In a case with a procedural twist, the district court terminated the plaintiffs claims by entering summary judgment in favor of three defendants sua sponte without providing the plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard. This was impermissible in the circumstances of this case, and we vacate the judgment dismissing those claims. However, we affirm the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of a fourth defendant.
I. BACKGROUND
Beginning in 1986, Juan A. López-Car-rasquillo worked as a migration specialist at the immigration office of the Puerto Rico Department of Labor in New York. On April 15, 1993, this office was merged into the Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Administration (“FAA”). Arcilio Alvarado was Secretary of the Puerto Rico Community Affairs Department of the FAA from January 2, 1993 to June 30 of that year, and in that capacity he supervised López. That supervisory authority ended on July 1, 1993 when Alvarado became the Associate Director of Regional Offices at the Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Administration. Alvarado’s position with the FAA ended on June 6,1994.
López is a member of the Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”), and he alleges that his political affiliation was well known throughout his department at the FAA. His father, Juan López-Hernandez, was also a prominent member of the PDP, as well as a delegate to the Puerto Rico House of Representatives for 16 years. On November 4, 1992, the president of the New Progressive Party (“NPP”), Pedro Rossello Gonzalez, was elected governor of *411 Puerto Rico. López claims that this shift in political power “established [him] as a primary target of the newly named directors and secretary.” López was formally dismissed from his position at the FAA on June 19,1996.
On December 10, 1996, he filed a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the FAA and seven government' officials, including Alvarado, Pedro Rossello Gonzalez, Governor of Puerto Rico, Wanda Rubi-anes, Director of the FAA, John Sota, Deputy Director of the FAA, Marlene Cin-trón, Director of the New York City office of the FAA, Diana Roca, Director of the Philadelphia office of the FAA, and Cesar Almodovar Marchany, Secretary of Labor. On September 2, 1998, the district court accepted an amended complaint by López that added additional facts about three of the defendants. In both pleadings, but more specifically in the amended complaint, he alleges that the defendants discriminated against him because of his political affiliation. López states that his name was eliminated from department directories, important documents were removed from his office, and trash was kept on his desk. He also claims that he was denied keys to an office “of a program that supposedly was under his responsibility,” and that he was left out of important decisions regarding employees under his supervision. López contends that these incidents constituted attacks on his self-esteem and caused physical symptoms, including elevated blood pressure and chest pains. He further alleges that this discrimination culminated in the termination of his job.
II. DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS AGAINST ROCA, RUBI-ANES, AND CINTRÓN
To explain the error in the court’s dismissal of Lopez’s claims against Diana Roca, Wanda Rubianes, and Marlene Cin-trón, we must recount the procedural posture of this case at the time of the court’s ruling. On June 2, 1997, the district court dismissed the claims against the FAA on Eleventh Amendment grounds, finding that the FAA was “an arm of the government” of Puerto Rico. In the same order, the court also dismissed Lopez’s claims against all of the individual' defendants except Alvarado because liability under § 1983 cannot rest on a theory of respon-deat superior. 1 López then sought to amend his complaint pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 15(a), alleging additional acts by Alvarado and three of the previously dismissed government officials — Rubianes, Cintrón, and Roca. The court initially denied the motion to amend the complaint, and López moved for reconsideration.
While this motion was pending, Alvarado, the sole remaining defendant, moved for summary judgment on the basis of the original complaint. Before acting on the summary judgment motion, the district court allowed the amended complaint against Alvarado, Rubianes, Cintrón and Roca. The court then granted summary judgment in favor of Alvarado, first on the basis of the original complaint, and then, upon reconsideration, on the basis of the amended complaint as well. The court also entered judgment against López, asserting that there were no longer any defendants remaining in the case. That statement was incorrect because of the court’s decision to allow López to file his amended complaint.
The amended complaint identified Rubianes, Cintrón and Roca (as well as Alvarado) as defendants and it added to the allegations of the original complaint. The district court’s allowance of this amended complaint reinstated Lopez’s claims against the three previously dismissed defendants. With these defendants back in the case, the district court *412 could not enter a judgment against López on the basis of granting summary judgment to Alvarado without disposing of the claims it had allowed in the amended pleading against Rubianes, Cintrón, and Roca. See 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1476, 556-57 (1990) (noting that once an amended pleading is filed it’“supercedes the pleading it modifies” and that “any subsequent motion ... should be directed at the amended pleading”).
