, when the Government moved to dismiss their claims in the Court of Federal Claims pursuant to
The Supreme Court on certiorari agreed. In UNR/Keene, the Supreme Court held that
When this court decided UNR, we chose “to revisit the jurisprudence encumbering this statute.” Id., 962 F.2d at 1021. In so doing, we declared “overruled” a number of cases, including Casman. UNR, 962 F.2d at 1022 n.3. The Supreme Court took exception to our efforts. “Because the issue is not presented on the facts of this case, we need not decide whether two actions based on the same operative facts, but seeking completely
As the Supreme Court has reminded us, anything we said in UNR regarding the legal import of cases whose factual bases were not properly before us was mere dictum, and therefore we will not accord it stare decisis effect. The Government can draw no comfort in this case from the holding of UNR, as affirmed in UNR/Keene. The issue the Government raises, and which is now properly before us on the facts of this case, is whether
II.
The precise issue in this case is the meaning of the term “claims” as it is used in
Deciding if the claims are the same or distinctly different “requires a comparison between the claims raised in the Court of Federal Claims and in the other lawsuit.” UNR/Keene, 508 U.S. at —, 113 S. Ct. at 2041. It also requires a definition of “claims” that the statute does not provide. As the Supreme Court put it, “The exact nature of the things to be compared is not illuminated, however, by the awkward formulation of
The legislative history of
The meaning and scope of the term, then, has been left to caselaw development. This court recently reviewed the question in Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 855 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1066, 109 S. Ct. 1342, 103 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1989) (Johns-Manville). Wе reaffirmed the rule that it is ‘operative facts’ and not legal theories by which claims may be distinguished under
The Court of Federal Claims dismissed plaintiff‘s suit pursuant to
Viewing claims as related to the nature of the relief sought is unremarkable.13 And using differing relief as a characteristic for distinguishing claims was especially appropriate here, because the Court of Federal Claims and its predecessors have been courts with limited authority to grant relief. These courts could not grant the kinds of general equitable relief the district courts could, even in cases over which they otherwise have had subject-matter jurisdiction. Although the powers of the Court of Federal Claims have been increased in recent years, so that in some instances it can grant complete relief in cases over which it hаs subject matter jurisdiction, the Court of Federal Claims remains a court with limited remedial powers.14
The Casman case cited in Johns-Manville arose when a government employee sued in district court for reinstatement to his position with the Government, and while that suit was pending, sued in the Court of Claims for back pay denied him as a result of the allegedly unlawful removal.15 When the Government moved to dismiss under
This court and its predecessor, although sometimes referring to the Casman rule as an “exception” to
The description of the Casman rule as an “exception” to
Similarly, the “operative facts” rule applied in Johns-Manville was an interpretation of the term “claims,” and was consistent with the Court of Claims decision in British American, which had held that two claims were not necessarily different simply because they were based on different legal theories. In British American, the plaintiff, acting under federal regulations and executive orders, surrendered gold bullion to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The plaintiff brought suit against the Government in district court under a tort theory, and in the Court of Claims under a contractual theory. In both courts plaintiff sought a money judgment. The Court of Claims held that
Courts have also long followed the principle of British American.17 See e.g. Los Angeles Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 236, 138 Ct. Cl. 648 (1957); Hill v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 382 (1985); Bennally v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 8 (1987); Johns-Manville, 855 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1988); UNR, 962 F.2d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1992); UNR/Keene, 508 U.S. at —, 113 S. Ct. 2035, 2043 (“The decision in British American Tobacco strikes us, moreover, as a sensible reading of the statute ...“).
Thus we have consistently tested claims against both the principle established in Casman and that established in British American. Taken together, these tests produce a working definition of “claims” for the purpose of applying
III.
