LOUISIANA ACORN FAIR HOUSING; Gene Lewis, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, v. Danny LeBLANC, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
No. 98-31351.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
May 15, 2000.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied June 22, 2000.
211 F.3d 298
E.
LIGA additionally asserts that sufficient evidence does not demonstrate that Bunol‘s injury occurred on a covered situs. Section 3(a) of the LHWCA restricts compensation awards to injuries “occurring on the navigable waters of the United States (including any аdjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel).”
LIGA claims that evidence exists to support a finding by the ALJ that Bunol‘s accident occurred in a field in Baton Rouge or on a dock in Harvey. The ALJ, however, found that the evidence showed that the injury occurred on the dock. The BRB further concluded that Bunol‘s employer conducted maritime activity at this facility. Again, the ALJ weighed conflicting evidence and rendered a decision that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Avondale Indus., 977 F.2d at 189 (defining “substantial evidence” as evidence that provides a substantial basis of fact from which can be reasonably inferred) (internal quotation omitted). Therefore, we find that the evidence supports the BRB‘s determination that Bunol‘s injury occurred on a situs covered by the LHWCA.
F.
Finally, LIGA disputes the BRB‘s determination concerning Bunol‘s residual wage earning capacity and demonstration of suitable alternative employment.3
LIGA again provides no evidence to challenge the findings of the BRB. We may not second-guess the determinations of the ALJ and the BRB absent a showing that substantial evidence does not support their conclusions. See Rihner, 41 F.3d at 1002. Accordingly, we find that the record supports the fact-finding of the ALJs and the determination of the BRB.
Respondent‘s motion to dismiss the petition for review is MOOT.
AFFIRMED.
Michael Russell Garber (argued), Badon & Ranier, Lake Charles, LA, for LeBlanc.
Marie K. McElderry, Dennis J. Dimsey, Rebecca K. Troth (argued), U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Washington, DC, for United States, Amicus Curiаe.
Before KING, Chief Judge, and DUHÉ and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
DUHÉ, Circuit Judge:
Danny LeBlanc appeals a jury‘s award of punitive damages to Gene Lewis, compensatory damages to Louisiana ACORN Fair Housing, Inc. (the “Appellees“), and the district court‘s award of attorney‘s fees to Appellees. The Appellees also appeal the district court‘s attorney‘s fees award. We reverse and vacate the jury‘s punitive damage award to Lewis, its compensatory damage award to ACORN, and the district court‘s attorney‘s fees award. We аffirm all other issues.
I. BACKGROUND
Gene Lewis (“Lewis“), who is black, called Danny LeBlanc (“LeBlanc“) on January 2, 1996, in response to a newspaper advertisement regarding the rental of a one-bedroom apartment in Lake Charles, La. LeBlanc owns and rents eleven furnished apartment units. Lewis then went to view the apartment and make the $100 deposit LeBlanc had requested. A tenant, Betty Richardson, showed Lewis the apartment. Richardson told Lewis that she did not think LeBlanc would rent to him because LeBlanc was prejudiced.
Lewis then asked tо speak to LeBlanc. When LeBlanc arrived, he allegedly told Lewis that “I just don‘t rent to you people.” When Lewis asked what LeBlanc
Lewis and ACORN sued LeBlanc under the Federal Fair Housing Act,
A jury trial was held and the jury verdict is the centerpiece of this appeal. The jury first concluded that LeBlanc made statements to Lewis indicating an intent not to rent apartments to black people. The jury then found that LeBlanc refused to rent an apartment to Gene Lewis and that race or color was an effective reason for that refusal.
The Jury awarded Lewis no compensatory or nominal damages but awarded him $10,000 in punitive damages. The jury based its punitive damages award on its finding that LeBlanc‘s refusal to rent an apartment to Lewis was motivated by ill will, malice, or a desire to injure Lewis, or a reckless оr callous disregard for Lewis’ legal rights. The jury awarded ACORN $1,076 in compensatory damages but did not award it nominal or punitive damages. The district court later awarded the Appellees $10,000 in attorney‘s fees pursuant to
Although the district court provided detailed instructions regarding damages to the jury, it did not specify whether a punitive damages award must be predicated upon a nominal or compensatory damages award. The court made clear that if the jury determined that LeBlanc violated the FHA it may award compensatоry and/or nominal damages. During its deliberations, the jury asked the court for definitions of compensatory and nominal damages. The judge then read definitions to the jury from Black‘s Law Dictionary. The judge said “[c]ompensatory damages are such as will compensate the injured party for the injury sustained and nothing more, such as will simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong or injury, damages awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity or restitution for harm sustained by him.” Regarding nominal damages, the judge said, “[n]ominal dаmages are a trifling sum awarded to a plaintiff in an action where there is no substantial loss or injury to be compensated, but still the law recognizes a technical invasion of his rights or a breach of the defendant‘s duty, or in cases where, although there has been a real injury, the plaintiff‘s evidence entirely fails to show its amount.”
