Case Information
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION
LAURA PECINA LOPEZ, §
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF §
GUSTAVO LOPEZ, DECEASED; §
MINORS K.P.L., G.L., S.L., AND K.L.; §
AND ON BEHALF OF GUSTAVO §
LOPEZ, SR; and GIOVANNI LOPEZ, §
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF §
GUSTAVO LOPEZ, DECEASED, §
§
Plaintiffs, §
§ v. § Civil Action No. 3:19-CV-2424-N
§
AMAZON LOGISTICS, INC; AMAZON §
TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, INC; §
J.W. LOGISTICS, LLC; KEDRIN §
HARRIS, INDIVIDUALLY AND d/b/a §
ALL POINTS 360, LLC; DWANE §
EDWARDS, INDIVIDUALLY AND §
d/b/a SINNIE MAE TRUCKING; and §
TIMMIE TURNER, §
§
Defendants. §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This Memorandum Order and Opinion addresses the motion for remand [2] filed by Plaintiffs Laura Pecina Lopez, individually and on behalf of Gustavo Lopez, deceased; minors K.P.L., G.L., S.L., and K.L.; and Gustavo Lopez, Sr.; and Giovanni Lopez, individually and on behalf of Gustavo Lopez, deceased (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Because the Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded complaint does not raise a federal question and because the subject matter of the action is not preempted by federal law, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. [1] Accordingly, the Court grants the motion and remands this case to the 116th Judicial District Court in Dallas County, Texas.
I. O RIGINS OF THE D ISPUTE This is a personal injury suit arising from a fatal vehicle accident that occurred on October 24, 2018, in Johnson County, Texas. Pltfs.’ First Am. Pet. 5–6 [1.46]. The accident was allegedly caused when Timmie Turner (“Turner”), a carrier for Amazon Logistics, Inc. and Amazon Transportation Services, Inc. (collectively, “Amazon”), rear- ended Gustavo Lopez while Turner was operating a Hino Box Truck at an excessive speed. Id. at 6. At the time, Turner was transporting and delivering items sold by Amazon. Id. Gustavo Lopez died from injuries allegedly sustained from this accident. Id. at 7.
Plaintiffs then filed this suit in state court, alleging multiple state tort and statutory claims against Turner; Amazon; Kedrin Harris, individually and d/b/a All Points 360, LLC (“All Points”); Dwane Edwards, individually and d/b/a Sinnie Mae Trucking (“Sinne Mae Trucking”); and J.W. Logistics, LLC (“J.W. Logistics”) (collectively, “Defendants”). The amended petition alleges that Amazon had a broker-carrier agreement with All Points and that All Points in turn had a broker-carrier agreement with J.W. Logistics, which “covered the pickup and delivery of Amazon shipments.” On October 14, 2019, J.W. Logistics removed the case to this Court, arguing that the state tort claims were preempted by the Federal Aviation and Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”) and an FAAAA amendment, the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”). Plaintiffs subsequently filed this motion to remand.
II. R EMAND L EGAL S TANDARD
District courts must remand a case if, at any time before final judgment it appears
that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “Because removal
raises significant federalism concerns, the removal statute is strictly construed and any
doubt as to the propriety of removal should be resolved in favor of remand.”
Gutierrez v.
Flores
,
Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, “a suit ‘arises under’ federal law only when
the plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon [federal
law.”
Vaden v. Discover Bank
,
The central inquiry in a complete preemption analysis is “whether Congress
intended the federal cause of action to be the exclusive cause of action for the particular
claims asserted under the state law.”
Id.
Complete jurisdiction is distinct from ordinary
preemption, which constitutes a defense but does not provide federal jurisdiction.
Johnson
v. Baylor Univ.
,
III. T HE C OURT H OLDS T HAT THE FAAAA D OES N OT P REEMPT P LAINTIFFS ’ C LAIMS A GAINST J.W. L OGISTICS J.W. Logistics’ notice of removal implicates two preemption provisions of the FAAAA — section 14501(c)(1), and section 14501(b), an FAAAA amendment titled the ICCTA. Section 14501(c)(1) provides:
Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), a State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of 2 or more States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier (other than a carrier affiliated with a direct air carrier covered by section 41713(b)(4)) or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). The ICCTA provision, section 14501(b), is more narrowly focused and reads:
Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, no State or political subdivision thereof and no intrastate agency or other political agency of 2 or more States shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to intrastate rates, intrastate routes, or intrastate services of any freight forwarder or broker.