The Government presents several arguments why this case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Government argues first that Loveladies’ APA challenge to the validity of the permit denial filed in district court, and their suit in the Court of Federal Claims for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment, are in reality one claim, arising from the same operative facts, and that under the law that alone is enough to bar jurisdiction under
The Government then argues that we should overturn longstanding precedent and adopt new law, a new definition of “claims.” The Government argues that it should be enough to preclude the Court of Federal Claims from hearing a claim if another claim, arising from the same operative facts, is pending in another court, regardless of the type of relief sought. Under this theory, if we accept, as we have done arguendo, that Loveladies’ two suits arise frоm the same operative facts,20 then
First, the Government reads Corona Coal Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 537, 44 S. Ct. 156, 68 L. Ed. 431 (1924), to hold “the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the concept that Section 154 [the predecessor of § 1500] should be made subject to a hardship exception.” True enough, and irrelevant. In Corona Coal, the petitioner argued that even though there was a pending suit in district court seeking the same relief based on the same facts as those in the Court of Claims suit, the statutory bar should not apply because the imminent running of the statute of limitations forced petitioner to file. The Supreme Court responded: “But the words of the statute are plain, with nothing in the context to make their meaning doubtful; no room is left for construction, and we are not at liberty to add an exception in order to remove apparent hardship in particular cases.” Id. at 540, 44 S. Ct. at 156.
The case before us is not a matter in which a court-created exception to an otherwise plain piece of legislation is at issue. As we noted earlier, Casman did not create an “exception” to the rule of
The Government‘s second argument for adopting its understanding of
Second, the Government introduces no evidence of the alleged confusion presumably surrounding
The Government finally argues that, even if
The district court complaint alleges jurisdiction under both the Fifth Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, and under
2. Declaring that the action of the defendant in denying the permit application of plaintiffs constitutes a taking of property in violation of plaintiffs’ rights under the Fifth Amеndment of the United States Constitution;
....
4. Declaring that the regulations relied upon ... are unconstitutional [as beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause];
....
5. Declaring that the regulations relied upon ... are ultra vires ...
and concludes with the usual “granting such other relief ...” prayer.
The complaint in the Court of Federal Claims is similar, but shorter. The jurisdictional allegations are limited to the Fifth Amendment, and to
It is important to note that the prayer in the Court of Federal Claims complaint contained an express request for damages. Significantly, that request was missing from the complaint in the district court. Furthermore, despite asking that the court ‘declare’ relief, neither complaint, in the jurisdictional allegations or elsewhere, refers or cites to the
The Government further argues that the presence of an allegation of a taking in the two complaints means that the claims in the district court suit were the same claims as those in the Court of Federal Claims suit, since Loveladies sought in the district court a
By contrast, in the complaint in the Court of Federal Claims Loveladies clearly alleged that a taking had occurred, and that just compensation was due them. As we have often noted, the Tucker Act, which was cited by Loveladies as their jurisdictional base, provides jurisdiction for damage suits against the United States Government, but a recovery against the Government requires a substantive right created by some money-mandating constitutional provision, statute or regulation that has been violated, or an express or implied contract with the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (in banc), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1065, 104 S. Ct. 1414, 79 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1984). That Loveladies sought a clear finding or “declaration” of their rights under the Fifth Amendment as the money-mandating source of their entitlement to recovery seems hardly surprising.
In sum, reading the two complaints in light of the legal and factual circumstances in which they were drawn leaves little doubt what was intended by the prayers for relief contained in them. At the time Loveladies filed their complaint in the district court seeking invalidation of the Government‘s action, they may not have foreseen the possible complications that might arise if they later sought monetary relief in the Cоurt of Federal Claims. If they had, perhaps they might have framed their pleadings with more precision. Be that as it may, the claims in the two courts are for distinctly different and not the same or even overlapping relief—this case presents the straightforward issue of plaintiffs “who seek distinctly different types of relief in the two courts.” UNR/Keene, 508 U.S. at —, 113 S. Ct. at 2044-45.25
IV.
The result we reach on the Government‘s motion is further supported by the Supreme Court‘s decision in Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. United States, 363 U.S. 202, 80 S. Ct. 1131, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1165 (1960). In that case the Supreme Court confronted the basic issue here: the interplay of two legally recognized and protected rights, which, because of the statutory jurisdictional structure, are thrown into apparent conflict. The problem arose there, as it does here, when a federal government agency exercised its regulatory power in a manner that raises questions both of the validity of the exercise and, if valid, the economic consequences of the exercise.