II. DISCUSSION
A. Punitive Damages
LeBlanc contends that we should vacate Lewis’ punitive damages award because the jury awarded Lewis neither compensatory nor nominal damages. Whether a plaintiff suing under the Federal Fair Hоusing Act may receive punitive damages absent compensatory or nominal damages is an issue of first impression in this Cir
The text of the Federal Fair Housing Act does not provide us with an easy answer. Section 3613(c) of the FHA provides that “(1) In a civil action under subsection (a) of this section, if the court finds that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred or is about to occur, the court may award the plaintiff actual and punitive damages.” The FHA is silent as to whether punitive damages may be awarded absent actual damаges. The text neither conditions a punitive damage award upon an award of actual damages nor does it endorse the jury finding in this case.
The FHA‘s legislative history provides little guidance. The United States Department of Justice, as Amicus Curiae for Appellees, relies heavily on Congress‘s 1988 amendments to the FHA. In an effort to strengthen enforcement of the FHA, Congress removed the $1,000 limitation on punitive damage awards that had been part of the Act since it was passed in 1968. A House Committee stated that the limitation on damages “sеrved as a major impediment to imposing an effective deterrent on violators and a disincentive for private persons to bring suits under existing law.” H.R.Rep. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1988). The United States argues that imposing a requirement that compensatory damages are a necessary predicate to an award of punitive damages would frustrate Congress’ purpose made clear in the 1988 amendments lifting the punitive damage limit. While the United States is correct to note that punitive damages are a very important component behind enforcement of the FHA, the legislative history neither supports nor discredits a punitive damages award absent actual damages.
Under these circumstances, we must apply the federal common law to fill this gap in the FHA which Congress has left unanswered. Courts create federal common law when it is necessary to effectuate the intent behind a federal statute. Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, § 6.3 at 353 (1994). When applying civil rights statutes, federal common law must be applied to effect uniformity, “otherwise the Civil Rights Acts would fail to effеct the purposes and ends which Congress intended.” Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 86 (3d. Cir.1965). Thus, where a cause of action arises out of a federal statute, federal, not state, law governs the scope of the remedy available to plaintiffs. Carpenters Dist. Council of New Orleans & Vicinity v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1288 (5th Cir.1994).
Based on these federal common law principles, we must assess both the FHA and other federal civil rights laws to determine whether a punitive damage award may stand absent a nominal or compensatory award. As the Fourth Circuit noted, “[t]here is no established federal common law rule that precludes the award of punitive damages in the absence of an award of compensatory damages.” People Helpers Foundation, Inc. v. City of Richmond, Va., 12 F.3d 1321, 1326 (4th Cir.1993). We must determine whether there is a common law rule allowing such a result. The Fifth Circuit has not addressed this question as it applies to the FHA and decisions by other circuits provide a variety of different answers.
The two most recent cases come from the Third and Fourth Circuits. In Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419 (3d Cir.2000), a jury found that the defendant violated the FHA when he denied rental housing to the plaintiffs based on race. However, the jury did not award actual damages. The district court thеn declined to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury. The Third Circuit reversed this decision stating: “it bears mentioning that beyond a doubt, punitive damages can be awarded in a civil rights case where a jury finds a constitutional violation, even when the jury has not awarded compensatory or nominal damages.” Id. at 430 (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974); Basista, 340 F.2d at 87) (emphasis added). The Third Circuit additionally noted that a FHA violation is all that is needed to establish liability. Id.2
The Fourth Circuit dealt with a similar question when a jury in a FHA case awarded one dollar in punitive damages but no compensatory damagеs. The Fourth Circuit concluded that “in the absence of statutory language to the contrary” punitive damages are not recoverable unless predicated upon an award of actual damages. People Helpers Found., Inc., 12 F.3d at 1327. Nevertheless, we respectfully suggest that the Fourth Circuit‘s basis for this holding is flawed. First, the court did not rely on any civil rights cases in reaching its decision. Id. at 1326-27. A survey of cases interpreting federal civil rights laws is essential, in our view, because of the need to maintain a uniform federal common law. Second, the Fourth Circuit noted that a majority of the 50 states prohibit punitive damage awards when there is no compensatory award. Id. at 1327. Although state law may be useful in articulating a policy for our interpretation of federal common law, it is federal law that must be the centerpiece of our decision not state law.
