Louise Rosmer, on Behalf of Herself and as Class Representative v. Pfizer IncorporatedLouise Rosmer, on Behalf of Herself and as Class Representative v. Pfizer Incorporated
Lead Opinion
Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge WILKINSON wrote the majority opinion, in which Senior Judge HALL joined. Judge MOTZ wrote a dissenting opinion.
OPINION
This case turns on one discrete question of statutory interpretation — whether
I.
Louise Rosmer filed an action in state court against Pfizer Inc. on behalf of herself and as class representative for “all persons whose spouses have been injured by the drug Trovan.” She alleged a loss of consortium arising from injuries to her husband caused by Trovan, an antibiotic manufactured by Pfizer. She sought to recover general and special damages resulting from the loss of consortium as well as punitive damages.
Only state-law claims were pled. Ros-mer is a resident of South Carolina. Pfizer is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New York. The parties agree that Rosmer’s individual claim exceeded $75,000. The complaint alleged, however, that some class members suffered less than $75,000 in actual and punitive damages.
Pfizer removed this action from state court to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, basing federal subject matter jurisdiction on
II.
In 1973, the Supreme Court held that in a class action, multiple plaintiffs with separate and distinct claims must each satisfy the jurisdictional amount for diversity suits in federal courts. See Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co.,
The rule that all plaintiffs in a class action must independently satisfy the amount in controversy requirement went unchallenged until 1990, when Congress created supplemental jurisdiction with the passage of
The supplemental jurisdiction statute was passed .in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Finley v. United States,
Congress did not authorize supplemental jurisdiction in all cases, however.
III.
We must decide whether
A.
The only exceptions to the federal court’s supplemental jurisdiction authority are those “provided in subsections (b) and (c)” or those “expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute.”
Rosmer nevertheless argues that the text of
We disagree with the Leonhardt court on this issue. Leonhardt relied on two main points to support its holding. First, it stated that the term “original jurisdiction” in
First, the text of
Indeed, the Leonhardt analysis falters because “original jurisdiction” would mean something different in
Second, Rosmer and Leonhardt maintain that “original jurisdiction” over a “civil action” means that the district court must have original jurisdiction over the entire action at the initiation of the complaint. Yet this reading of the statute would render the phrase “over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction” virtually superfluous.
The phrase “other claims” cannot refer only to claims added after the action has already been filed. The Leonhardt court read the “other claims” language narrowly because
The Leonhardt court’s analysis on this point, however, does not persuade us.
Furthermore, if supplemental jurisdiction is premised on initially obtaining original jurisdiction over the whole action, the statute would not even apply to cases such as United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,
Rosmer urges us to read distinction after distinction into the term “original jurisdiction.” But we refuse to squint at
B.
Rosmer argues, however, that
The Supreme Court, however, has consistently stated that when a statute is plain on its face, a court’s inquiry is at an end. “The legislative intent of Congress is to be derived from the language and structure of the statute itself, if possible, not from the assertions of codifiers directly at odds with clear statutory language.” United States v. Lanier,
C.
■Rosmer maintains, however, that since the statutory text is ambiguous, we may resort to the use of legislative history. She argues that since three other circuits and four Justices of the Supreme Court (by voting to reverse in Abbott) would hold that
We respect the views of those who take a different view of
Rosmer further maintains that
D.
Rosmer finally argues that interpreting
It is not our place to balance these competing policies. For us to say which party makes a superior policy argument would betray a misunderstanding of the role of courts in our federal system. The plain text of
IV.
A word, finally, on the position of our fine dissenting colleague. The debate over federal diversity jurisdiction has been a long-running one, and the dissent makes no secret of which side it embraces. It extols “the century-long congressional practice of narrowing rather than expanding diversity jurisdiction.” Infra at 123. It references the proposition that the “well-established ‘congressional purpose’ to limit diversity jurisdiction served [the] two salutary goals” of “limiting the rising caseload of diversity cases so that the federal courts would not be overwhelmed by state law questions and unable to resolve federal question cases promptly,” and “acceding to the ‘rightful independence of state governments,’ which ‘requires that [federal courts] scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute [
It is difficult to view the dissent as anything more than an all-out assault on federal diversity jurisdiction. There are, to be sure, legitimate arguments to be made for and against the exercise of this form of federal jurisdiction. As a set of policy prescriptions, the dissent is in many ways congenial. However, Article III rather explicitly charges Congress with “ordain[ing] and establish[ing]” the structure of the federal courts, the boundaries of their jurisdiction, and the parameters of
Reduced to its analytical core, the dissent argues that
This is so for two reasons, which we have earlier touched upon. First, one searches in vain for a difference in the way
Second,
The dissent argues that its “reading of
Much of the dissent is a pastiche of legislative history and policy prescription, with quotations from the Federal Courts Study Committee thrown in for good measure. Though we see no reason to examine
[0]n its .face,section 1367 does not appear to forbid supplemental jurisdiction over claims of class members that do not satisfysection 1332 ’s jurisdictional amount requirement, which would overrule Zahn .... [There is] a disclaimer of intent to accomplish this result in the legislative history.... It would have been better had the statute dealt explicitly with this problem, and the legislative history was an attempt to correct the oversight.
