Lori Dowling Hanson, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Department of Natural Resources, Respondent.
A20-0747
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
April 6, 2022
Gildea, C.J. Concurring, Chutich, Thissen, JJ.
Court of Appeals. Office of Appellate Courts.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jason Marisam, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.
Leslie L. Lienemann, Culberth & Lienemann, LLP, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
Justin D. Cummins, Cummins & Cummins, LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Employee Lawyers Association of the Upper Midwest.
Brian T. Rochel, Phillip M. Kitzer, Kitzer Rochel, LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota; Frances E. Baillon, Baillon Thome Jozwiak & Wanta LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Nicholas G. B. May, Fabian May & Anderson, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae National Employment Lawyers Association-Minnesota Chapter.
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment for the employer because the employee did not create a genuine issue of material fact over whether her protected activity was a motivating factor in her termination.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
GILDEA, Chief Justice.
Appellant Lori Dowling Hanson was terminated from her position as a regional director with respondent State of Minnesota Department of Nаtural Resources (DNR) after an incident at a hotel, where she was staying for a work-related conference. Hanson sued the DNR, alleging that her reporting of suspected illegal activity at the hotel caused her termination, in violation of the Minnesota Whistleblower Act,
This action arises from the DNR‘s decision to terminate Hanson from the high-level position she held as the regional director of the northeastern region of Minnesоta. Regional directors are the chief spokesperson for the DNR in their respective region and represent the Commissioner in relationships with other governmental units, special interest groups, and Native American tribes. Hanson‘s position also required her to lead and maintain an outreach program to strengthen partnerships with government agencies, tribes, constituent leaders, and other groups in the region. As one of four regional directors in the State, Hanson reported directly to the DNR Deputy Commissioner. She was an at-will employee who served at the pleasure of the DNR Commissioner and the Governor.
On August 14, 2017, Hanson arrived at Fortune Bay Resort Casino on the Bois Forte Indian Reservation for a work-related conference. The hotel is located within the boundaries of Hanson‘s DNR region. Hanson was planning to attend meetings over the course of 3 days as a DNR representative on an international water quality board.
During the first night of her stay, Hanson was awakened three times by noises coming from the room next door. She heard “a lot of noise,” “a crying baby,” and “bodies . . . being thrown against the wall.” She called the front desk to complain each time.
The next day, Hanson again heard a baby crying in the neighboring room when she left her room that morning and when she returned at lunch. She did not call the front desk or law enforcement to report her concerns but “made a mental note . . . that if the baby was still in distress by that evening, [she] would do something.”
About 10 minutes later, Hanson opened her room door—not wearing any clothes—and peered up and down the hallway for 10 to 12 seconds before returning to her room. Approximately 5 minutes after that, Hanson opened her door, now clothed, and talked to two men in the hallway who were knocking on the neighboring room‘s door. She told them that she was “pretty concerned about the baby inside,” and they replied, “Well, we don‘t want no baby.” The men left shortly after that. Hanson believed these men were “johns or pimps.”
A couple of minutes later, Hanson left her room to speak to hotel management. Hotel security called 911 to report a possibly unattended crying baby after hearing Hanson‘s concerns. A Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) police officer was dispatched to the hotel in response.1
Hanson returned to her room and then soon came back out and looked up and down the hallway. Two women opened the door of the neighboring room, one of them holding a bra. One of the women said, “What‘s your problem?” Hanson responded, “It‘s gonna
After Hanson talked to the two women in the neighboring room, the hotel manager and the head of hotel security talked to the occupants of that room and were let inside. The hotel manager and the head of hotel security later told the BIA officer, after he had arrived, that “everything was secure and the child was safe.” They also reported this to Hanson, who still insisted that she talk with law enforcement.
Hanson then called 911. She identified herself as “a state official,”2 asked for a “safe escort” from the hotel, and stated that she was “barricaded” inside because she had “stumbled upon” a prostitution ring.3 She asked the dispatcher to send St. Louis County law enforcement officers because hotel management had “only offered to call BIA.”4
When the dispatcher informed Hanson that it “is routine for them” to call the BIA, Hanson responded, “What‘s routine for me right now? Help me. . . . I‘m barricaded in my room and scared shitless.” When informed that they had “a call to check on a child,” Hanson replied, “Ok, do you have a call to check on a Minnesota state official who would like safe . . . exit?” Hanson also reported that “they could be suffocating this child as we speak.” Though she told the dispatcher that she felt “threatened,” she refused to answer whether anyone made threats to her.5 She told the dispatcher that “law enforcement [should] use full precautions” when responding.