49 U.S.C. § 14501(b)(1). J.W. Logistics argues that, as a broker, the negligence and negligent-hiring claims Plaintiffs assert against it [2] are federally preempted by these provisions and provide this Court with jurisdiction. The Court agrees that section 14501(c)(1) applies to the claims and parties here. The Court holds, however, that Plaintiffs’ negligence claim does not fall within the scope of section 14501(c)(2) and assumes without deciding that the negligence-hiring claim does fall within its scope but determines that the negligent-hiring claim also falls within the scope of section 14501(c)(2)’s preemption exception.
A. The Parties and Claims Fall Within the Scope of Section 14501(c)(1) But Section 14501(b) is Inapplicable As a threshold matter, the Court must initially determine whether J.W. Logistics is a broker within the meaning of the FAAAA and whether Plaintiffs’ state common law claims constitute “a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law” that may be subject to FAAAA preemption. See 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). Regarding J.W. Logistics’ broker status, Plaintiffs contend that the allegations in their state court amended petition do not identify whether J.W. Logistics is a broker or whether its services are interstate or intrastate in nature. Pltfs.’ First Am. Pet. 5 [1.46] (stating that All Points “had a Broker Carrier arrangement with JW Logistics” but not specifying which party was the broker). Further, Plaintiffs argue that under the facts alleged in their amended petition, J.W. Logistics does not meet the FAAAA’s definition of a broker, defined in part as “a person, other than a motor carrier or an employee or agent of a motor carrier .” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(2) (emphasis added). The amended petition alleges that “ each Defendant was an agent of the other Defendants ,” and later identifies one defendant, Turner, as a “carrier.” Pltfs.’ First Am. Pet. 4–5 [1.46].
The Court finds these arguments unpersuasive. First, J.W. Logistics has provided the Court with a copy of its broker authority issued by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”) and requests that it take judicial notice of this. Def.’s Resp. Mot. Remand Ex. 1 [10.1]. Because this is a publicly available document relevant to an issue in this case, and there is no dispute as to the accuracy of this document, the Court takes judicial notice of the certificate and its identification of J.W. Logistics as a broker. See F ED . R. E VID . 201. This alone does not resolve Plaintiffs’ remaining argument against J.W. Logistics’ broker status, however, as the FMCSA’s definition of “broker” is broader than that in the FAAAA. [3]
As to Plaintiffs’ second argument, the Court notes initially that Plaintiffs’ amended petition was filed in state court under the more lenient state pleading standard and made liberal use of collective pleadings that referenced all six defendants — even though it is implausible that all the allegations and claims in the petition are applicable to each of the defendants, who have differing roles in the transportation chain. See Pharos Capital Grp., LLC v. Nutmeg Ins. Co. , 999 F. Supp. 2d 947, 954 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (“[T]he federal pleading standard under Twombly and Iqbal is arguably more stringent than the Texas “fair notice” requirement.”). More significantly, the amended petition states that “Amazon Logistics, Inc. had a Broker Carrier arrangement with All Points 360 and All Points 360 had a Broker Carrier arrangement with JW Logistics.” Pltfs.’ First Am. Pet. 5 [1.46]. That implies that at least one and likely two parties are brokers. Taking the general assertion “all Defendants are agents of each other” to mean specifically that all defendants are “agents of a motor carrier” within the meaning of the FAAAA would undermine the assertion that some of the defendants are brokers. It would also give a general, broad-brush statement more specificity than either the text of the statement or the surrounding context of the petition at large warrant. Where the petition allegations seem contradictory, the Court chooses to follow the specific allegations over a general, collective allegation. Thus, the Court determines that J.W. Logistics is a broker under the FAAAA.
Regarding Plaintiffs’ common law tort claims, the Court holds that section
14501(c)(1) applies to these types of claims. Section 14501(c)(1) extends to a state “law,
regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law.” § 14501(c)(1). Common
law claims are “other provisions with the force of law” and consequently may be subject
to FAAAA preemption.
See Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg
,
The Court holds, however, that the companion preemption clause, section 14501(b),
is not applicable here. Unlike section 14501(c)(1), section 14501(b) specifically limits its
preemptive scope to laws related to “
intrastate
rates,
intrastate
routes, or
intrastate
services
of any freight forwarder or broker.” § 14501(b)(1) (emphasis added);
see also Loyd v.
Salazar
,
B. Section 14501(c)(1) Does Not Preempts Plaintiffs’ Negligence Claim
As of yet, neither the Supreme Court nor the circuit courts have addressed the
specific issue whether the FAAA preemption clauses encompass negligence or negligent-
hiring claims in personal injury suits against brokers. The district courts that have
confronted this question are split on both outcome and rationale.
