53 N.Y.S. 985 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1898
The correctness of the decision below does not depend upon the solution of the question so elaborately discussed by counsel; namely, whether the definite sum specified in the receipt which accompanied ' the delivery of the deed could be extended by a subsequent parol agreement between the parties. It may be assumed for the purposes of this discussion that it could not. And it may also be assumed that, even if it could, the evidence of such extension was ' insufficient to justify a finding to that effect. The real question is-whether the definite sum so specified in the receipt has actually been paid. The burden of proof of such payment was clearly upon the respondents. They furnished no direct evidence thereof. What they claimed was that payment was effected in law by.the bank’s receipt and proper application of the rents subsequently assigned to it. This, too, is undoubtedly what the learned referee meant when he found as a fact that “the Murray Hill Bank was repaid the amount mentioned in said letter, to-wit, $5,000” — the letter here referred to being the paper to which we have attributed the character of a receipt. There could be no question that the parties could agree by parol upon the due application of these rents. They stood upon an entirely different footing-from the equitable mortgage effected by the deed and receipt. To extend such a mortgage by parol would be one thing; to agree upon the application of the-rents was quite another. The appellants claim that the original loan of $5,000 was not paid by the receipt of these rents, for the reason that the latter were applied to other purposes under an agreement which the parties were perfectly competent to make. If such an agreement is made out, either expressly or by implication, resulting from the understanding of the parties and the course of dealing between them, then the respondents’ rights are subject thereto,
The question whether Bauer agreed that the rents should be applied to some other purpose than the payment of the $5,000 in question involves the consideration of the evidence. There is no proof of any express agreement, at the outset, as to what should be done with those rents. ’ The bank, in fact,- deposited them in.three accounts which Bauer had, and used them wherever advantageous to pay charges against him. An account marked “ Moritz Bauer account, 158th street Court House,” Was opened on December' 19,. 1895. In this the rents were thereafter deposited, and overdrafts from the other accounts were charged against it. Before this date the rents were placed to the credit of the other accounts, and used like any of Bauer’s deposits. - It is thus clear, so far as .the proof goes, that the rents were not used to pay this specific $5,000 loan. It is not pretended , that Bauer protested against this, or signified his disapprobation in any way. He says that he did' not inquire, and did not know what was being done with the rents, and that he had no knowledge that they were used to pay his overdrafts. It is difficult to credit this testimony. If we are to believe it, during a period of four years and a half the bank received' many thousands of dollars of Bauer’s money, about the disposition of which he never took the trouble to inform himself. It is clear that he had ample
Bauer’s testimony is directly contradicted-by that of Iieimburg, ■one of the directors of the bank. The latter states: “ I had repeated talks with Mr. Bauer ás to how the rents of the real estate were being applied. , * * * Mr. Bauer told me, whenever either of the.accounts should be short, the rents should be applied to either one of them; and he often said ‘ in about two weeks you will have $650 again when the rent becomes due from the city.’ Q. A:nd either account that would be short, you could apply the rent to? A. Yes, sir.” The whole situation of the parties lends great weight to this testimony. Bauer was in constant need of .money, .and kept soliciting the bank to make him advances. He also repeatedly overdrew his accounts. In the end he owed the bank over $50,000, for which the security was quite insufficient. His .account was a source of anxiety to the bank, which was trying to protect itself. Among other things, the bank officials endeavored without success to get Bauer to execute an instrument making the equity in the court house property security for his general indebtedness. It is most improbable that the officers of the bank would have consented to allow the money derived from the rents to be applied to that small portion of his debt which was .abundantly and overwhelmingly secured. That Bauer could ever have entertained such an idea is, also, most improbable. That he did not is demon
The result of our examination of this branch of the case is that,, whether or not Bauer expressly and specifically agreed at the outset-as to what should be done with the rents, they were applied as they were with his full knowledge and consent; and ■ that the arrangement thus entered into is .binding upon both him and the respondents. - We think that it would be a fraud upon the bank now to-allow the money to be diverted to another purpose.
A different result would follow if there were proof that the-rents yere actually applied in payment of this particular loan in whole or in part.. But, as we have seen,'the respondents rely, not. upon proof of this sort, but upon the general right of Bauer, in. the absence of any special agreement, to have the rents so applied. That right, however, was lost by the implied agreement resulting from the clear understanding and course of dealing between the parties of which we have treated.
We also think that the bank was entitled in. any event to prior
These views necessitate a reversal. The other questions discussed need not now be considered, as they are not likely to arise upon a rehearing.
The ■ order appealed from should be reversed, the exceptions to the report sustained, and a rehearing ordered before another referee, with costs to the appellants to abide the event.
Van Brunt, P. J., Rumsey, O’Brien and McLaughlin, JJ., concurred.
Order reversed, exceptions to report, sustained, and rehearing ordered before another referee, with costs to appellants to abide event.