During the 911 call, Hanson received a phone call from the St. Louis County Undersheriff, who asked, “What the hell‘s going on? I got [the County Administrator]
The BIA officer and a Breitung Township police officer then arrived at the hotel and knocked on Hanson‘s door. The hotel manager and head of hotel security arrived after Hanson opened her door. Hanson stated that they asked her for identification, if she had any warrants, and whether she would take a breathalyzer test.
The BIA officer then knocked on the neighboring room‘s door and found one woman and four children. He entered the room, along with the hotel manager. He noted that “[t]he room was clean and orderly.”7 The woman explained that the youngest child “was tеething and crying a lot.”
Hanson, who was still talking to the township officer, asked if she could change from her pajamas. She said that “the head guy”8 laughed at her and said, “Yeah, you can go get dressed, but the door‘s staying open.” Hanson felt “very threatened.”9 Hanson
The BIA officer then knocked on Hanson‘s door and reported that the children in the neighboring room were “fine” and that the hotel‘s video surveillance “did not capture any suspicious footage.” He told her that “she would be arrested for trespassing if she did not leave the resort within ten minutes.” Hanson requested police escort from the reservation, asking for a St. Louis County deputy sheriff. The BIA officer responded with something like, “That‘s not going to happen.”10 Hanson replied that “she knew people and was calling them now.”11 The officer told Hanson that she needed “to pack her things and that management wanted her to leave.” Hanson became “angry” and “refused to leаve.” The officer repeated that Hanson needed “to pack her things.” During this encounter, the BIA officer and the township officer smelled alcohol on Hanson‘s breath.
Hanson asked the officers if it would be possible for her to ask a DNR conservation officer to respond to the hotel. According to Hanson, they “laughed” and said, “No [conservation officer]‘s gonna come here—but yeah, . . . go ahead.” Hanson replied, “I know their boss‘[s] boss.” Hanson called DNR Captain Tom Provost, the Division of
Captain Provost then called a DNR conservation officer, who was at home, and told him that a DNR employee was at the hotel and “might‘ve run afoul of the political issues at the casino.” Captain Provost asked him to respond to the hotel in plain clothes and provided Hanson‘s name and phone number. Captain Provost asked the conservation officer to determine if any St. Louis County deputies were also available to respond.
Before he left for the hotel, the conservation officer called Hanson, and she told him that “she was afraid.” Hanson said “that she had stumbled onto a sex ring” and wanted an escort from the hotel but that “security wouldn‘t let Saint Louis County on the property.” The conservation officer described Hanson‘s demeanor during the call as “kind of frantic” and “very distraught.” On his way to the hotel, the conservation officer called Captain Provost to report that a St. Louis County sergeant would also be responding. Captain Provost asked the conservation officer to call him when it was over.
The conservation officer then arrived at the hotel and knocked on Hanson‘s door. The officer saw that Hanson and the sergeant were packing up her belongings and almost ready to leave.
As the conservation officer, the sergeant, and Hanson were leaving the hotel, the township officer handed a breathalyzer test device to the conservation officer and asked him to get Hanson to provide a breath sample. The conservation officer asked Hanson to take the test. Hanson refused, telling the officers that she had not consumed alcohol since 5 p.m. that evening. Hanson heard the BIA officer say, “Now I‘m calling my boss.”12 The
Hanson then called Captain Provost to report that she was leaving the hotel, and she thanked him for sending the conservation officer. Soon after, the conservation officer called Captain Provost and “expressed amazement about ‘this crazy situation.’ ” The officer reported that at least one BIA officer had been at the hotel and that Hanson had now left.