See Gillum v. High
Standard, LLC
,
The Supreme Court has instructed that when Congress has statutorily preempted
state laws, “our task is to identify the domain expressly preempted.”
Dan’s City Used
Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey
,
In determining whether a tort claim falls within the ambit of preemption provisions,
courts frequently look to the facts underlying the claim or the specific nature of the tort
claim alleged to determine whether it “relates to” “services.”
See Cruz Miguesl Aguina
Morales v. Redco Transport Ltd.
,
This is a fine distinction, but the Court declines to alter the lines that Congress has
drawn by choosing specific statutory language. Further, this interpretation of the statute
aligns with Fifth Circuit preemption holdings, which have repeatedly drawn narrow
distinctions based on underlying factual pleadings and the specific type of common law
claim alleged.
Compare Hodges
,
[5] “The term ‘broker’ means a person, other than a motor carrier or an employee or agent of a motor carrier, that as a principal or agent sells, offers for sale, negotiates for, or holds itself out by solicitation, advertisement, or otherwise as selling, providing, or arranging for, transportation by motor carrier for compensation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(2).
a negligence claim for personal injury caused by an airline’s improper storage of baggage because it relates to airline operations), with Malik v. Continental Airlines, Inc. , 305 F. App’x 165, 169 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that the FAAAA preempted a negligence claim for lost luggage because “her claims are centered on airline personnel’s alleged mishandling of her bags, not damage from the way in which the plane was flown,” and thus related to airline “services”); see also Elam , 635 F.3d at 807, 813–14 (holding that the ADA did not preempt a negligence claim seeking damages for a rail crossing accident but did preempt a negligence per se claim based on a state antiblocking statute). [6]
In contrast, the Court assumes without deciding that negligent-hiring claims “relate to” core broker services “with respect to transportation” and are thus within the scope of section 14501(c)(1). Because the Court holds these claims are also within the scope of section 14501(c)(2)’s preemption exception, however, this claim is not preempted either.
C. Plaintiffs’ Negligent-Hiring Claim Falls Within the Scope of Section 14501(c)(2)’s Preemption Exception Section 14501(c)(2) of the FAAAA is an exception to section 14501(c)(1)’s preemptive scope, providing in relevant part:
Paragraph (1) shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles, the authority of a State to impose highway route controls or limitations based on the size or weight of the motor vehicle or the hazardous nature of the cargo, or the authority of a State to regulate motor carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements and self-insurance authorization.
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A). Both the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have held that
the safety regulation exception should be broadly construed.
City of Columbus v. Ours
Garage and Wrecker Srvc., Inc.
,
In applying these principles, the Court holds that personal injury tort claims, including a negligent-hiring claim, are within the scope of section 14501(c)(2)’s exception. To reach this conclusion, the Court must determine both that common law claims constitute an exercise of a state’s “safety regulatory authority” and that a negligent-hiring claim asserted against a broker is “with respect to motor vehicles.”
As to the first prong, the Court declines to read “safety
regulatory authority
” as
limited to state
regulations
as some courts have done.
See Gillum
,
Further, Supreme Court precedent suggests “regulatory authority” can encompass more than regulations — specifically, that a state’s “regulatory authority” authorizes “other provisions having the force and effect of law,” which includes common law claims. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, CA , 569 U/S. 641, 650–51 (2013) (“The ‘force and effect of law’ language in 14501(c)(1) . . . targets the State acting as a State, not as any market actor — or otherwise said, the State acting in a regulatory rather than proprietary mode ”) (emphasis added). The structure of section 14501(c)(2)(A) also supports a broad interpretation of a state’s “safety regulatory authority.” There are three types of exceptions listed in section 14501(c)(2). The second and third list specific types of laws or regulations related to vehicle weight, cargo type, and insurance. The first, by contrast, is relatively open-ended and focuses not on a specific type of law, such as a regulation, but on state authority as it relates to a certain goal — safety.
Some courts assert that “safety regulatory authority
of a State
” cannot include
private rights of action.
Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.
,
Regarding the second prong of the safety exception, the Court also holds that a
negligent-hiring claim in a personal injury case is an exercise of regulatory authority “with
respect to motor vehicles.” The Supreme Court has defined the phrase “with respect to” as
“concerning.”
See Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc.