In Pennsylvania Railroad, war conditions had prevented the Government‘s planned ex-
The Court of Claims proceedings initially were suspended while the railroad and the Government disputed before the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) the correctness under governing regulations of the rates, an issue which was under ICC jurisdiction. The railroad disagreed with part of the ICC‘s determination, and appealed to the District Court as the statute provided, seeking to set aside the ICC order. Plaintiff railroad requested that the Court of Claims continue to stay its proceedings pending the District Court ruling on the validity of the ICC determination. The Court of Claims declined to do so. Id. at 203-04, 80 S. Ct. at 1132-33.26
The Supreme Court held that this was error:
[J]urisdiction [to review the ICC determination] is vested exclusively in the District Courts.... It necеssarily follows, of course, that since the Railroad had a right to have the Commission‘s order reviewed, and only the District Court had the jurisdiction to review it, the Court of Claims was under a duty to stay its proceedings pending this review.
Id. at 205-06, 80 S. Ct. at 1133 (emphasis added).
The plaintiff in Pennsylvania Railroad had a right to have the Commission‘s order reviewed because it determined certain rights and obligations which had significant legal consequences for its dispute with the Government. Plaintiffs such as Loveladies, too, have a right to have the Corps’ permit denial reviewed, without being placed in the position of having to give up a substantial legal right protected by the Takings Clause of the Constitution. See also Aulston v. United States, 823 F.2d 510, 514 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Claims Court ordered to “hold appellants’ taking claim on its docket in suspension for such time as is reasonably necessary for appellants to challenge the [agency] decision in a district court, and if successful there, to return promptly to the Claims Court.“).
The plaintiff in Pennsylvania Railroad, after filing in the Court of Claims, was confronted with the necessity of litigating the regulatory issue in another court. In the case before us, plaintiffs filed thе APA action in the district court first, and then filed the takings claim in the Court of Federal Claims. In a takings case this is entirely logical—if the validity of the regulatory imposition is to be challenged, it makes sense to pursue the validity question first so as to determine the necessity for prosecuting the takings claim. The risk of course is that too long a time may be required for initiation of a suit, discovery and other pretrial activities, and decisions at both trial and appellate levels. It may not always be possible because of the statute of limitations for a plaintiff to wait for the regulatory challenge case to be finally concluded before filing in the Court of Federal Claims.27
Litigation can serve public interests as well as the particular interests of the parties. The nation is served by private litigation which accomplishes public ends, for example, by checking the power of the Government through suits brought under the APA or under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. Because this nation relies in signifi-
CONCLUSION
The motion of the Government that the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims be vacated and the complaint dismissed is denied. The case is returned to the panel for decision on the merits.
MOTION DENIED.
MAYER, Circuit Judge, with whоm NIES* and RADER, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting.
Because I see no reason to reconsider our recent in banc decision in UNR v. United States, 962 F.2d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1992), aff‘d sub nom. Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 113 S. Ct. 2035, 124 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1993), I dissent.
I.
A court is free to reverse itself when it sits in banc, of course, but “any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification,” which is missing from today‘s undertaking. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2370, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1989) (citation omitted). This is especially so “in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done.” Id.
This case revolves around the authority of the Court of Federal Claims to hear petitioners who have a suit against the government relating to the same claims pending in another court.
In UNR we addressed the meaning of “claim” under section 1500. 962 F.2d at 1023. The claims heard by the Court of Federal Claims generally involve requests for monetary relief. But it does not follow that only suits brought in other courts for money damages can give rise to section 1500‘s jurisdictional bar. Section 1500 divests the Court of Federal Claims of jurisdiction over such a claim where the plaintiff has a suit for the claim pending in another court or where the one in the Court of Federal Claims relates to—is “in respect to“—another suit. The jurisdictional question raised by section 1500 is thus not simply whether the claims are the “same,” but whether they are sufficiently related to invoke the bar. In UNR, the in banc court reaffirmed that the answer lies in a comparison of the operative facts from which the suits arise. “[C]orrectly construed, section 1500 applies to all claims on whatever theories that ‘arise from the same operative facts.‘” 962 F.2d at 1023 (citation omitted).