The next day, the BIA officer called Deputy Commissioner David Schad, Hanson‘s supervisor at the time, and reported that Hanson “had been harassing and abusive toward hotel staff and law enforcement[,] . . . refused to leave her hotel room until a DNR state conservation officer arrived[,] . . . acted erratically, including being observed in the hallway without any clothes on, and . . . misused her state title.” Schad later informed DNR Commissioner Tom Landwehr of the incident.
The DNR placed Hanson on paid investigatory leave the day after the BIA оfficer‘s call to Schad, stating that the decision was made because of her “recent conduct at Fortune Bay Resort Casino,” and began an investigation into the events at the hotel. Approximately 4 weeks later, a DNR human resources investigator submitted a 42-page report describing the incident. The report recounts many of the facts described above. It focused on the
After receiving the report of the investigation and consulting with Schad and the DNR human resources director, Landwehr terminated Hanson‘s employment on September 25, 2017. The only communication that Hanson received about the deсision was a termination letter, and Landwehr did not state the reason for her termination in the letter. But Landwehr and Schad testified at their depositions about the concerns that lead to the termination decision. They testified that they were concerned that Hanson was nude in a public space, was asked to leave the hotel because of the way she was conducting herself, questioned the BIA‘s jurisdiction to respond to the hotel, and misused her state position. Schad did not “have a problem with what she reported“; he was concerned about “how she handled herself during the reporting.”13
The district court granted the DNR‘s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Hanson did not establish a prima facie case, the first step of thе McDonnell Douglas
Hanson appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. Hanson, 2021 WL 1525296, at *8. The court held that Hanson had not submitted dirеct evidence of retaliation and so applied the McDonnell Douglas framework to her claims. Id. at *4–6. The court observed that the first step of McDonnell Douglas “is a relatively low burden” for a plaintiff to bear. Id. at *5. It further stated that the prima facie case can “be established merely by ‘showing that the employer has actual or imputed knowledge of the protected activity and the adverse employment action follows closely in time.’ ” Id. (quoting Hubbard v. United Press Int‘l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 445 (Minn. 1983)). Unlike the district court, the court of appeals
The court of appeals then considered whether Hanson met her burden at step three of McDonnell Douglas to provide sufficient evidence “to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the DNR‘s non-retaliatory reasons for the termination are a pretext.” Id. The court held that “the DNR submitted evidence that its termination decision was based solely on Hanson‘s misconduct during the incident at the hotel and not at all based on” Hanson‘s reports of suspected illegal activity. Id. at *6. The court went on to state that “[t]o prove pretext, Hanson must, at the least, prove that the DNR‘s evidence of non-retaliatory rеasons is untrue.” Id. The court held that Hanson did not meet her burden because she did “not identify any evidence in the record that casts doubt on or contradicts the DNR‘s evidence of non-retaliatory reasons.” Id.
We granted Hanson‘s petition for review on her whistleblower claim.
ANALYSIS
This case comes to us on review of the district court‘s grant of summary judgment for the DNR, which we review de novo. See Henson v. Uptown Drink, LLC, 922 N.W.2d 185, 190 (Minn. 2019). We will affirm a grant of summary judgment if no genuine issues of material fact exist and if the court accurately applied the law. Hoover v. Norwest Priv. Mortg. Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534, 542 (Minn. 2001). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . and resolve all doubts and factual inferences against the moving
Employment relationships are “generally at-will” in Minnesota, so “an employer may discharge an employee for any reason or no reason and . . . an employee is under no obligation to remain on the job.” Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs., 841 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Minn. 2014) (citation оmitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). But there are statutory exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine that prevent an employer from discharging an employee for improper reasons. The Minnesota Whistleblower Act (MWA),
At the first step, the employee must establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the elements of which will vary depending on the facts of the case. McDonnell Douglas,
At the second step, the burdеn of production shifts to the employer to provide “some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” to explain why it took the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the employer does so, the presumption of discrimination no longer applies. Tex. Dep‘t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981).
At the third step, the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the employer‘s proffered reason is pretextual. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. Sufficient evidence of pretext could include that the employer‘s stated reason is untrue. See Hoover, 632 N.W.2d at 546. In Minnesota, an employee could alternatively offer evidence at this step that an improper reason “motivated the discharge decision,”17 rather than proving that the employer‘s reason is untrue. McGrath v. TCF Bank Sav., FSB, 509 N.W.2d 365, 366 (Minn. 1993). The employee retains the ultimate burden of persuasion. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
A.
