198 Ky. 500 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1923
Opinion of the Court by
Reversing.
This appeal is from a judgment in favor of appellee for injuries to his person and his automobile.
The only question we need discuss is whether appellant’s motion for a peremptory instruction should have been sustained.
The facts are these: The accident occurred at the intersection of Galt and Frankfort avenues in Crescent Hill, a suburb of Louisville. Frankfort avenue runs east and west, while Galt avenue runs north and south. (On the north side of Frankfort avenue, Galt avenue is •some ten or twelve feet further west than it is on the south side of Frankfort avenue. The next street east of Galt avenue is Franck avenue. It was about eleven o’clock p. m., when the accident occurred, and it was a foggy night. Appellee was driving his automobile east
In a city, of course, the driver of a vehicle is. not required to await the passing of every street car that he sees in the distance, and that being true, he is not necessarily guilty of. contributory negligence in attempting to cross the track in front of a car which he sees approaching, but the question will depend on the particular circumstances of the case. Though the “Stop, Look and Listen” doctrine does not prevail in this, state, it is the rule that one about to cross a street car track at a place like the one in question must use ordinary care, to learn of the approach of .a car and keep out of its way. Appellee knew of the approach of the car when he was about liwenty feet from Galt avenue. Notwithstanding this fact, he drove fifty or sixty feet without looking again to see where the oar was, and started across the track when the car was not over a hundred feet away. It is no excuse for his. conduct that when some distance from the track he misjudged the speed and distance of the car. Knowing that the car was coming, it was his duty to look and see where the oar was before attempting to cross in front of it. If he had done this, he would have seen the car bearing down on him and only a few feet away. We therefore conclude that appellee was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and that the motion for a peremptory should have been sustained.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for a new trial not inconsistent with this opinion.