136 P. 864 | Ariz. | 1913
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of murder in the first degree, with punishment fixed at life-imprisonment, and from an order overruling a motion for a new trial. There are a number of complaints of the admission of evidence over the objection of appellant and the rejection of evidence offered by him. We have carefully examined these suggested errors.and have concluded that no prejudicial error was committed.
The appellant in his brief makes this statement: “The grounds for this appeal are that the verdict of the jury was contrary to the law and the evidence, in that there was no evidence to prove any premeditated design, no fact upon which to base criminal intent, nor from which malice might be inferred, and no evidence to show that defendant was even armed, or that he was guilty of any -overt act -at the scene of the homicide, or that he in any manner directly or indirectly contributed to the death of the deceased.” This is a direct challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict and judgment. Counsel for appellant has urged this ground with great earnestness and ability, both in brief and in his oral argument to the court.
The facts, succinctly stated, are: One Aviso, who was charged with a crime in Gila county, had gone to Eagle creek, Greenlee county. Jack Campbell, a deputy sheriff of Gila county, had gone to Greenlee county in search of Aviso. At Morenci he procured Alberto Manguia and H. D. Keppler, deputy sheriffs of Greenlee county, to go with him to Eagle creek to arrest Aviso. The -appellant Losano lived on Eagle creek, and the officers had information that Aviso was stopping at his house. This information was obtained on September 23, 1912,. and the officers left that night for Losano’s
Appellant suggests that Keppler, in his wild and hurried, effort to escape the fate of ,his fellow-officers, at best could have had only a momentary glance at the person whom he' recognized as appellant, and that his identification was very improbable and not worthy of belief. That, however, was a. question for the jury. The reasonableness, the weight, and' effect of statements of witnesses are peculiarly within the-province of the jury, and they having resolved the matter against the appellant, and their decision, having the approval of the trial court in his refusal to grant a new trial, ought not to be disturbed by us, but ratified in all eases of a conflict of evidence. The jury may have made a mistake, but they are more apt to be right in their deductions and conclusions than an appellate court. They see and hear the witnesses and have the advantage of observing their conduct and demeanor— psychological aids of inestimable worth never found in the cold records submitted to an appellate tribunal. The verdict of a jury upon conflicting evidence ordinarily will not be set. aside by an appellate court, the presumption being in favor of the verdict, and this seems to be the general rule in the courts of this country. 12 Cyc. 908, note 69.
The jury must have believed witness Keppler and must have been satisfied that appellant was present participating in the unprovoked and unnecessary killing of the two officers,, and, that being true, “premeditated design,” “criminal intent, ” “ from which malice might be inferred, ’ ’ were manifest, from appellant’s very actions and conduct.
Judgment affirmed.
FRANKLIN, O. J., and CUNNINGHAM, J., concur.