25 Ind. 503 | Ind. | 1865
This was a suit brought by Wells, the appellee, against the appellants to recover the possession of a certain tract of land.
The defendants below answered by a general denial.. The court, to which the cause was submitted for trial by agreement of the parties, found for the plaintiff. A motion by the defendants for a new trial was overruled; judgment for the plaintiff. The defendants appeal. The evidence is made a part of the record by a bill of exceptions. On the trial, the plaintiff gave in evidence a deed of conveyance in fee, to himself, for the land in controversy, dated October 25th, 1845, from Charles F. Wells and wife, said Charles F. being the original patentee from the United States. The defendants then gave in evidence a deed from the plaintiff and wife to the Evansville, Cleveland and Indianapolis Straight Line Railroad Company, dated the 26th of April, conveying to said railroad company the land in controversy, in fee simple. This deed was acknowledged before a justice of the peace of Daviess county, the certificate of acknowledgment bearing the same date as the deed, and was recorded in the recorder’s office of said county on the 11th day of July, 1856. The consideration stated in the deed is $1,000,,
The defendants having closed their evidence, the plaintiff, being sworn, was permitted, over the objection of the defendants, to testify in his own behalf that the deed executed by him to the railroad company, dated April 26th, 1856, was in fact executed on the 27th of April of that year, the same being Sunday. He testified, in substance, as follows: that although said deed from him to the railroad company purports to have been executed on the 26th day of April, 1856, yet that in'fact it was executed and acknowledged by him and his wife on the 27th of April, 1856, which was Sunday; that Asaihel L. Page, who resided in his -neighborhood, was, at the time of the execution of the deed, one of the directors of said railroad company, and negotiated the purchase of the land in controversy on behalf of the company; that said Page came to the plaintiff's house the day the deed was executed, bringing with ¡him the justice of the peace who took the acknowledgment, and told the plaintiff he would like to have the deed that day, to which the plaintiff assented. The deed was then prepared, signed and acknowledged, and by agreement between Page, the plaintiff and the justice, the deed and
James Wade was also sworn as a witness for the plaintiff, and in his evidence substantially corroborated the statements of the plaintiff as to the circumstances attending the execution of the deed, and that it was executed on Sunday.
The plaintiff, Wells, bases his claim to recover the land exclusively on the ground that his deed to the railroad company, having been executed on. Sunday, is void, and therefore conveys no title whatever to the railroad company.
A statute in force at the time the deed was executed, provides “ That if any person of the age of fourteen years
In Link v. Clemmens, 7 Blackf. 479, it Avas held, under a similar statute, that a replevin bond executed on Sunday came within the term “ common labor,” and was therefore void, as being a contract prohibited by law.
And so in Reynolds v. Stephenson, 4 Ind. 619, it was held that a promissory note executed on Sunday was void. In that case it is said: “ It is admitted that the note in question was made on Sunday. Then the record presents this question : Did the making of it constitute an act of ‘ common labor ? ’ We think the statute was intended to prohibit every description of secular business not within the exceptions pointed out by itself. The execution of this note was secular business and not embraced by the exceptions. This view is sustained by various adjudications made upon statutes, the provisions of which are in effect the same as ours. Allen v. Deming, 14 N. H. 133; Towle v. Larrabee, 26 Maine 464; Adams v. Hamell, 2 Doug., (Mich.,) 73. See also notes to 2 Parsons on Contracts 764, e.”
It is also a general rule of the law that void contracts are not susceptible of ratification. But in Banks v. Werts, 13 Ind. 203, it was held that contracts not otherwise obnoxious, but void only because made or executed on Sunday, formed an exception to the general rule, and were susceptible of subsequent ratification. We think the ruling in that ease is fully sustained by the authorities there referred to, as well as by the principles of right and reason. Contracts prohibited by law, because they are in their nature contrary to public policy, or repugnant to the good of society or public morals, are void, and in their very nature incapable of subsequent ratification. But contracts void only because made
In Adams v. Gay, 19 Vt. 353, it is said that contracts made on Sunday should be held an exception, in some sense, from the general class of contracts which are void for illegality. They are not tainted with any general illegality, but are only illegal as to the time in which they are entered into. It is not sufficient to avoid them that they have grown out of a transaction on the Sabbath, and although closed upon that day, yet if affirmed upon another day, they then become valid. This court, in Banks v. Werts, supra, after referring to this and other cases, add: “These decisions relate alone to contracts made on Sunday. They proceed on the ground of a retention of the property, and a subsequent ratification by the parties; and in principle they seem to be correct.”
Here, Wells, after executing the deed, abandoned the possession of the land to the railroad company, retained and still retains the purchase money, set up no claim to the land, and exercised no acts of ownership whatever over it, for a period of over eight years. Now, applying to these facts the principles laid down in the cases above referred to, it seems but reasonable to hold that by these acts, both affirmative and negative, the execution of the deed was subsequently ratified by Wells. But we do not place the* decision of the case on this ground.
Another question is incidentally presented by the record in this case. A deed takes effect from the time of its delivery, and not from the time it may be signed and acknowledged. It may be drawn up, signed, and even acknowledged on Sunday, but if not delivered until a subsequent day it is a valid deed, whatever might be the effect of the acknowledgment made on Sunday. 2 Parsons on Contracts 764, g, and authorities there cited. The evidence in the case at bar does not show when the deed was, in fact,
But assuming that the deed was delivered on Sunday, the question then arises, can Wells, who executed the deed to the railroad company, set up its invalidity against the subsequent vendees of the company, who puz’ehased the land for a valuable considei’ationj in good faith, and without notice, either actual or constructive; that the deed was executed on Sunday ? We are clear in the opinion that he cannot.
The evidence shows that at the instance of Wells, both 4he deed and the justice’s certificate of acknowledgznent were ante-dated, to make it appear that the deed was a valid one, and upon its face it did so appear. In this condition it was delivered to the railroad company, and sent to be recorded. Wells abandoned the possession of the land and claimed no interest in it. Under these circumstances, it appearing from the deed that the railroad company had a perfect aizd izzdefeasible title to the land, Carpenter and Love purchased it for a valuable consideration, in good faith, and without any notice whatever that Wells’ deed to the railroad company was executed on Sunday;
Mr. Story says: “No man can reasonably doubt that if a party, by the willful suggestion of a falsehood, is the cause of prejudice to another, who has a right to a full and correct representation of the fact, his claim ought, in conscience, to be postponed to that of the person whose confidence was induced by his representation. And there can be no real difference between an express representation, and one that is naturally or necessarily implied from the circumstances. The wholesome maxim of the law upon this subject is, that a party who enables another to commit a fraud is answerable for the consequences.” 1 Story’s Eq., § 384, p. 412. Here, Wells, by executing and delivering the deed to the railroad company, and intentionally giving to it a false date, so as to make it appear valid on its face, enabled the latter to practice a fraud on innocent purchasers. See, also, Commonwealth v. Kendig, 2 Penn. St. R. 448; Bloxsome v. Williams, 3 Barn. & Cress. 232; Fennell et al. v. Ridler, 5 id. 406; 2 Parsons on Contracts 765.
The judgment is reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded for a new trial, and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.