OPINION OF THE COURT
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delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.,
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suing a municipal entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must show that their injury was caused by a municipal policy or custom. The case before the Court in Monell directly involved monetary damages. The question presented is whether the “policy or custom” requirement also applies when plaintiffs seek prоspective relief, such as an injunction or a declaratory judgment. We conclude that it does so apply.
I
The case arises out of the following circumstances: The California Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act, Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 11164 et seq. (West Rev. Supp. 2010), requires law enforcement and other state agencies to investigate allegations of child abuse. These agencies must report to the California Department of Justice all instances of reported child abuse the agency finds “not unfounded,” even if they are “inconсlusive or unsubstantiated.” §§ 11169(a), 11170(a)(3). The statute requires the department to include all these reports in a Child Abuse Central Index (Index), where they remain available
“a report has previously been filed which subsequently proves to be unfounded, the Department of Justice shall be notified in writing of that fact and shall not retain the report.” § 11169(a).
The statute, however, does not set forth procedures for reviewing whether a previously filed report is unfounded, or for allowing individuals to challenge their inclusion in the Index. Nor, up until the time of this lawsuit, had California or Los Angeles County created any such procedures. But cf. § 11170(a)(2) (“The submitting agencies are responsible for the accuracy, completeness, and retention of the reports described in this section”).
The two plaintiffs in this case were initially accused of child abuse. But they were later exonerated. They sought to have their names removed from the Index. Unable to
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convince the Los Angeles Sheriffs Department to remove them, they filed this § 1983 casе against the attorney general of California, the Los Angeles County sheriff, two detectives in the sheriffs department, and the County of Los Angeles. They sought damages, an injunction, and a declaration that the defendants had deprived them of their constitutional rights by failing to create a procedural mechanism through which one could contest inclusion on the Index. See U. S. Const., Arndt. 14; Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment to all of the defendants on the ground that California had not deprived the plaintiffs of a constitutionаlly protected “liberty” interest. But on appeal the Ninth Circuit disagreed.
The Ninth Circuit held that the Fourteenth Amendment required the State to provide those included on the list notice and “ ‘some kind of hearing.’”
The Ninth Circuit also held that the plaintiffs were prevailing parties, thereby entitled to approximately $600,000 in attorney’s fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (providing for payment of attorney’s fees to parties prevailing on § 1983 claims). See No. 05-56467 (June 22, 2009), App. to Pet. for Cert. 1-4 (hereinafter First Fee Order); No. 05-56467 (Dec. 2, 2009), App. to Reply to Brief in Opposition 1-2 (hereinafter Second Fee Order). The Ninth Circuit wrote that Los Angeles County must pay approximately $60,000 of this amount. First Fee Order 3; Second Fee Order 2.
Los Angeles County dеnied that it was liable and therefore that it could be held responsible for attorney’s fees. It argued that, in respect to the county, the plaintiffs were not prevailing parties. That is because the county is a municipal entity. Under Monell’s holding a municipal entity is liable under § 1983 only if a municipal “policy or custom” caused a
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plaintiff to be deprived of a federal right.
The Ninth Circuit responded to this argument as follows: First, it said that county policy might be responsible for the deprivation. It “is possible,” the Ninth Circuit said, that the
The county then asked us to review this last-mentioned Ninth Circuit holding, namely, the holding that Monell’s “policy or custom” requirement applies only to claims for damages but not to claims for prospective relief. Because the Courts of Appeals are divided on this question, we granted the county’s petition for cer-tiorari. Compare Reynolds v. Giuliani,
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Chaloux, supra, at 251 (holding that Monell does not apply to prospective relief claims). See also Gernetzke v. Kenosha Unified School Dist. No. 1,
We conclude that Monell’s holding applies to § 1983 claims against municipalities for prospective relief as well as to claims for damages.
II
A
We begin with § 1983 itself, which provides:
“Every person who, under color of аny [state] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . other person . . . to the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States], shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or othеr proper proceeding for redress.” (Emphasis added.)
In 1961, in Monroe v. Pape,
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power ... to impose civil liability on municipalities.”
