106 Ky. 849 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1899
deliveeed the opinion of the coubt.
In July, 1891, John L. Brantley, while in the service of the appellant, received injuries from which he died within a few hours. In May, 1895, this action was brought by his administrator for damages to his intestate by reason of his pain and suffering. The statute of limitations was ■pleaded, but held by the trial court not to apply, and this is the controlling question in the case. It will be seen that some three years and ten months elapsed from the accrual of the cause of action until the institution of the suit, whereas the section under which the limitation in such actions is fixed provides as follows: “An action
The words “and not thereafter” are • not found in the corresponding section of the Revised Statutes fixing the limitation of the actions indicated above, and it is contended they were added for the express purpose of precluding the application of the following provision of the General Statute: “If a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in the third article of this chapter dies before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement thereof, and the cause of action survives, the action thereon may be brought by his representative after the expiration of that time, if commenced within one year after his qualification.” General Statutes, chapter 71, article 4, section 3; Kentucky Statutes, scetion 2526.
The “third article” referred to in the section last quoted contains numerous provisions as to the limitation of actions other than the provision fixing the limitation of actions for personal injuries, malicious prosecution, etc.; and it is said there is therefore ample room for the operation of section 3, article 4, as to the limitation of actions. The words “and not thereafter” do not occur in any other of these sections of article 3, and the
Inasmuch as it is permissible under our statutes to grant original administration during a period of twenty years after the death of the testator or intestate, the application of the section last quoted to the causes of action mentioned in section 3, article 3, would give, it is argued, a right of action for personal injuries, injuries to cattle, etc., for a period of twenty-one years from the accrual of the cause of action. We can not believe that the Legislature intended to elongate the time for bringing actions on demands of the character indicated to such an unreasonable period. But whether the words “and not thereafter” were added to the section for the purpose of making the limitations as to these actions an exception to the provisions of the subsequent section is at least very doubtful.
In Carden v. L. & N. Railroad Co., (March 25, 1897), [39 S. W., 1027], this court held that, when the action was for the death of the person, the limitation was one year, under the section we have first quoted, and being the same section which controls in this case. The court said in that case: “It is admitted by plaintiff that if the cause of action had accrued to bis intestate in her lifetime, the running of the statute would not be stayed by her death until the grant of administration, but, having begun, would have continued; and it is not easy to see why, on principle, any distinction should be made between the case where cause of action accrued in the lifetime of an intestate and where it does not accrue until after her death. The only reason that can be given why the statute should
From necessity and the reason of the thing, the statute of one year was applied in the Carden case, although logically, as must be admitted, the cause of action did not accrue until after the death of the intestate; and it never accrued to the deceased at all, but to the personal representative. There is no such difficulty in applying the statute in the present case. The cause of action confessedly accrued to the injured person in his lifetime, and confessedly, too, his death did not stop the running of the statute. But, while the addition of these words “and not thereafter” might seem significant as argued, and might, indeed, be held sufficient, if absolutely necessary, to support appellant’s contention that the same period of limitation was intended to 'be prescribed in actions growing-out of the same transaction, yet in view of a construction of the two sections, to be suggested presently, which accomplishes the same result substantially, we do not feel authorized to give the words quoted the importance contended for. To do so would certainly lead us to ignore entirely the provisions of the last section, if they are held to apply; and that they do apply can hardly be denied. It seems to us, however, that the true meaning of the sections, when taken together, is plain enough. Under the first section quoted the limitation is one year from the injury. The death of the injured party does not stop the running of the statute; therefore, unless a personal representative shall qualify within one year from the injury, the action is barred. If he does so qualify, he is given
This action is barred by time, and the case is remanded for judgment accordingly.