157 Ky. 620 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1914
Opinion of the Court by
Affirming.
Mrs. Jennie Sweeney lived on Payne street in Louisville between Spring and Charlton streets. Payne street makes a curve at Charlton and she lived about 150 feet west of the curve. The Louisville Railway Company operates its street cars on Payne street. After passing the curve at the intersection of Charlton street there is
The propriety of the instruction above indicated is the chief ground relied on for reversal. We are referred by counsel to a number of cases especially Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S., 233, to the effect "that the doctrine of
' The. plaintiff was standing on her own property and while standing there was.injured by the street car leaving the track'arid'running against the pole near the sidewalk and throwing tlie pole against the gate which thus knocked the gate violently against her. The case would be exactly the same If the. pole had struck the plaintiff while standing on her own property, or if the street car' without striking the pole or the gate had itself run against her and inflicted the injury to her upon her own property; for the forcé of the street car put the pole in motion; and the law traces the force which injured the •plaintiff back to its starting point. The rule announced in the celebrated squib case has been uniformly followed since. In that ease a man threw a lighted squib into the market place; one person knocked it from him another also knocked it off, and a third was injured. It was held that the person who threw the squib was answerable to the person injured. The same rule must apply here, and the law of the case is the same as it would be if the street car had itself run against the plaintiff at her gate.
The plaintiff as the owner of her property was entitled to the undisputed possession of it. The entry of the defendant upon it either by its street car or by the pole which it set in motion, was a trespass. One who-trespasses upon another, and inflicts an injury, Is liaBIe^for the injury unless caused by the act of God or joro-’' duced by causes beyond his control. Ve have held that one who in blasting throws rock or other debris upon the land of another, is liable for the injury done irrespective of whether the blasting was negligently done or not, as there is in such a case an actual invasion of anothers premises and the act itself is a nuisance. The same principle has been applied to the pollution of air or the abstraction of any portion of the soil, or the casting of anything upon the landTn other ways. (Langhorne v. Turman, 141 Ky., 809, Langhorne v. Wilson, 91 S. W., 254, and cases cited.) The same principle must apply here. The plaintiff while standing on her own premises was struck and injured by a force put in motion by the defendant which knocked over the telephone pole and threw it upon her gate, causing the gate to inflict a serious in
The attorney for the plaintiff in stating his case to the jury referred to the fact that the priest who was sent for when Mrs. Sweeney was hurt, administered final unction. The court stopped the attorney and told the jury to disregard the statement. When the priest was on the witness stand the attorney asked him: “What did you do —?” But before he could finish the question, the court again stopped him; and we must assume that the jury obeyed the admonition of the court. The attorney was not justified in his conduct but a judgment will not be set aside for such misconduct where the court promptly intervenes and condemns it.
Some of the witnesses for the plaintiff were allowed to state their conclusions as to whether the plaintiff appeared to be suffering very much, or to be in a very bad condition, and while some of this testimony was improper, as the witnesses were not experts, it could have had no serious effect on the trial for the reason that the real facts were fully brought out before the jury by the physicians.
The verdict is not so excessive as to warrant us in disturbing it if the testimony of the plaintiff and a number of witnesses who testified for her is to be believed.
Judgment affirmed.