Following a bench trial, Daniel Lopez was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, failure to maintain lane, and driving without a license. Lopez appeals his conviction for possession, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress statements he made while in police custody. Discerning no error, we affirm.
On appeal from a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence. Short v. State,
Once Lopez was secured, the officer conducted a search of Lopez’s vehicle and discovered several baggies of cocaine in the center console and one baggie of marijuana under a passenger seat. One of the passengers in Lopez’s vehicle acknowledged that the marijuana belonged to him. When the officer returned to his patrol car, he started to inform Lopez that, in addition to driving without a license,
Lopez interrupted the officer and said, “[t]hat cocaine is mine. I don’t want my home boys to get in trouble for my cocaine.” A few minutes later, and without any additional statement being made by the officer, Lopez continued and said, “I have the [gumption] to sell it [and] I’ve got the [gumption] to go to jail for it.”
Lopez claims that the trial court should have suppressed his statements because the officer’s actions resulted in a custodial interrogation prior to delivery of a Miranda warning. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires the exclusion of any statement made by an accused during custodial interrogation who has not been advised of his Miranda rights.
The determination of whether an “interrogation” occurs focuses primarily upon the reasonable perceptions of the suspect and not the intent of the officer, although the officer’s intent is relevant. Rhode Island v. Innis,
Here, Lopez claims that when the officer told him that he was being charged with possession because none of the passengers in his vehicle had claimed the cocaine, he believed that the officer was threatening to arrest those passengers for possession if he did not confess. We find, however, that Lopez’s statements were spontaneous and voluntary. The officer did not threaten to arrest anyone other than Lopez for possession of cocaine. Instead, he merely informed Lopez that he was being arrested for possession because the cocaine was found in his vehicle and none of the passengers claimed ownership. See Johns v. State,
“[T]he definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” (Footnote and emphasis omitted.) Rhode Island, supra,
Judgment affirmed.