78 A.D. 577 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1903
The order which is the subject of this appeal grants the defendant’s motion for a counsel fee to be paid to her attorney for the purpose of defending the judgment ef this court (Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 71 App. Div. 509) on the appeal therefrom by the plaintiff, now pending in the Court of Appeals, but denies her motion made at the same time for alimony to be paid to her during the pendency of the action, and for past alimony. The action was
The motion for alimony is not a proceeding, within the meaning of the Code, enforcing the order or judgment of this court. The order of this court reversed the judgment and granted a new trial. Subject to the right to appeal and the incidental stay of the new trial until the determination of the appeal, the parties are in the same position as they were in before the former trial was had. Their status as husband and wife is meanwhile restored. It was held in Higgins v. Sharp (164 N. Y. 4) that the power to grant alimony in actions of this character is within the equitable jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, aside from the general regulations of proceedings relating to alimony contained in the Code. And in McBride v. McBride (119 N. Y. 519) it was held that where the plaintiff, the wife, had recovered a judgment of divorce awarding her alimony, from which judgment an appeal was taken by the defendant to the Court of Appeals and a stay procured, she was,, nevertheless, at liberty to obtain a temporary allowance of alimony pending the appeal and until the final determination of the action. Here the application is not to be regarded as made after final judgment, but is to be regarded as made before trial, and the right, in a proper case, to the relief sought is within the precise provisions of section 1769 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The cases cited dispose of the respondent’s contention.
On the papers presented the defendant made out a case entitling her to a reasonable allowance by way of alimony. They established her inability to properly support herself unaided, and her husband’s ability to pay. Indeed, an order was granted in the first department giving her an allowance of seven dollars per week for alimony in an action previously instituted by her for a separation, and this sum was regularly paid to her by her husband until the decree of
The order, so far as appealed from, should be reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and the motion for alimony granted by allowing the sum of -seven dollars per week from the time the motion was made, with costs.
Goodrich, P. J., Bartlett, Woodward and Jenks, JJ., concurred.
Order, so far as appealed from, reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and motion for alimony granted by allowing the sum of seven dollars per week from the time the motion was made, with costs.