24 Me. 439 | Me. | 1844
The opinion of the Court was drawn up by
The instructions in this case authorized the jury to find, that the defendant was entitled to a lien upon the horse for his keep and cure. It is insisted for the plaintiff, that they were erroneous. For the defendant, it is contended, that they may be sustained on the ground, that he was an innkeeper.; and the facts proved would be sufficient to entitle him to be so considered by the rules of the common law. In this State no person can lawfully assume that character without first obtaining a license therefor according to the provisions of the statute, c. 36. The seventeenth section of that statute provides, that no person shall be a common innholder, except such person be duly authorized therefor. It is said, that the provisions of this statute should be considered as limited to
Story also states, that a bailee, for work on a thing, has a lien upon it for the amount of his compensation. Story on Bailm. $ 440. And that salvors, innkeepers, common carriers, farriers, blacksmiths, tailors, shipwrights, and other artisans, have' such a lien. Story on Agency, § 355. That a printer had a lien on the printed sheets for compensation for printing them was decided in the case of Blake v. Nicholson, 3 M. & S. 167. That a miller had upon the meal, which he had ground, in the case of Chase v. Westmore, 5 M. & S. 180. And that a stable keeper had upon a horse sent to him to be kept and trained for the race course, in Benan v. Waters, 3 C. & P. 520. The cure of a lameness or disease to which the horse was subject, would seem to be a service quite ■as meritorious, find as much deserving the favor of the law, as the training him for a race course. Best C. J. did not however found his opinion upon the particular merit of that service but upon the doctrines of the common law. “ For I take it (he says) to be a common law principle, that if a man has an article delivered to him, on the improvement of which he has to bestow trouble and expense, he has a right to detain it until his demand is paid.” These authorities would authorize the instructions in this case, unless the testimony shows, that the defendant, by some act of his own, had waived or destroyed his lien. He cannot properly be considered as having waived, or asf intending to waive it, by his contract with Jefferds to receive the horse in payment of the amount due to him, paying the difference in value, when he obtained no title by that contract, because Jefferds had no authority to make it. By that want of authority the contract became ineffectual and inoperative for any purpose. And if, as some of the witnesses state, the defendant said, he had sold the horse to his brother, while he supposed his own title to be perfect, that would not show any intention to waive his lien. It might