Hanson first claims that she offered direct evidence of retaliation and so we should not apply the McDonnell Douglas framework in our analysis. See Hoover, 632 N.W.2d at 542 (“Discrimination plaintiffs may prove discriminatory intent by direct evidence or by using circumstantial evidence in accordance with [McDonnell Douglas].“). Direct evidence establishes “that the employer‘s discrimination was purposeful, intentional or overt,” Goins v. W. Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. 2001), “such as where an employer announces he will not consider females for positions,” Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Minn. 1986).
As proof of direct evidence, Hanson points to Landwehr‘s and Schad‘s deposition testimony to imply that if Hanson had not reported suspected illegal activity, she would not have been terminated. Landwehr was asked, “[T]he report was a basis for terminating her?” He responded, “Yes.” Landwehr agreed that the baby crying and Hanson‘s suspicions of prostitution “were the triggering features for what happened the rest of that evening“; they “started the process.” Similarly, Schad was asked, “So had there not been an incident and had there not been a report of that incident, she wouldn‘t have been terminated; right?” Schad answered, “Correct.” Schad testified that the “events” of that evening were “the trigger for terminating her.”
B.
Without direct evidence of retaliation, our analysis proceeds according to the three-step framework of McDonnell Douglas.
First, Hanson has established a prima facie case. Because the DNR does not argue that Hanson‘s reporting was not protected conduct, we assume that her reporting is statutorily protected. See
Second, the DNR offered a legitimate reason for Hanson‘s termination: that it was inappropriate for Hanson to appear in a public space without clothes on, assert her position as a state official to gain preferential treatment, use DNR resources in a personal situation, insist that county law enforcement officers needed to respond where the BIA had jurisdiction, and create such a disturbance that she is asked to leave a hotel in a region where she was supposed to be cultivating good working relationships. The DNR has accordingly satisfied its burden of offering a legitimate reason for the employment action.
Third, and fatally for Hanson‘s claim, she did not provide any evidence that her reporting of suspected illegal activity in any way motivated the DNR‘s decision to
Hanson argues that Schad and Landwehr testified that she would not have been terminated but for her reporting, which demonstrates unlawful discharge. But this argument ignores the impact of intervening events at the hotel that night, namely the way that she conducted herself. In one sense, it is true that if Hanson had not repоrted the suspected illegal activities, she likely would not have been terminated. If Hanson had not reported the suspected illegal activities, she likely would not have called subordinate law enforcement personnel, undermined the BIA‘s jurisdiction, inappropriately used her high-level position, and been asked to leave the hotel. But it is different to say that the DNR
As additional evidence that her whistleblowing caused her termination, Hanson asserts that the DNR was concerned that her reporting of suspected illegal activities would cause problems with the DNR‘s relationship with the tribe. Hanson points to Landwehr‘s testimony that it was inappropriate for Hanson to insist that a county or state law еnforcement officer escort her from the hotel instead of the BIA and township officers who responded. But Landwehr said that it was appropriate for Hanson to report her concerns about the activities in the neighboring room and that he would have done the same thing if he had been in that situation. And Landwehr stated that, rather than the fact that Hanson reported her suspicions, it was the way that Hanson conducted herself at the hotel—in particular, that she insisted on a response from law enforcement agencies without jurisdiction—that might cause issues with the DNR‘s relationship with the tribe.
Hanson also points out that the termination letter that she received from the DNR did not state any reasons for the decision, and she contends that this raises suspicion about whether the DNR‘s reasons given after the fact are pretextual.19 An employer‘s shifting
Hanson asserts that this is a mixed-motive case because Hanson and the DNR offer conflicting reasons for Hanson‘s termination. In a mixed-motive case, “the court finds that an employment decision was based partly on legitimate motives and partly on unlawful ones.” Hasnudeen, 552 N.W.2d at 557. We apply the McDonnell Douglas framework in mixed-motive cases, too, Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 626-27 (Minn. 1988), however, the third step focuses on whether the improper reason “motivated” the employer‘s decision, McGrath, 509 N.W.2d at 366.
