for the Court:
¶ 1. Stеvie Lott, appearing pro se, appeals the Circuit Court of Jones County’s order clarifying his sentence after his post-release supervision was revoked. Treating Lott’s motion as one for post-conviction rеlief, we find no error and affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 2. In January 2001, a Jones County jury convicted Lott of two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him to serve twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), with five years to serve, and fifteen years suspended, with five of those years on post-release supervision.
¶ 3. On October 3, 2008, Officer Jason Cook filed a petition to have Lott’s post-release supervision revoked because Lott left the state of Mississippi and did not pay certain court-ordered fees. On March 24, 2009, a revocation hearing was held. Officer Cook testified that Lott had not reported to his field officer since June 11, 2008, and had failed to pay a $1,500 community-service fee or participate in the circuit court’s community-service program.
¶ 4. Lott denied the accusations, stating that after approximately six years
¶ 5. The trial court found Lott left Mississippi in violation of the terms of his post-releаse supervision. Thus, the trial court revoked Lott’s post-release supervision and required him to serve the remainder of his original sentence in the full-time custody of the MDOC.
¶ 6. In March 2011, Lott filed a motion to show cause for why his post-release
¶ 7. On January 27, 2012, the trial court entered an order in response, stating Lott was to serve the remaining time of his оriginal twenty-year sentence in the full-time custody of the MDOC. In its order, the trial court did not state specifically that it considered Lott’s motion as one for post-conviction relief; however, the subject matter of Lott’s claims is consistent with post-conviction proceedings.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 8. In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion for post-conviction relief, the appellate court “will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless they are found to be clearly errоneous.” Presley v. State,
ANALYSIS
I. Jurisdiction
¶ 9. Lott’s notice of appeal, was not filed in the trial court within thirty days of entry of the trial court’s judgment. Appellate rules require that the notice of appеal “shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.” M.R.A.P. 4(a). The trial court denied Lott’s motion to clarify his sentence on January 27, 2012. Lott’s notice of apрeal was stamped “filed” by the circuit court clerk on March 2, 2012, but is otherwise without a date.
¶ 10. We must determine whether appellate jurisdiction exists. The prison-mailbox rule states that in pro se post-conviction relief proceedings, the prisoner’s motion is considered delivered for filing when the prisoner gives the documents to prison officials for mailing. Sykes v. State,
¶ 11. There is no indication in the record when Lott delivered his documents to prison officials for mailing. Since his notice of appeal was received by the trial court only five days lаte, it is possible that the documents were delivered to prison authorities within the time frame allowed by Rule 4(a). The State has admitted that under the prison-mailbox rule, the appeal was probably timely noticed. Therefore, we exercise our discretion under Rule 2(c) to suspend the thirty-day requirement to the extent Lott’s filing may have been untimely. Accordingly, we find jurisdiction proper and address Lott’s appeal on the merits.
2. Revocation
¶ 12. As the State notes, Lott’s arguments about the revocation of his post-release supervision appear to “evolve.” Lott’s initial motion in March 2011 was to “show cause” as to why his “probation”
¶ 13. Post-release supervision is an alternative to probation for convicted felons. Ivory v. State,
the court ... shall cause the probationer to be brought before it and may ... revoke all or any part of the probation or the suspension of sentence, and may cause the sentence imposed to be executed or may impose any part of the sentence which might have been imposed at the time of conviction.
Id.
¶ 14. As stated earlier, due to the subject matter of his motion for clarification, it is proper to convert Lott’s pleading into a motion for рost-conviction relief, to the extent he is claiming his conditional release was improperly revoked. See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-5(l)(h). Here, after Lott had served his six years in prison, he began serving his five years of post-release supervisiоn. During this time, Lott violated the terms of his post-release supervision, and it was properly revoked under section 47-7-37. The judge then ordered Lott to serve the remainder of his twenty-year sentence in the custody of the MDOC.
¶ 15. It is apparent that the trial court was entitled to revoke Lott’s post-release supervision and impose his sentence based on the evidence presented at the revocation hearing by Officer Cook. At this hearing, Lott was tоld exactly what terms he had violated: failing to report to his field officer; failing to pay court costs, restitution, community-service fees, and fines; and failing to participate in the community-service program. While Lott claims that he was unaware he had to participate in a community service program, Lott admitted that he left Mississippi and went to Minnesota without permission to do so.
¶ 16. Lott’s sentence was not ambiguous. Nor was it necessary at the revocation hearing for the trial judge to reiterate verbally Lott’s entire sentence into the record; the order entered on January 27, 2012 states Lott is to serve “the remaining time of his original twenty (20) year sentence in the full-time custody” of the MDOC. Additionally, it is clear from the record and Lott’s pleadings that he knew the conditions of his post-release supervision, with the exception of the community service. However, the findings of other violations, suсh as not reporting to his field officer and paying certain fines, are sufficient to justify the revocation. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying post-conviction relief to Lott.
¶ 17. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JONES COUNTY DENYING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO JONES COUNTY.
Notes
. The original sentencing order is not a part оf the record before us.
. The trial court's order of January 2012 explains that Lott’s post-release supervision had been revoked on May 22, 2007 as well, and he was thus required to serve an additional year of his original twenty-year sentence in the full-time custody of the MDOC.
. Lott claims that he discussed this topic with officials at MDOC, and they recommended he file this motion to clarify his sentence.
. Lott refers to the following exchange at the March 24, 2009 revocatiоn hearing:
THE COURT: All right. The Court finds [Lott] left the State without permission of his probation officers whereby violating his post-release supervision. What do you recommend?
OFFICER COOK: I recommend that he complete his sentence, Your Honor, due tо the fact that he may leave the State again.
THE COURT: All right. The Court revokes his post-release supervision and requires him to serve the sentence.
. Additionally, while Lott filed his motion past the three-year statute of limitations for post-conviction relief petitions, petitions alleging an illegal sentence are not subject to this deadline. See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Supp.2012); Jackson v. State,
. However, "an inmate who is uncertain about the operation of his sentence and desires clarity should pursuе the administrative review procedures” of the MDOC, and not the court. Burns v. State,
. Other documents in the record associated with Lott’s appeal, such as his designation of the records and affidavit of poverty, are all signed and dated February 23, 2012.
. Lott's sentence did not appear to include any probation; thus, we assume he means "post-release supervision.”