Appellees contend that two other cases support upholding Lewis’ punitive damages award. In Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487 (9th Cir.1978), a jury awarded one dollar in actual damages and $5,000 in punitive damages. The court noted in dicta that “it has in fact been noted that a finding of аctual damages is not a condition to the award of punitive damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1968.” Id. at 492 (citing Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1112 n. 4 (7th Cir.1972), aff‘d. sub nom. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974)). This decision is not entirely on point because the jury did award a nominal award in addition to punitive damages. Moreover, the case relies on Rogers v. Loether. The Appellees argue that Rogers supports the proposition that the FHA does not require a finding of actual damages as a condition to the award of punitive damages. 467 F.2d at 1112 n. 4. However, the Seventh Circuit in Rogers never decided this question raising the issue only in dicta.
In conclusion, the FHA cases do not provide us with a uniform federal common law. The Third Circuit holds punitivе damages may be appropriate when a constitutional violation exists. The Fourth Circuit closes the door on punitive damages absent an award of actual damages but uses questionable authority to reach that conclusion. The Seventh and Ninth Circuit cases suggest that a punitive award is permissible absent actual damages but did not confront the question directly as we must.
We must now examine decisions by this and other federal courts interpreting similar federal civil rights statutes. In a series of
The rule in our circuit is that in the absence of proof of actual injury, a plaintiff who has been deprived of his constitutional rights may only collect nominal damages. Mere proof of the violation of a right will not support an award of compensatory damages. However, claims of mental and emotional distress, if proven, can support an award of compensatory damages. Moreover, the societal interest in deterring or punishing violators of constitutional rights supports an award of punitive damages even in the absence of actual injury.
(Internal citations omitted and emphasis added).
Therefore, our circuit has adhered to the general rule that a punitive award may stand in the absence of actual damages where there has been a constitutional violation, a rule similar to the Third Circuit FHA rule in Alexander.
A review of other court decisions interpreting Section 1983 reveals a similar link between a finding of a constitutional violation and upholding a punitive award absent a showing of actual harm. The Seventh Circuit has long held that a jury may award punitive damages even absent a compensatory award if the plaintiff suffered a constitutional violation. Erwin v. Manitowoc, 872 F.2d 1292, 1299 (7th Cir.1989); McKinley v. Trattles, 732 F.2d 1320, 1326 (7th Cir.1984); Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 889 (7th Cir.1983); Endicott v. Huddleston, 644 F.2d 1208, 1217 (7th Cir.1980).
Beyond Section 1983, decisions interpreting other civil rights acts reach more varied results on the question whether a punitive award may be upheld absent actual damages. Speaking generally, the Third Circuit has said that federal law permits the recovery of punitive damages and as a matter of federal common law it is not necessary to prove nominаl damages. Basista, 340 F.2d at 87.
However, since the Third Circuit‘s insightful decision in Basista, federal courts have become more divided on this punitive damages question. The Seventh Circuit determined that under
Although the goal of a federal common law of damages is to produce uniform results, so far the federal judiciary has not succeeded in this endeavor. There are many cases under the FHA and other civil rights statutes that support either upholding or vacating Lewis’ punitive damages award. However, we find most instructive our own circuit‘s case law limiting punitive damages awards, absent an actual damages award, to cases were a violation of a constitutional right has occurred. LeBlanc did violate Lewis’ rights under the FHA but he did not violate Lewis’ constitutional rights. For that reason, we vacate Lewis’ punitive damage award.3
In the alternative, the Appellees argue that we should rеmand the case to the district court for a further determination of the damages award. First Appellees contend that because the jury found LeBlanc violated the FHA the district court should have award Lewis nominal damages for this invasion of his civil rights. Appellees contend that when rights are violated in a civil rights case a presumption of injury exists, thereby requiring at least nominal damages. Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986); Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159, 164 (5th Cir.1977).
Next Appellees contend that the jury may have lumped the compensatory and nominal damages awards into the punitive sum because of its misunderstanding of the law. They also argue that the jury may have been confused about the damage definitions. We do not find this argument persuasive. The jury used a two-page verdict form that asked them only four questions addressing each type of damage award separately. The jury also asked the judge during deliberations for definitions of nominal and compensatory damages. Moreover, the fact that the jury awarded ACORN compensatory damages but not punitive damages refutes any argument that the jury may have been confused by the types of damage awards or lumped the various awards together.
B. ACORN‘s Standing
LeBlanc also appeals the jury‘s compensatory damages award to ACORN and the court‘s attorney‘s fees award to ACORN. ACORN also appeals its attorney‘s fees award. Before we reach the merits of these awards, we must detеrmine sua sponte whether ACORN has standing to bring this suit against LeBlanc.
The Supreme Court, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), stated the minimum requirements that an organization must establish to have constitutional standing:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed in a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (internal quotes, parentheses and citations omitted).