Moreover, before disposing of claims against the reinstated defendants, the court had to provide López with notice and an opportunity to be heard.
See Futura Development of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico,
López had no such notice here. Rubi-anes, Cintrón and Roca never filed a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment once the amended complaint was permitted. The district court provided no notice to López that it was considering sua sponte dismissal or summary judgment. Instead, the district court granted summary judgment to Alvarado on the basis of his pending motion and then simply asserted that the rest of the case had also been terminated, ignoring the fact that Rubi-anes, Cintrón and Roca were reinstated as defendants because of the amended complaint it had allowed. Under these circumstances, entering judgment in favor of these defendants was an error.
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF ALVARADO
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Alvarado on the basis of the statute of limitations. In ruling upon a motion for reconsideration, the court stated that the additional facts pleaded by López in his amended complaint did not change this disposition. We review the district court’s ruling de novo.
See Muniz-Cabrero v. Ruiz,
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Sheinkopf v.
*413
Stone,
On appeal, López argues that the district court erred in finding his claim time-barred under the statute of limitations. He contends further that the district court should have found the existence of a continuing violation in the discriminatory conduct he attributes to Alvarado. We agree that the district court properly entered summary judgment for Alvarado, but we affirm for reasons different than those relied upon by the district court.
See Medina-Munoz,
The statute of limitations inquiry assumes that Alvarado committed an act or engaged in a course of conduct that could be the basis for a claim of political discrimination. If Alvarado committed no such predicate act or acts, there is no need to consider whether Lópezs complaint was timely filed or, in the alternative, whether the conduct constituted a continuing violation such that López could still recover for some incidents otherwise barred by the statute of limitations. Having reviewed the summary judgment record in vain for evidence that Alvarado committed a discriminatory act, we conclude that López has not met his burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on this essential point. -
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Alvarado presented evidence, properly substantiated, to refute Lópezs allegations of his discriminatory conduct. In his affidavit, Alvarado states, “I did not conspire or meet with anyone in order to set up a plan which will lead to plaintiffs eventual dismissal.” He also states that 'he did not participate in the decision to dismiss López from his position at the FAA in 1996. Because Alvarado properly supported his motion for summary judgment, López had to demonstrate the existence of a trialworthy issue regarding discriminatory conduct by Alvarado.
See Woods-Leber v. Hyatt Hotels of Puerto Rico, Inc.,
In response to Alvarado’s motion for summary judgment, López offered only a personal affidavit and two pages from the transcript of Alvarado’s deposition. Because the deposition excerpt is in Spanish, and López did not provide an English translation, we decline to consider it as
*414
part of the record on summary judgment.
See
1st Cir. R. 30(d);
see also Gonzalez-Morales v. Hemandez-Arentibia,
In his affidavit, López references the “Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment” filed with the district court and avers that “it is correct in all its parts to the best of my knowledge.” This statement is insufficient as a proffer of evidence because affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be based on the affiants personal knowledge.
See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e);
see also Carmona v. Toledo,
Finally, the only other evidence of discrimination that might be gleaned from this record is a single line in Lopez’s affidavit, where he states, “Mr. Alvarado in many occasions made reference to my political affiliation.” This assertion about statements of political affiliation — unaccompanied by any specific factual information to support this claim, and unrelated to any employment action taken by Alvarado against López — is patently insufficient to establish an act of political discrimination. See,
e.g., Figueroa-Serrano v. Ramos-Alverio,
In short, López has failed to offer any properly substantiated evidence indicating that an act by Alvarado is cognizable as a claim of political discrimination. Accordingly, we need not reach the issue of whether a lawsuit filed to recover for such an act would be barred by the statute of limitations. Because López has not met his burden of opposing the motion for summary judgment, the court properly entered judgment for Alvarado.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. Although the court dismissed the case against all but one of the defendants, only three of the seven defendants — the FAA, the Governor of Puerto Rico, and Cesar Almodo-var-Marchany — filed the motion to dismiss.
. Reese v. Sparks,
. We note that some of the documents submitted by Alvarado to support his motion for summary judgment are also in Spanish, and we decline to consider these as well.