48 La. Ann. 331 | La. | 1896
The opinion of the court was delivered by
In 1895 the Police Jury of Bienville parish contracted for the building of a court house. The ordinance providing for the erection of the court house and accepting a bid from the contractors, the terms of payment and the amounts to be paid in instal-ments were fixed as follows: Two thousand dollars 1st February, 1896 ; three thousand dollars February 1, 1897; three thousand dollars February 1, 1898; three thousand dollars February 1, 1899; three thousand dollars February 1, 1900, with eight per cent, inter
This contract is assailed by plaintiffs on the grounds: First, that the current expenses and existing outstanding obligations of the parish will consume the entire revenues of the parish arising from the ten mills as allowed by law, and the current licenses, together with whatever funds may be in hand, belong to the parish; that therefore there are no revenues with which to carry out said illegal contract for the building of the courthouse. Second, that the police jury is without authority to enter into a contract for the building of a court house, or contract a debt or pecuniary liability without providing in the ordinance creating the debt the means of paying the principal and interest of the debt so contracted; and, third, that the police jury can not pledge the future revenues of the parish, or issue any obligation, warrant, promissory note or any evidence of debt, or incur any future liability.
There was judgment for the defendants. Plaintiffs appealed.
The parish of Bienville had the undoubted right to build the court house. This duty is imposed by law. The question presented is whether they adopted the proper means for defraying all expenses in connection with its construction.
On the first point it is alleged that the current expenses and outstanding obligations of the parish will more than consume the ten-mill tax — the full limit of parochial taxation, without a compliance with Art. 209 of the Constitution. If the parish for legitimate expenses has reached the limit of taxation prescribed, then there must be a strict compliance with Art. 209. But we are not to estimate the outstanding obligations of the parish, not provided for in
The ordinance exhibits a strict compliance with the law, in providing in the ordinance creating the debt the means of paying the same, as there is an appropriation of a part of the ten-mill tax for each year, until it is paid. We can not class the obligation on the part of the police jury to pay at designated times, certain sums of money on its contract, as a promissory note, bond or warrant.
Of course no warrant can issue on the parish treasury when there are no funds to meet it. The law positively prohibits it. Act 30 of 1877. The cases relied on by plaintiffs and reported in 23 An. 191 (Capmartin vs. Police Jury); 23 An. 232 (Breaux vs. Parish of Iberville); 23 An. 251 (Marionneaux et als. and other cases vs. Police Jury Parish of Iberville); 24 An. (Edwards vs. Parish of Bossier); 26 An. 59 (Sterling vs. Parish of West Feliciana); 30 An. 461 (Smith vs. Parish of Madison); 42 An. 886 (Snelling vs. Police Jury et als.), do not apply to this case. In these eases negotiable paper was issued, or bonds or warrants issued for the purpose of raising money.
In the last case cited, Snelling vs. Police Jury et als., 42 An. 886, there was a contract for the building of a bridge, and to pay for the same ten negotiable promissory notes were issued. But we were careful to say in that case that police juries have the authority to contract for improvements which they are authorized to make, to he paid out of the taxes which they are authorized to levy, and which are set apart for this special purpose. The money sp raised and set apart, however, must be in the treasury before a warrant could issue, for the Act No. 30, Secs. 1 and 5, of 1877, expressly says so.
The budget, or exhibit of expenses, shows that in the year 1896, in which the first payment is provided for, the last instalment on the jail will have been paid, leaving six mills for current expenses, and an excess of four mills to be applied to other purposes.
We find in the ordinance no violation of Art. 209 of the Constitution, nor do we find that it conflicts with any statute of the State.
Judgment affirmed.