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Stephen B. Burbank, & Thomas M. Mengler, Compounding or Creating- Confusion About Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 Emory L.J. 943, 960 n. 90 (1991). In reading the clear language of the statute in the same way that the esteemed drafters of
We have no idea whether, as the drafters intimate, Congress made a “mistake” or “oversight” here. It is not implausible to believe that the legislature desired a single class action, even one in diversity, to be resolved in a single judicial setting. Additionally, Congress may have, rightly or wrongly, imputed a bias in state court against certain out-of-state defendants which it sought to counteract by fortifying diversity jurisdiction. The point is’ that Congress can take such steps. And in exercising its constitutional prerogatives, Congress is even free to incur the displea
V.
It seems appropriate in conclusion to repair to the simplicity of the statute. Louise Rosmer is of diverse citizenship and her claim exceeds the amount in controversy requirement of
The straightforward nature of the statutory interpretation here is paralleled by the straightforward route through which Congress can amend the statute. If Congress wishes to exempt diversity class actions from supplemental jurisdiction, it need do nothing more than insert the words “
AFFIRMED.
Notes
.
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between—
(1) citizens of different States....
.
§ 1367 . Supplemental Jurisdiction.
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely onsection 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements ofsection 1332 .
(c)The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if—
1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction,
3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or
4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
. Although the plaintiff in Finley amended her complaint to add the non-diverse party, the holding was in no way based on the formalistic distinction between whether the plaintiff originally filed the complaint against both parties or amended the complaint to do so.
. Moreover, even if we were inclined to write in an exception for
. The same can be said of the dissent’s concern that § 1367(b) does not except claims by
This same observation is sufficient to meet the dissent's further objection that the majority is overruling Strawbridge v. Curtiss. See infra at 126-128. The majority, of course, is doing nothing more than interpreting a statute. Rosmer’s claim satisfies the requirement of Strawbridge. And to say that § 1367 overrules Strawbridge is to say that Gibbs overruled National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
Because § 1367 unambiguously preserves the rule of Zahn v. International Paper Company,
I.
Section 1367(a) provides in relevant part:
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
Just as clearly, however,
Since the earliest years of the Republic, however, the Supreme Court has interpreted the diversity jurisdiction statute to require complete diversity of citizenship of each plaintiff from each defendant. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss,
The Supreme Court has also held that
In Snyder, the Court concluded that where no members of the plaintiff class possessed a claim meeting the “matter in controversy” requirement they could not aggregate their claims; and so a federal court had no jurisdiction over such a class action. Id. at 336,
In Zahn, the Supreme Court considered whether Snyder applied to diversity-based class actions like the one at issue here, in .which only the named plaintiff satisfied the “matter in controversy” requirement. See Zahn,
In so concluding, the Court made clear that its holding was premised upon its construction of
In summary, the Supreme Court has definitively interpreted
II.
Nevertheless, Pfizer maintains, and the majority holds, that when, in 1990, Congress enacted the supplemental jurisdiction statute,
To accomplish this incongruous result, the majority must look past the Supreme Court’s clear and definitive interpretations of
This is not to say that
Nor does retaining the Zahn rule affect the holdings in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,
Furthermore, the linchpin of the majority’s statutory analysis — reliance on the prohibitions listed in
In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely onsection 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20 or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements ofSection 1332 .
The majority maintains that because “nowhere in
On the other hand, if the majority were correct and
The majority’s approach strips
Moreover, under the majority’s interpretation, § 1867 overrules not just Zahn, but also the venerable precedent established almost 200 years ago in Strawbridge v. Curtiss. Before today, plaintiffs have not been allowed to use ancillary or pendent jurisdiction to circumvent Strawbridge,
In addition to upsetting long-established precedent, the majority’s interpretation utterly conflicts with the steadfast Congressional policy of restricting, rather than expanding, diversity jurisdiction. The majority’s holding would be remarkable even if compelled by the statutory text. But nothing in
Nor does the majority’s approach find any support in
Although it is clear that Congress did not determine to accept the Study Committee’s suggestion to curtail diversity jurisdiction, it is equally clear that Congress did not determine to expand diversity jurisdiction by enactment of
The majority’s interpretation of
III.
In short, the majority today fashions an interpretation of
. The Snyder Court noted that the well-established "congressional purpose” to limit diversity jurisdiction served two salutary goals: (1) limiting the rising caseload of diversity cases so that the federal courts would not be overwhelmed by state law questions and unable to resolve federal question cases promptly, and (2) acceding to the "rightful independence of state governments,” which "requires that[federal courts] scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute [
. Specifically,
. The sole exception to Strawbridge's well-established restrictive interpretation of
. Lest there be a suggestion that.my membership on the Federal Courts Study Committee has led me to an unprincipled acceptance of its views, I note that as a member, I voted against its recommendation that Congress limit diversity jurisdiction. See Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee at 42-43. Although the result the majority reaches today may better accord with my personal policy views, I cannot concur in its holding given the clear statutory language adopted by the appropriate policy-maker — the Congress.