* Circuit Judge Nies vacated the position of Chief Judge on March 17, 1994.
We confirmed the trial court‘s dismissal of the claims, holding that section 1500 applied regardless of which action was first filed, and that “claim“, as it appears in the statute, refers nоt to the legal theory of the suit but to the operative facts supporting the petitioners’ various actions. Thus, we held that the petitioners’ claims in the Court of Federal Claims were claims for or in respect to which they had suits pending in the district court, even though the former were based on contractual theories of recovery and the latter on tort theories, because they arose from the same personal injuries. Id. at 1023.
We also considered the exception to this rule set out in Casman v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 647 (1956), which excused adherence to section 1500 where the claims in question seek different forms of relief. We all knew a factual predicate for a Casman exception was not before us in UNR, but during the course of our consideration of the statute, it was plain that we could not square that and like cases with the clear meaning of the jurisdictional statute. That statute, as a whole, was before us in UNR; there is no requirement that a factual predicate underlay every jot and tittle of it before a court can explain what it means.
The history of section 1500 is replete with instances where courts sought to temper perceived inequity by inventing exceptions to the rule. See 962 F.2d at 1020. In Casman, the injustice was thought to arise because no court was able to simultaneously grant complete relief to the petitioner: he sought restoration to his position, available only in the district court, and back pay, which he could only recover in the Court of Claims. Casman held section 1500 inapplicable because it was thought unfair to force the plaintiff to choose between the two courts. 135 Ct. Cl. at 650.
But it is axiomatic that courts cannot extend their jurisdiction in the interest of equity. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 818. Faced with a jurisdictional statute riddled with judicially created loopholes, in UNR we concluded that section 1500 should be applied according to its plain words, and that instrumental to such application was a single, coherent definition of the word “claim” as referring only to the facts underlying the petitioner‘s action against the government. This construction is consistent with precedent stretching back sixty years or more. UNR, 962 F.2d at 1023; Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 855 F.2d 1556, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988); British American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 89 Ct. Cl. 438, 440 (1939).2 We overruled Casman because it was in conflict with this interpretation.
The Suprеme Court agreed that “the comparison of the two cases for purposes of possible dismissal would turn on whether the plaintiff‘s other suit was based on substantially the same operative facts as the Court of Claims action, at least if there was some overlap in the relief requested.” Keene, 508 U.S. at —, 113 S. Ct. at 2042. Finding that the Casman exception was not implicated by the facts of the case before it, the Court chose not to decide whether two actions seeking different relief would require dismissal under
Be that as it may, now, only one year later, the court resurrects Casman, scrambling once more down the path of judicial revision of the statute. Normally, “[i]n cases where statutory precedents have been overruled, the primary reason for the Court‘s shift in position has been the intervening development of the law, through either the growth of judicial doctrine or further action taken by Congress.” Patterson, 491 U.S. at 173, 109 S. Ct. at 2370. To my knowledge, no laws have changed in the short time since we decided UNR. Departing from stare decisis demands more than cursory distinctions—at the very least, one would expect reversal of our so recent in banc precedent to be supported by some compelling reason.
“[A] traditional justification for overruling a prior case is that a precedent may be a positive detriment to coherence and consistency in the law....” Id. This was the justification which supported the overruling of Casman in UNR. We said there that section 1500, which had become a judicial embarrassment, a monument to cynicism, “is now so riddled with unsupportable loopholes that it has lost its predictability and people cannot rely on it to order their affairs.” 962 F.2d at 1021. In fact, only the other day we unanimously agreed that “fail[ure] to adhere to a statutory mandate over an extended period of time does not justify ... continuing to do so.” In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (in banc).
I agree that plaintiffs should have access to the full range of remedies which the Constitution and statutes provide, especially in light of the important public interest in controlling government excesses. Indeed, the claims of these property owners might well be valid on the merits, if only it were appropriate to reach them. When the government takes private property it must pay just compensation. But Congress set out just how such plaintiffs may bring their suits; we have no right to second guess in the absence of congressional transgression of the Constitution.