,
Some courts read this phrase more narrowly as requiring that the law in question be
a regulation of a motor vehicle or that the defendant have control over a regulated motor
vehicle for the exception to apply.
Gillum
, 2020 WL 444371, at *4;
Volkova v. C.H.
Robinson Co.
,
Some courts insist that this interpretation opens the door to “all” otherwise-
preempted claims avoiding the reach of the FAAAA’s preemptive provisions.
Creagan v.
Wal-Mart Trans., LLC
, 354 F. Supp. 3d 808, 814 (N.D. Ohio 2018) (rejecting an
interpretation that claims may trigger the safety regulatory exception if they “concern”
motor vehicles because “if this were so, all preempted claims would then be ‘saved’”). The
Court disagrees. Only claims plausibly related to safety and respecting motor vehicles will
fit. And these claims are intended to avoid preemption, as the FAAAA was enacted with
the primary goal of minimizing economic regulation, not state police power over safety
regulation.
Ours Garage and Wrecker Srvc., Inc.
, 536 U.S. at 439 (“Congress’ clear
purpose in § 14501(c)(2)(A) is to ensure that its preemption of States’ economic authority
over motor carriers of property, § 14501(c)(1), ‘not restrict’ the preexisting and traditional
state police power over safety.”). Where the provisions occasionally clash, the Fifth Circuit
has instructed that a “congressional decision to enact both a general policy that furthers a
particular goal and a specific exception that might tend against that goal does not invariably
call for the narrowest possible construction of the exception.”
Cole
,
C ONCLUSION The Court holds that section 14501(c)(1) does not preempt Plaintiffs’ negligence claim against J.W. Logistics. Because the Court holds that the safety regulation preemption exception in section 14501(c)(2) applies to negligent-hiring claims against brokers, that claim is also not preempted. Because the Court holds that there is no ordinary preemption of these claims under the FAAAA, there cannot be any complete preemption either. Accordingly, the Court determines that Plaintiffs’ claims against J.W. Logistics are not federally preempted and that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. The Court remands the case to the 116th District Court in Dallas County, Texas.
Signed April 28, 2020.
___________________________ David C. Godbey United States District Judge
Notes
[1] The facts in the amended petition do not support diversity jurisdiction under section 1332(a), and the removing defendant, J.W. Logistics, does not contend that diversity jurisdiction exists.
[2] Plaintiffs refer to the Defendants collectively throughout their amended petition and do not clarify which claims are alleged against which Defendants. The amended petition alleges a variety of negligence-based claims, including negligence, gross negligence, negligence per se based on driving violations of the Texas Transportation Code, negligent entrustment, and negligent hiring. It also alleges a Texas statutory wrongful death claim. Because both parties consistently and repeatedly describe Plaintiffs’ claims against J.W. Logistics as “negligence and negligent hiring” throughout the motion to remand briefing, those are the claims the Court addresses here. But, if Plaintiffs did intend to allege all the claims listed in the amended petition against J.W. Logistics, the result would not differ. Gross negligence, negligence per se, and the statutory wrongful death claim would be assessed similarly to the general negligence claim in this case, as they are all premised on the carrier driver’s unsafe operation of the motor vehicle. Negligent entrustment would be assessed similarly to negligent hiring, as it more specifically addresses the transportation arrangement at the core of broker services.
[3] The FMCSA defines a broker as “a person or entity which arranges for the transportation of property by a motor carrier for compensation. A broker does not transport the property and does not assume responsibility for the property.” FMCSA, What are the definitions of motor carrier, broker and freight forwarder authorities? , https://ask.fmcsa.dot.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/248/~/what-are-the-definitions-of- motor-carrier%2C-broker-and-freight-forwarder. While it is unlikely that a carrier’s employee or agent would fit this definition, the definition by its terms does not exclude “an employee or agent of a motor carrier” from its scope. Consequently, a FMCSA broker certification does not necessarily guarantee that an entity is a “broker” within the meaning of the FAAAA.
[4] The primary allegation supporting the negligence claim is that Turner, the driver, was “driving recklessly and far exceeding the safe speed” as well as maintaining an unsafe
[6] Because the Fifth Circuit has not addressed whether state tort claims are preempted by the FAAAA and in what cases, the Court finds analogous opinions on ADA preemption instructive. See Finley v. Dyer ,2018 WL 5284616 , at *4 (N.D. Miss. 2018) (“Insofar as the FAAAA’s preemption provision is in pertinent part identical to the preemptive provision of the ADA and is generally construed in pari materia, the Court deems this authority extremely persuasive.”) (internal quotation omitted).