Hanson did not provide evidence to support her assertion that the DNR fired her for an improper reason. Specifically, Hanson did not provide evidence that her protected conduct—reporting suspected illegal aсtivity—was a motivating factor in her termination.
Hanson argues that the court of appeals held that she had established a causal connection and that thereby raises a fact issue as to whether her reporting motivated the termination decision. But a causal connection based on temporal proximity, while enough to satisfy her prima facie case, is not sufficient to satisfy Hanson‘s burden to provide evidence that the DNR‘s stated reasons are pretextual or that her reporting motivated the termination decision. See Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 445-46. Temporal proximity alone is not sufficient for an employee‘s claim to proceed to trial, and so Hanson‘s argument fails. See id.
Without any other evidence either that the DNR‘s reasons are untrue or that her reporting motivated the DNR to terminate her employment, summary judgment was appropriately granted to the DNR because there is no genuine issue of material fact.20 See Maethner v. Someplace Safe, Inc., 929 N.W.2d 868, 884 (Minn. 2019) (holding that a party
C.
Alternatively, Hanson argues that we should not apply the McDonnell Douglas framework in MWA cases and suggests a streamlined summary judgment standard to use in its place. Hanson asks us to replace McDonnell Douglas with a standard based on the model jury instructions that focuses on whether the whistleblowing activity “was a motivating factor” or “played a part” in the adverse employment action. See 4 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass‘n, Minnesota Practice—Jury Instruction Guides, Civil, CIVJIG 55.65 (6th ed. 2021).
We acknowledge that there is debate about the continuing viability of the McDonnell Douglas framework. See, e.g., Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 863 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., concurring) (“Perhaps McDonnell Douglas was necessary nearly 40 years agо, when Title VII litigation was still relatively new in the federal courts. By now, however, as this case well illustrates, the various tests that we insist lawyers use have lost their utility. Courts manage tort litigation every day without the ins and outs of these methods of proof, and I see no reason why employment discrimination litigation (including cases alleging retaliation) could not be handled in the same straightforward way.“); Wells v. Colo. Dep‘t of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1221-28 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., writing
But we reach the same outcome in this case whether we apply McDonnell Douglas or the jury instructions standard advocated for by Hanson. Hanson contends that she was fired because she reported suspected illegal activity. The DNR counters that the decision to terminate her employment was because she acted in an unprofessional manner at the hotel. These competing reasons could raise a question of fact as to whether the whistleblowing was a motivating factor in the termination decision, in addition to the DNR‘s stated reasons. But, as detailed above, Hanson offers no evidence to support her claim thаt her reporting was a factor that the DNR considered in making its decision to fire her, and her speculation to the contrary is not enough to survive summary judgment. See Bob Useldinger & Sons, Inc. v. Hangsleben, 505 N.W.2d 323, 328 (Minn. 1993) (“Mere speculation, without some concrete evidence, is not enough to avoid summary judgment.“). In sum, there is no genuine issue as to whether the DNR was motivated to terminate Hanson based on her whistleblowing, because there is no evidence that her reporting played any part in, much less was a motivating factor in, the DNR‘s decision.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.
CONCURRENCE
CHUTICH, Justice (concurring).
I agree with the court that appellant Lori Hanson‘s whistleblowing claim fails as a matter of law, and that the decision of the court of appeals should be affirmed. I write separately, however, because I agree with Hanson and the amici, the National Employment Lawyers Association-Minnesota Chapter and the Employee Lawyers Association оf the Upper Midwest, that the McDonnell Douglas framework has become cumbersome and increasingly obsolete. Because this court has never been asked to analyze whether courts should use the McDonnell Douglas framework for cases brought under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act,
I.
