Reversing.
On the 17th day of October, 1913, Elizabeth Benke unfortunately lost her life upon the crossing of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad at Eighth and Saratoga streets, in the city of Newport. She was struck by a moving train and killed. Her administratrix filed this suit in the Campbell Circuit Court against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, and the Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company, alleging that her death was caused by the concurrent gross negligence of the respective agents and servants of each of these railroad companies, who were operating a train over the tracks of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company at that point; that they negligently ran the train against decedent at that point, instantly killing her, and that their negligence in so doing was the proximate cause of her death, and sought a judgment against each of the companies for the damages caused the estate of the decedent by her death. The petition further alleged that the.road at that point belonged to the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, and that they owned and operated a line of steam railroad over the road, and had at that time full power to own and operate such railroad,, and that the train which ran over and killed the decedent was operated by' the servants of both of the railroad companies.
The Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, by its answer, denied that it, either alone or with its co-defendant, or by any agent or servant of it, operated or ran the train of cars complained of, or that at the place it was guilty of any negligent act. It furthermore plead as a defense that the decedent, in being upon the railroad track, was guilty of negligence, and was not in the exercise of ordinary care, and that such negligence and want of care upon her part so contributed to the accident by which she was hurt, as that, but for it, the accident would not have happened, and she would not have been killed or injured.
The Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company, by its answer, denied that the train of cars complained of was operated or run by both companies, or by their respective agents or servants; and denied that any concurring negligence of the companies, or their servants, was the proximate cause of the death of decedent, and, also, denied that it operated the loco
The trial before the court and a jury resulted in a verdict of the jury and a judgment of the court in favor of the appellee against each of the appellants, and they having filed grounds for a new trial, which were overruled, they each appeal to this court.
The first ground relied upon was alleged error upon the part of the court in overruling the motion of appellants for a direct verdict in their favor, at the close of the appellee’s evidence. A proper exception was taken by the appellants to the ruling of the court complained of by them.
The proof introduced by appellee showed that the decedent was a lady forty-two years of age, in good health, and in possession of all of her faculties of sight and hearing, and that she had for many years been a resident upon Saratoga street, between Eighth and Ninth streets, in Newport, and had resided in a house, and was so residing, at the time of her death, which is on the east side of Saratoga street, and the second door from the Eighth street crossing, and between Eighth and Ninth streets. Saratoga street is sixty-six feet in width and forty feet between the curb stones on each side, the sidewalks being thirteen feet in width. The tracks of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company are laid near the middle of this street, which runs north and south. From the edge of the sidewalk on the east side, in front of the house of decedent, it is seventeen feet and four inches to the rail of the railroad track on the east side. It is about the same distance from the west rail of the railroad track to the sidewalk upon the west side. The railroad track is four feet and nine inches in width. Eighth street, including the sidewalk, is fifty feet in width, and runs east and west. From Tenth street to Ninth street it is a descending grade of one foot and nine inches in the one hundred feet, and
The conductor stated, in substance, that the ■ train was proceeding at not exceeding seven miles per hour;
The engineer testified, in substance, upon his introduction by appellee, that the train was moving from four to six miles per hour; that he had it under perfect control and was keeping a lookout at the front window along the track of the railroad; that he was using a sufficiency of air to regulate the movement of the train; that the matter of adjusting the injector was only a matter of from one to ten seconds; that he at all times was keeping a lookout in front for any persons who might be upon the track, and could see anyone who was upon the track, or very near to it, and that he did not see'the decedent until she was within eight or nine feet of the railroad track, and five or six feet in front of the engine; that she was moving rapidly, and as he expressed it, ran across the track in front, and that upon discovering her purpose to cross, he immediately applied the “emergency” air brakes with all of its power, and opened the sand box, and stopped the train as quickly
Eoy, who had been an engineer, testified as an expert, that the train, by the use of “emergency air” and using the sand, could be stopped in about ten feet, when going at the rate of seven or eight miles an hour, and at ten miles an hour, twelve or fourteen feet, and from four to seven miles an hour, from six to eight feet, with good brakes, keyed up, and all the triple valves working throughout the entire train.
Charles R. Johns, who was chauffeur of the police automobile in Newport, testified that he received a call somewhere in the neighborhood of seven o’clock to go to the scene of the tragedy, and that he went up Monmouth Street to Eighth and over Eighth to Saratoga, and arrived there in two or three minutes after he received the call; that the train was standing still, and the decedent’s body was under the engine, and the engineer was standing along side of the engine, and he asked him how this thing happened, and the engineer said: ‘ ‘ Honest, I don’t know. I didn’t see her,” and the fireman, in a conversation with others, said: “If that woman did not get by, we got her.” This evidence was objected to and the objection overruled and exception taken.
One Munninghoff, introduced by the appellee, did not see the tragedy, but testified that the train stopped nearly all at once, but moved about one hundred feet after it began to slow up. This was the substance of all of the evidence introduced by the appellee in chief.
