Losinno v. HendersonLosinno v. Henderson
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Weinfeld
OPINION
EDWARD WEINFELD, District Judge.Petitioner, now serving an indeterminate sentence not to exceed four years at Auburn Correctional Facility, New York, seeks his release upon a federal writ of habeas corpus. His sentence was imposed pursuant to a judgment of conviction entered in the County Court of Orange, State of New York, upon his plea of guilty to promoting gambling in the first degree. He seeks to void the judgment of conviction on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution and under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 1
The petitioner’s plea of guilty was entered after his motion for an order of suppression of evidence obtained under an allegedly invalid eavesdropping warrant was denied. Upon direct appeal from the judgment of conviction, 2 the Appellate Division *382 held the warrant to be illegal, reversed the judgment of conviction and dismissed the indictment. 3 Upon appeal by the State, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the indictment and remitted the case to the Appellate Division, 4 which then affirmed the conviction. The claims here presented were also urged upon the state courts, and petitioner has exhausted available state remedies.
The petitioner charges three violations of his constitutional or statutory rights: First, that the eavesdropping warrant through which evidence was obtained against him was issued without probable cause in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment; second, that the eavesdropping warrant was void on its face because it authorized the District Attorney of Orange County to designate the person or persons to conduct the eavesdropping surveillance; and third, that the warrant was invalid on its face because it authorized the overhearing and interception of “all conversations” on the target telephone.
As to petitioner’s claim of the use of evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the recently decided case of Stone v. Powell 5 forecloses federal habeas corpus relief if “an opportunity for full and fair litigation” of such claim was afforded petitioner in the state courts. Upon each appellate review in the state courts, petitioner made the same contention of violation of Fourth Amendment rights that he here advances. Notwithstanding this, he argues that Stone is no bar to federal habeas corpus relief because the state appellate courts “remained silent” with respect to his Fourth Amendment claims, and because “there is really no sound way of knowing the basis upon which they rendered their opinions.” The appellate records make it clear that the constitutional claim was briefed and presented for review. There is, of course, no requirement that a court write an opinion touching upon every contention raised by an appellant. That the appellate courts rejected petitioner’s constitutional claims without specifically addressing each one does not indicate that he was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate them or that they were not fully considered. Indeed, when the Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction on remittitur, it stated that it had “considered the points raised by counsel and [found] them without merit.” As the Supreme Court recently remarked in Stone:
“[W]e are unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States. State courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law.” 6
Losinno’s further argument that he was deprived of a full and fair opportunity to litigate the constitutional claims presented here because he was not afforded an evidentiary hearing is without substance. These claims were based only on the warrant and the affidavit upon which it was issued, and consequently no hearing was required.
Petitioner contends that even if his constitutional claim is foreclosed under Stone v. Powell, he is nonetheless entitled to federal habeas corpus relief and the vacatur of the judgment of conviction because the State violated the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 — in short, that while his federal constitutional claim fails, the same facts establish a violation of the federal statute which voids the judgment of conviction.
A threshold question that the parties have not addressed is whether this Court has habeas corpus jurisdiction under 28
*
Whether the federal courts have habeas corpus jurisdiction where a state prisoner grounds his claim for release on an alleged violation of the laws of the United States and he does not claim a constitutional violation has rarely arisen under
Unambiguous as they may be, these statements cannot be taken to preclude consideration of nonconstitutional claims, because they were not made in response to an assertion of nonconstitutional federal rights. Nevertheless, the question of jurisdiction appears to be close, for there are serious objections to allowing habeas corpus proceedings to serve as yet another review by federal district courts of nonconstitutional claims already fully determined by state courts, which, like federal courts, are obligated to enforce the “laws ... of the United States.”
13
However, the recent opinion of the Supreme Court in
Davis v. United
States
14
gives direction on this jurisdictional issue. In
Davis
the Court held that errors of federal law “lacking a constitutional dimension” are cognizable on collateral attack under the “laws of the United States” provision of
“[T]here can be no doubt that the grounds for relief under§ 2255 are equiv *384 alent to those encompassed by§ 2254 . under which relief is available on the ground that ‘[a person] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’ ” 15 (Emphasis in original.)
The Court carefully noted, however, that not every violation of federal law is cognizable under
We thus turn to consideration of petitioner’s alleged federal statutory violations to determine whether they constitute a “fundamental defect” of such “exceptional circumstances” that habeas corpus relief is warranted. First, he argues that the wiretap warrant was invalid on its face under
Petitioner’s second statutory claim is that the wiretapping order was invalid on its face because it violated
Turning to the merits, however, it is apparent that Losinno’s minimization claim is without substance. He argues that the requirements of
Having found that the order, taken as a whole, did not in fact authorize continued listening to “all conversations,” we must further inquire whether the warrant nevertheless limited interceptions so as to comply with
Thus, in United States v. Grillo, 25 the Court of Appeals held that the minimization provision of the state statute
“is essentially a summation of ‘the more specific requirements of [C.P.L.] 700.- *386 30(l)-(6) [corresponding to18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) ], all of which lead to “minimization,” ’ . . . [W]hen the orders and supporting affidavits are construed in ‘a commonsense and realistic fashion,’ ■. . mere omission of the ‘talismanic minimization language’ from a wiretap order otherwise in compliance with the statute would not render the warrant invalid at least where the supporting affidavits evidenced an actual knowledge of the minimization requirements and an agreement to abide by [them]. 26
The order being attacked here easily passes muster under the standards enunciated in
Grillo.