Since its creation a half-century ago, McDonnell Douglas has evolved into a wide-reaching, burdensome, and—for many plaintiffs—insurmountable framework. See generally Katie Eyer, The Return of the Technical McDonnell Douglas Paradigm, 94 Wash. L. Rev. 967 (2019) (describing plaintiffs’ challenges reaching a jury under courts’ rigid application of McDonnell Douglas tests). McDonnell Douglas originated as a framework to help federal judges evaluate Title VII claims that were to be tried without
In response to the expanded scope of McDonnell Douglas, federal and state courts alike have developed confusing and inefficient inferences and tests in their attempts to follow the framework across employment discrimination cases. Courts began, for example, to distinguish between direct evidence, which can be evaluated on its own, and indirect evidence, which requires the McDonnell Douglas framework. Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 743-45 (8th Cir. 2004) (Magnuson, J., concurring specially). Minnesota courts also ask whether there was close temporal proximity between the employment decision and the discrimination, e.g., Hubbard v. United Press Int‘l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 445 (Minn. 1983), infer against discrimination when the same decision-maker hired and made the adverse employment decision, e.g., Alagock v. State, No. A12-1658, 2013 WL 1707692, at *6 (Minn. App. Apr. 22, 2013) (citing Herr v. Airborne Freight Corp., 130 F.3d 359, 362-63 (8th Cir. 1997)), and question whether the discrimination was merely a “stray remark,” e.g., Diez v. 3M, 564 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Minn. App. 1997). These requirements impose unnecessary impediments at the summary-judgment stage.
Unsurprisingly, members of the academy have long critiqued the fraught evolution of McDonnell Douglas. In addition to objecting to its burdensome tests and inferences,
Courts are increasingly voicing these same concerns. Some are uncomfortable with the mismatch between McDonnell Douglas’ requirements to survive summary judgment and the less-burdensome standard of proof at trial. In Walker v. Abbott Laboratories, 416 F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 2005), for example, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the McDonnell Douglas “formula has its place but does not displace the general standards for summary judgment.” Similarly, in Jones v. City School District of New Rochelle, 695 F.Supp.2d 136, 143-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), the court applied a “simplified” McDonnell Douglas approach for summary-judgment motions in employment discrimination cases, which focused on the “ultimate question” for a potential jury of whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of discrimination.1 See also The Hon. Denny Chin, Summary
Courts have also started to question other aspects of McDonnell Douglas. In Griffith, for example, the concurrence probed—although it did not challenge—the lack of a statutory basis for the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Griffith, 387 F.3d at 740 (Magnuson, J., concurring specially). And in Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765-66 (7th Cir. 2016), the Seventh Circuit went so far as to abandon the McDonnell Douglas-driven distinction between direct and circumstantial or indirect evidence, although it ultimately left in place the “burden-shifting framework.”
II.
Given these critiques, I would urge the court to pause before assuming that McDonnell Douglas applies in the context of Minnesota‘s whistleblowing statute. It is well-settled that the “rule of stare decisis is never properly invoked unless in the decision put forward as precedent the judicial mind has been applied to and passed upon the precise question.” Fletcher v. Scott, 277 N.W. 270, 272 (Minn. 1938); see also In re Krogstad, 958 N.W.2d 331, 337-38 (Minn. 2021) (recognizing the principle articulated in Fletcher). We have mentioned McDonnell Douglas in only three Minnesota Whistleblower Act cases, either in dicta or without analyzing whether the framework actually applies.
Moreover, nothing in the text of the Minnesota Whistleblower Act shows that courts should use the McDonnell Douglas framework instead of the usual Rule 56.01 summary-judgment standard. See
In addition, extending the framework to claims under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act makes little sense. McDonnell Douglas is burdensome, complex, and hinders plaintiffs’ access to justice. It was also designed for federal judges hearing Title VII discrimination claims when a right to a jury trial for those claims did not exist. By contrast, Minnesota Whistleblower Act claims are based on state law and plaintiffs have a right to trial by jury. Tellingly, those juries are not instructed on McDonnell Douglas, meaning a judge would use a more rigorous analysis at summary judgment (McDonnell Douglas) than the jury would use at trial (that the employer more likely than not retaliated against the employee). Those shifting standards invert the purpose of summary judgment and subvert the role of juries.
For these reasons, I conclude that this court should not expand the weathered McDonnell Douglas standard to claims brought under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act. Instead, courts should use the general summary-judgment standard in Rule 56.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 56.01, the court must grant summary
Because Hanson did not raise a genuine dispute of material fact, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for the Department of Natural Resources. Accordingly, I concur in the court‘s decision to affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
THISSEN, Justice (concurring).
I join in the concurrence of Justice Chutich.