The engineer being recalled by the appellants, testified, that when he first saw the decedent and discovered 'she was intending to cross the track in front of the engine, that he did all he had time in which to do, in order to avert injury to her; that he did not sound the whistle nor do any other thing more than he did, because he
The pilot testified that he was sitting in the rear of the engineer, and the engineer was keeping a lookout at the front window of the cab, and that he was looking out at the window on the east side of the cab as they approached Eighth street; that the train was running four or five miles an hour; that he saw the decedent when she stepped off the sidewalk into the street, and as he thought, was going to walk down to the crossing; that she continued to walk along in that way until about the time the train arrived at the crossing, on the south side of Eighth street, when she struck a little trot, and started across in front of the engine, and as soon as he discovered her purpose, he cried out to her, when the engineer, who was looking out at the front window, looked out of the window on the east side, and then at the front again, but immediately applied the emergency brakes, and opened the sand box. She stepped off the curb into the street about forty or fifty feet south of Eighth street, and about fifty or sixty feet of the engine, and walked diagonally from where she stepped into .the street toward the northwest corner of Eighth and Saratoga streets, and was about ten feet from the rail when he first realized that she was going to try to cross the track, and was about ten feet from the engine when she increased her gait, and he realized that her purpose was to cross the track in front of the engine. The engineer at that time was looking out of the window in front of him, and immediately applied the emergency air brakes. Witness then asked the fireman if the lady got across, but the fireman had not seen her, and by that time witness was getting off the cab, and got down in the deck of the' engine, and looked and she was right under the engine, on the fireboarcl side. There was nothing in the evidence for appellants, which added to the evidence for appellee, tended to support her cause of action.
The appellee’s claim for damages is based upon the alleged negligence of those operating the train. In L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Kimble’s Admrx., 140 Ky., 759, negligence was defined as follows: “To be negligent, one must either do something which he knows or should
In L. H. & St. Louis Ry Co. v. Jolly’s Admrx., 90 S. W., 977, it was said:
“The law does not look to bare possibilities. It requires no more of the human machine than may be reasonably expected of it under the circumstances.”
At crossings in a city the law in this State does not require an individual, before crossing the railroad track, to stop, to look or to listen. L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 134 Ky., 716; C. & O. Ry. Co. v. Patrick, 135 Ky., 506.
In Central Railway Co. v. Smith, etc., 93 Ky., 457, it was said:
“This rule does not dispense with the duty on the part of one crossing, or using the street, to use ordinary care and prudence for his own safety, and if he fails to do this, and is guilty of gross neglect, as well as the party injuring him, and but for which the accident would not have happened, he cannot recover. ’ ’
In commenting, however, upon the above rule, -the court said:
“We do not mean to be understood as holding that one in crossing or going upon a railroad track, where he is entitled to go or be, should neglect the use of his faculties, or fail to exercise any reasonable precaution, that would enable a person of ordinary prudence, under the circumstances, to discover the approach or presence of a moving train, and thereby prevent injury to his person.”
In Southern Ry. Co. v. Sanders, 145 Ky., 679, it was held that where a person who is injured, goes upon the track so close to an approaching engine, that injury to him could not have been averted by those in charge of the train, if a reasonable lookout had have been observed, he cannot recover.
In the case at bar, the uncontradicted evidence shows that the decedent was forty-two years of age; had resided upon the street all of her life, and was acquainted witn the coming and going of the trains, ,and had the perfect use of her faculties. It was seven o’clock, A. M., and there were no persons in the street or about
It has furthermore been held that it was a question for the jury, whether one crossing a railroad track at a place in constant use by the public, used ordinary care for his safety, to learn of the approach of the train, and keep out of its way, and where the determination of that question depended on a number of circumstances, on which persons may reasonably differ. C. & O. Ry. Co. v. Patrick, 135 Ky., 506; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Miller, supra.
The train was giving the usual and customary signals of its presence and approach, and the engineer could not be expected to stop the train for the reason that some person was in close proximity to the track, but it became his duty, when he saw that she was intending to cross the track, to use such reasonably safe means as were at hand, to prevent injuring her. This he and the conductor stated that he did, and there is no •contradiction of it. Whether he saw her or not, as appellee insists that he did not, her attempt to cross the track so close to the engine necessarily resulted fatally to her, and it does not appear that anything was left undone which could have been done to save her from injury, after those operating the train realized'1 that she purposed to cross the track in front of the engine.
The evidence of the expert engineer, Foy, to the effect that the train could have been stopped within six to twelve feet, does not contradict the evidence to the effect that it was stopped as quickly as it could have been done, because the question propounded to him and the one answered by him was, that it could have been stopped within the distance mentioned by him, but that was regardless of the safety of the train. The conductor owed a duty to those with him upon the train, as well as a duty to the decedent, and could only be held culpable, if he failed to use ordinary care in the exercise of all reasonable means at his command, consistent with the
If the train had been stopped within the distance prescribed by the expert, it does not appear probable that the result would have been different.
So we conclude that there was a failure of evidence to show that those operating the train failed to use ordinary care for the safety of the decedent, and a conclusive showing by the evidence that her death was caused by her own failure to exercise ordinary care for her own safety, and the court was in error when it overruled the motions of the appellants for a direct verdict by the jury.
Having arrived at this conclusion, it is unnecessary to discuss the other questions raised in the bill of exceptions.
The judgment appealed from is, therefore, reversed, and this cause remanded with directions to proceed in conformity to this opinion.