56 Ind. 253 | Ind. | 1877
Appellee, as plaintiff, sued the appellant, as defendant, in the court below, to recover the cost of certain street improvements, and to have the same declared a lien on certain real estate. Appellee’s complaint was in two paragraphs. The appellant demurred separately to each paragraph of the complaint, for the want of sufficient facts therein to constitute a cause of action; which demurrer was overruled, and appellant excepted. The appellant then answered, in three paragraphs, as follows :
First. A general denial;
Second. The causes of action did not accrue within six years before the commencement of the action; and,
Appellee demurred separately to the second and third paragraphs of appellant’s answer; which demurrers were sustained by the court below, and the appellant excepted. And the action, being at issue, was tried by the court below, without a jury, and a finding made in favor of appellee and against the appellant. On written causes filed, appellant moved the court below for a new trial, which motion was overruled, and appellant excepted. Appellant also moved the court below in arrest of judgment, which motion was overruled, and appellant excepted. And judgment was rendered upon the finding of the1 court below, as prayed for in the complaint.
In this court, the appellant has assigned many alleged errors of the court below; but we will first consider those which call in question the sufficiency of the facts stated in each paragraph of the complaint, to constitute a cause of action.
In the first paragraph of its complaint, the appellee alleged, in substance, that appellant was indebted to appellee in the sum of fifty-six dollars and eighty-seven cents, with interest from December 9th, 1867, and costs taxed at five dollars, which indebtedness accrued as follows : That appellee, on the 8th day of July, 1867, being then an incorporated town, under a special act of the Legislature of this State, approved February 16th, 1848, and the amendments to said act, thereafter approved, enacted an ordinance providing for the grading, curbing and gravelling of Jefferson street, m said town, at the cost of the property holders and owners of lots fronting on said Jefferson street, as appears by a copy of said ordinance, filed with and made part of said paragraph; that the appellant was then, and still was, the owner of lot Yo. 105, fronting twenty-three feet on said Jefferson street, between Court street and the "Wabash and Erie Canal; that said ordinance was duly published for three consecutive weeks
In the second paragraph of its complaint, the appellee alleged, in substance, that on the 7th day of April, 1867, the appellant was, and ever since had been, the owner of lot Ho. 105, in the original plat of the town of Huntington,in Huntington county, Indiana, which lot had a front of seventy-seven feet on Market street, in said town, now
The question presented for our consideration by appellant’s demurrers to appellee’s complaint is the same as to each paragraph of said complaint. That question may be thus stated:—Did the proceedings of the officers of the town of Huntington, as set out in appellee’s complaint, in relation to the improvement of the streets therein mentioned, so far conform to the laws under which the town was incorporated, as to subject the appellant, or his lot, which fronted on said streets, to the payment of any portion of the cost of the improvement of the said streets, or of either of them?
At the time the proceedings mentioned in the complaint were had, the appellee was a town incorporated under an act entitled “An act incorporating the town of Huntington,” approved February 16th, 1848. Local Laws 1848, ,p. 487. By the 5th section of said act, it was provided, among other things, “ that all laws and ordinances which shall be passed by said common council, shall be published at length on the door of the court-house in Huntington or in a newspaper published in Huntington, at least ten days by order of said common council; after which publication in manner aforesaid, such laws and ordinances shall be and remain in full force until repealed or modified by the proper authority.” Local Laws 1848, p. 490. It would seem from this provision, that no ordinance of the town of Huntington could be regarded as in force for any purpose until it had been published, in manner aforesaid, by order of the common council, for at least ten days. There is no averment in either paragraph of appellee’s complaint, in this action, of any such publication of the ordinance therein mentioned.
“ Sec. 17. That for the purpose of carrying into effect the powers heretofore granted to the said common council, to compel the owners of lots to grade and pave or McAdamize the sidewalks or streets in front of their respective lots, said council are hereby authorized to order that said owners do so grade and pave or McAdamize said sidewalk or street within the period of thirty days after a copy of said ordinance shall have been personally served upon them by the marshal of said corporation, if said owners be residents of Huntington county, or if non-residents, by publication, for three consecutive weeks, in some newspaper published in said county, or by written notices posted up on the door of the court-house in Huntington, for the period of thirty days, and upon failure of said owners to comply with said ordinance within the period of sixty days, said common council shall require the marshal of said corporation to sell out said work to the lowest responsible bidder, after having given ten days’ notice of said sale,” etc.
It will be observed, in considering this amended section, that the publication of the ordinance, therein mentioned, is another and different publication, and for a very different purpose, from the publication provided for in the 5th section of the act incorporating said town. The latter publication was made to give validity to the ordinance, without which the ordinance would never be in force; while the former publication was made solely for the purpose, under the law, of giving notice to an owner of property, non-resident of Huntington county, of an ordinance supposed already to be in force. As we construe this amended section, in connection with the other sections of said act, and especially the said 5th section,
It seems, therefore, that, under the laws incorporating said town of Huntington, a valid and legal contract for the improvement of a street in front of a lot, owned by a non-resident of Huntington county, could not be so made as to render the lot, or the owner thereof, liable for the cost of such improvement, until at least one hundred and one days had elapsed after the passage of the ordinance requiring such improvement. In the first paragraph of appellee’s complaint, in this action, the time between the passage of the ordinance, and the sale of the contract for the improvement of the street, therein mentioned, was only eighty-four days; and, in the second paragraph of
In our opinion, the court below erred in overruling the appellant’s demurrer to each paragraph of appellee’s complaint. This conclusion renders it unnecessary for us to consider any of the other alleged errors assigned by the appellant.
The judgment of the court below is reversed, at the appellee’s costs, and the cause is remanded, with instructions to the court to sustain the appellant’s demurrer to each paragraph of appellee’s complaint, and for further proceedings.