Unlike the order in that case, this order authorized the District Attorney “to obtain by wiretapping conversations and discussions pertinent to the said [gambling] crimes.” In addition, the order complied in all respects with
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is accordingly denied.
Notes
.
. Under New York law, petitioner’s plea of guilty did not preclude appellate review of claims relating to improper denial of his suppression motion. N.Y.C.P.L. § 710.70(2) (McKinney’s 1971). Thus, the guilty plea did not constitute a waiver of such claims that would preclude federal habeas corpus review. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 95 S.Ct. 886, 43 L.Ed.2d 196 (1975).
. People v. Losinno, 47 A.D.2d 534, 363 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1975).
. People v. Losinno, 38 N.Y.2d 316, 379 N.Y.S.2d 777, 342 N.E.2d 556 (1975).
. - U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976).
. - U.S. - n. 35, 96 S.Ct. 3051, n. 35; see United States ex rel. Aloi v. Arnold, 413 F.Supp. 1384, 1386 (S.D.N.Y.1976).
. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 14, 1 Stat. 81.
. Act of Feb. 5, 1867 § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 416, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963).
.
. A few very early cases granted relief to state prisoners claiming to be in custody in violation of federal laws conferring on federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to try their crimes, but it is clear that such claims would always involve a denial of due process as well as a violation of a federal statute. See, e.g., Ex parte Tatum, 23 F.Cas. 708 (E.D.Va.1877). See also United States ex rel. Cook v. Parkinson, 396 F.Supp. 473 (D.S.D.1975) (criminal act performed on alleged Indian territory).
. Mapp v. Warden, 531 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1976); see, e.g., Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963); Stewart v. Cox, 344 F.2d 947 (10th Cir. 1965); Grundler v. North Carolina, 283 F.2d 798 (4th Cir. 1960); Norris v. South Carolina, 309 F.Supp. 1113 (D.S.C.1970); Williams v. Peyton, 297 F.Supp. 857 (W.D.Va.1969); United States ex rel. Hill v. Deegan, 268 F.Supp. 580, 596 n. 20 (S.D.N.Y.1970).
. See Stone v. Powell, - U.S. -, - n. 35, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3051, n. 35, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976).
. 417 U.S. 333, 94 S.Ct. 2298, 41 L.Ed.2d 109 (1974).
. Id. at 344, 94 S.Ct. at 2304.
. Id. at 346, 94 S.Ct. at 2305, quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 429, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962).
.
See Stone v.
Powell, - U.S. -, - n. 10, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3043 n. 10 (1976). Because state prisoners are rarely in a position to assert violations of nonconstitutional federal rights, no court appears to have applied
Davis
to a
. See Krilich v. United States, 502 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992, 95 S.Ct. 1429, 43 L.Ed.2d 673 (1975).
.
See United States v. Consiglio,
391 F.Supp. 564, 570 (D.Conn.1975).
See also United States v. Giordano,
416 U.S. 505, 515, 527-29, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974);
Gelbard v. United States,
408 U.S. 41, 46-52, 92 S.Ct. 2357, 33 L.Ed.2d 179 (1972). Much of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Stone v. Powell,
- U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), might be taken to imply that wrongful admission of illegally obtained evidence could never constitute a fundamental defect for purposes of habeas corpus jurisdiction. In
Stone,
however, the Court addressed itself only to violations‘of the judicially-created exclusionary rule, adopted to encourage compliance with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. The instant petition is grounded on alleged violations of the exclusionary rule adopted by Congress to effectuate its purposes in passing the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
. United States v. Scott, 170 U.S.App.D.C. 158, 516 F.2d 751, 754-55 (1975); United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 874 (7th Cir. 1975).
. See N.Y.C.P.L. § 700.30(7) (McKinney’s 1971).
. See United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 598 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936, 94 S.Ct. 2651, 41 L.Ed.2d 240 (1974).
. E. g., United States v. Rizzo, 491 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990, 94 S.Ct. 2399, 40 L.Ed.2d 769 (1974).
. United States v. Baynes, 400 F.Supp. 285 (E.D.Pa.1975).
. 499 F.2d 872 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056, 95 S.Ct. 638, 42 L.Ed.2d 653 (1974).
. Id. at 879, quoting United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936, 94 S.Ct. 2651, 41 L.Ed.2d 240 (1974) (citations omitted).