Sixteen years later, in Monell, the Court reconsidered the question of municipal liability. After reexamining the 1871 legislative history in detail, the Court concluded that Congress had rejected the Sherman amendment, not because it would have imposed liability upon municipalities, but because it would have imposed liability upon municipalities based purely upon the acts of others. That is to say, the rejected amendment would have imposed liability upon local governments “without regard to whether a local government was in any way at fault for the breach of the peace for which it was to be held for damages.”
The Court also concluded that a municipality could not be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employed a tortfeasor. The Court’s conclusion rested on “the language of § 1983, read against the background of the same legislative history.” Id., at 691,
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in particular the constitutional objections that had been raised to the Sherman amendment, supported this conclusion. Id., at 692-694, and n. 57,
For these reasons, the Court concluded that a municipality could be held liable under § 1983 only for its own violations of federal law. Id., at 694,
“Local governing bodies, therefore, can bе sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes*468 a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and prоmulgated by that body’s officers. . . . [They can also be sued for] deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.” Id., at 690-691,98 S. Ct. 2018 ,56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (footnote omitted).
The Court has also included the terms “usagе” and “practice” as customs for which liability is appropriate. See ibid. The length of this list of types of municipal action leads us here to use a shorthand term “policy or custom,” but when we do so, we mean to refer to the entire list. See id., at 694,
In sum, in Monell the Court held that “a municipality cannot be held liable” solely for the acts of others, e.g., “solely because it employs a tort-feasor.”
B
The language of § 1983 read in light of Monell’s understanding оf the legislative history explains why claims for
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prospective relief, like claims for money damages, fall within the scope of the “policy or custom” requirement. Nothing in the text of § 1983 suggests that the causation requirement contained in the statute should change with the form оf relief sought. In fact, the text suggests the opposite when it provides that a person who meets § 1983’s elements “shall be liable ... in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” Thus, as Monell explicitly stated, “[l]ocal governing bodies .. . can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes” a policy or custom.
Monell’s logic also argues against any such relief-based bifurcation. The Monell Court thought that Congress intended potential § 1983 liability where a municipality’s own violations were at issue but nоt where only the violations of others were at issue. The “policy or custom” requirement rests upon that distinction and embodies it in law. To find the requirement inapplicable where prospective relief is at issue would undermine Monell’s logic. For whether an action or omission is a municipality’s “own” has to do with the nature of the action or omission,
C
The Humphrieses’ (hereinafter respondents) arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. Respondents correctly note that by the time Monell reaсhed the Supreme Court only the plaintiffs’ damages claim remained live. See id., at 661,
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From this fact they conclude that the Court’s holding applies directly only to claims for monetary damages. A holding, however, can extend through its logic beyond the specific facts of the рarticular case. It does so here.
Respondents add that not only did Monell involve a damages claim, but its holding rests upon the concern that municipalities might have to pay large damages awards. The Court so suggests when it points out that municipalities should not be liable for an employee’s wrongful acts, simply by applying agency-based principles of respondeat superior. But as we have pointed out, the Court’s rejection of respondeat superior liability primarily rested not on the municipality’s economic needs, but on the fact that liability in such a case does not arise out of the municipality’s own wrongful conduct.
Respondents further claim that, where prospective relief is at issue, Monell is redundant. They say that a court cannot grant prospective relief against a municipality unless the municipality’s own conduct has caused the violation. Hence, where such relief is otherwise proper, the Monell requirement “shouldn’t screen out any case.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 48.
To argue that a requirement is necessarily satisfied, however, is not to argue that its satisfaction is unnecessary. If respondents are right, our holding may have limited practical significance. But that possibility does not provide us with a convincing reason to sow confusion by adopting a bifurcated relief-based approach to municipal liability that the Court has previously rejected.
Finally, respondents make the mirror-image argument that applying Monell’s requirement to prospective relief claims will leave some set of ongoing constitutional violations beyond redress. Despite the fact that four Circuits apply Monell’s requirement to prospective relief, however, respondents have not presented us with any actual or hypothetical example thаt provides serious cause for concern.
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For these reasons, we hold that Monell’s “policy or custom” requirement applies in § 1983 cases irrespective of whether the relief sought is monetary or prospective. The Ninth Circuit’s contrary judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.