It cannot seriously be doubted that Congress has the power to order that the government need not defend claims arising from the same operative facts simultaneously in several forums. That a commonly based suit is pending in the district court does not necessarily forever divest the Court of Federal Claims of jurisdiction over a claim; section 1500 decrees only that a party cannot maintain actions in both courts at the same time. It may sometimes happen that the district court challenge is not finished within six years, after which any Court of Federal Claims action would bе barred. See
As we said in UNR, “[i]t may have seemed unfair ‘to deprive plaintiffs of the only forum they [had] in which to test their demand,’ but that does not justify rewriting the statute.” 962 F.2d at 1022 (citation omitted). “Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end.” TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194, 98 S. Ct. 2279, 2301, 57 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1978).3 In Keene, the Supreme Court
II.
Finally, the court‘s resurrection of Casman is not even supported by the facts of this case. The government argues that in both the district court and the Court of Federal Claims the complaints sought relief “[d]eclaring that the action of the defendant in denying the permit application of plaintiffs constitutes a taking of property in violation of plaintiffs’ rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” This is sufficient overlapping relief to make the question one of operative facts alone, even under this court‘s imaginative reading of Keene. See Keene, 508 U.S. at —, 113 S. Ct. at 2043 (relying on operative facts when there is “some overlap in the relief requested“).
The court elides this argument by saying that we should ignore the words of the complaints—language expressly requesting a declaration of a taking—and substitute instead its understanding of what Loveladies must have intended by the several suits. It concludes that Loveladies did not seek overlapping relief because it must not have intended to request a “formal” declaration under the
But declaratory relief is not some special, exclusive remedy; it is an additional form of relief, readily available even when it would be cumulative of other requested relief.
Nor is it surprising that Loveladies did not rely on the Declaratory Judgment Act as a basis for jurisdiction, since that act is not an independent source of federal jurisdiction. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671, 70 S. Ct. 876, 878, 94 L. Ed. 1194 (1950); Speedco, Inc. v. Estes, 853 F.2d 909, 911 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Indeed, there is no special set of procedures governing declaratory judgment actions; they are controlled by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 57. Under those rules, Loveladies needed only to state facts adequate to support its request for relief; no ritualistic citation to the Declaratory Judgment Act was necessary.
That said, the court‘s position reduces to a decision to ignore Loveladies’ request for overlapping relief because it resulted from imprecise pleading, a mere oversight that we should excuse since the district court had no jurisdiction to address the takings allegation. But it makes no difference under section
The result of the court‘s machinations is to revive Brown v. United States, 358 F.2d 1002, 1005, 175 Ct. Cl. 343 (1966), which said, “Section 1500 was not intended to compel claimants to elect, at their peril, between prosecuting their claim in this court (with conceded jurisdiction, aside from Section 1500) and in another tribunal which is without jurisdiction.” But we overruled Brown in UNR, 962 F.2d at 1022, and in Keene the Supreme Court expressly agreed, Keene, 508 U.S. at — & n. 12, 113 S. Ct. at 2045 & n. 12.
Lynnwood CAMPBELL, Petitioner, v. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, Respondent. No. 93-3483. United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit. June 6, 1994.
Notes
The law, Roper, the law. I know what‘s legal, not what‘s right. And I‘ll stick to what‘s legal.... I‘m not God. The currents and eddies of right and wrong, which you find such plain-sailing, I can‘t navigate. I‘m no voyager. But in the thickets of the law, oh there I‘m a forester.... What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil? ... And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you—where would you hide, Roper, the laws being flat? ... This country‘s planted thick with laws from coast to coast—Man‘s laws, not God‘s and if you cut them down ... d‘you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow them? ... Yes, I‘d give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety‘s sake.” 437 U.S. at 195, 98 S. Ct. at 2302 (quoting R. Bolt, A Man for All Seasons, Act I, p. 147 (Three Plays, Heinemann ed. 1967)).