We must focus on the injury in fact requirement. Under the Federal Fair Housing Act, the Supreme Court has held that an organization has suffered injury in fact if the defendant‘s actions impaired the organization‘s ability to provide counseling and referral services. The Court said, “[s]uch concrete and demonstrable injury to the organizаtion‘s activities—with the consequent drain on the organization‘s resources—constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization‘s abstract social interests.” Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982). Although the
Based on these two cases, the Fifth Circuit has described what types of organizational activities do not meet the Supreme Court‘s injury in faсt requirement. For example, “[t]he mere fact that an organization redirects some of its resources to litigation and legal counseling in response to actions or inactions of another party is insufficient to impart standing upon the organization.” Association for Retarded Citizens of Dallas v. Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation Ctr. Bd. of Trustees, 19 F.3d 241, 244 (5th Cir.1994) (Federal Fair Housing Act case); see also Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Fowler, 178 F.3d 350, 358-59 (5th Cir.1999).
In contrast, we noted that an organization could have standing if it had proven a drain on its resources resulting from counteracting the effects of the defendant‘s actions. Id. at 360. Likewise, the Third Circuit concluded that a housing organization had standing where its staff “stopped everything else” and devoted all attention to the litigation in question and diverted resources to counter the defendant‘s conduct. Alexander, 208 F.3d at 427 n. 4. We reiterate that the Supreme Court in Havens noted that an organization must demonstrate at trial that it suffered some sort of impairment in facilitating open housing before receiving judicial relief.
We conclude that ACORN did not demonstrate at trial any impairment in facilitating open housing. At best ACORN proved the resources it exрended defending Lewis (although ACORN never kept time sheets to record its work for Lewis); but it did not prove a drain on its resources. ACORN‘s executive director, Jeffrey Karlson, testified at length at the trial. However, Karlson neither mentioned any specific projects ACORN had to put on hold while working on Lewis’ case nor did he describe in any detail how ACORN had to re-double efforts in the community to combat discrimination.
One excerpt in particular demonstrates the conjectural and hypothetical nature of Karlson‘s testimony. When asked tо describe how LeBlanc‘s discrimination frustrated ACORN‘s mission, Karlson said:
Again, all I can do is base this on the mission of the organization being frustrated over two and a half years in trying to resolve this particular complaint to the extent that this one complaint started to take over an inordinate amount of our work time and staff time of our normal activities, really takes away from our activities in other areas, being able to do outreach and education, research and monitoring, intakes and investigations of complaints. It takеs away from our normal activities—and this particular case has. My estimate is 96 and a half hours of our staff time, over two and a half years, and that‘s conservative. If I kept time sheets, probably much larger than that, but we did not.
But in terms of frustration of mission, our mission after we resolved the complaint, we have to make up for all that lost ground and all that lost time. And I can‘t sit here and give you and exact amount for what that is, but we have to go back out and repair the damage that‘s been done, because the discrimination in this casе is continuing and ongoing. That‘s why we‘re in court, trying to seek relief to get that to stop and to stop it from happening in the future. So, to the extent that we can do that through frustration of mission, we have to go back and redouble our efforts in the community to make up for that lost ground that was taken away from us during the course of this particular complaint and to help heal some of the damage in the community. I don‘t know if I
can really explain it much more than that. (Tr. at 88-89).
None of ACORN‘s testimony at trial demonstrates a concrete and particularized injury as required by Lujan; instead, as the Supreme Court cautioned in Lujan, ACORN‘s injury based on the testimony at trial is only conjectural, hypothetical and speculative. Therefore, we find that ACORN lacks standing to bring suit and reverse and vacate the jury‘s compensatory award to ACORN. In addition, because ACORN lacks standing, we conclude that ACORN is not longer a “prevailing party” pursuant to
CONCLUSION
We reverse and vacate the district court‘s punitive damages award to Lewis, and the compensatory damages award and attorney‘s fees award to ACORN. In all other respects we affirm.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND VACATED IN PART.
KING, Chief Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Judge Duhé has written a careful and thorough opinion, and I concur in Part IIB of the opinion and its holding regarding ACORN‘s standing. While I agree fully with the description in Part IIA of the opinion of the legal landscape on the award of punitive damages, I cannot agree with its conclusion, and I would affirm Lewis’ punitive damage award. As Judge Easterbrook said in declining to read a compensatory-punitive link into § 1981a or Title VII when no such link had been reаd into § 1983, “[e]xtra-statutory requirements for recovery should not be invented.” Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir.1998). I can see no justification for inventing such a requirement for the FHA.
As the majority acknowledges, punitive damages are a very important part of the FHA‘s goal of eradicating discriminatory practices. “Punitive damages are awarded in the jury‘s discretion ‘to punish [the defendant] for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.‘” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 54, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983) (quoting
I see no language in the Act dictating the majority‘s conclusion and I find it unfaithful to the FHA‘s purposes. I also see it as providing a basis for similar conclusions in other сontexts, thereby threatening the fulfillment of other civil rights acts’ goals. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.