Loomis v. Exelon Corp.Loomis v. Exelon Corp.
Many defined-contribution pension plans offer participants an opportunity to select investments from a portfolio, which often includes mutual funds. In recent years participants in pension plans have contended that the sponsor offers too few funds (not enough choice), too many funds (producing confusion), or too expensive funds (meaning that the funds’ ratios of expenses to assets are needlessly high). See, e.g.,
Hecker v. Deere & Co.,
Exelon’s defined-contribution pension plan allows participants to choose how their retirement assets will be invested. It offers 32 options, including 24 mutual funds that are open to the public. These funds are no-load vehicles. In other words, they do not charge investors a fee to buy or sell shares. Purchases and sales occur at net asset value, calculated daily. A no-load fund covers its expenses by deducting them from the assets under management. So if these assets appreciate 10% in a given year, and the expenses come to 1%, investors receive a net gain of 9%; if the assets decline 5% in the market, investors’ net return is -6% that year. The funds аvailable to participants in the Exelon Plan have expense ratios ranging from 0.03% to 0.96%. The low-expense funds tend to be passively managed (index funds, for example, which do not make any
Plaintiffs, participants in Exelоn’s Plan, contend that its administrators have violated their fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, see
Similar arguments were made in
Hecker
but did not prevail. Deеre offered 25 retail mutual funds with expense ratios from 0.07% to just over 1% annually. We held that as a matter of law that was an acceptable array of investment options, observing that “all of these funds were also offered to investors in the general public, and so the expense ratios necessarily were set against the backdrop of market competition. The fact that it is possible that some other funds might have had even lower ratios is beside the point; nothing in ERISA requires every fiduciary to scour the market to find and offer the cheapest possible fund (which might, of course, be plagued by other problems).”
Plaintiffs contend that the panel in
Hecker
retreated from this holding when denying a petition for rehearing. It did not. Two principal issues were disputed in
Hecker:
first, whether ERISA plans must offer “wholesale” or “institutionаl” funds; second, whether Deere’s portfolio of funds was covered by a safe harbor,
argued- — and especially in their Petition for Rehearing they continue to argue— that the Plans were flawed because Deere decided to accept ‘retail’ fees and did not negotiate presumptively lower ‘wholesale’ fees. The opinion discusses a number of reasons why that particular assertion is not enough, in the context of these Plans, to state a claim, and we adhere to that discussion.
Nothing in
Jones v. Harris Associates, L.P.,
— U.S. -,
True, the participants in Exelon’s Plan press an argument that was not presented to the panel in
Hecker:
that the Plan should have paid the expenses directly, allowing participants to reap the gross rather than thе net return. But whether to cover these expenses is a question of plan design, not of administration. The participants want Exelon to contribute more to the Plan than it does. ERISA does not create any fiduciary duty requiring employers to make pension plans more valuable to participants. When deciding how much to contribute to a plan, employers may act in their оwn interests. See, e.g.,
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson,
Note that this is not an argument about the absolute level of fees. Any participant who wants a fund with expenses under 0.1% can get it through Exelon’s Plan. Nor is it an argument that Exelon has left participants adrift and apt to blunder into the high-expense funds when they would be better off with the low-expense funds. Cf. Warren Bailey, Alok Kumar & David Ng, Behavioral biases of mutual fund investors, 102 J. Fin. Econ. 1 (2011). Both Exelon and the funds distribute literature and hold seminars for the participants, educating them about how the funds differ and how to identify the low-expense vehicles.- Plaintiffs do not contest the adequacy of the Plan’s and the funds’ disclosures. What plaintiffs contend instead is that, if a pension plan offers only “institutional” vehicles, fees will be lower on average, and that participants tempted by a high-expense fund might save.
One reason
Hecker
rejected this argument that the administrator’s fiduciary duties require limiting choices to “institutional” funds is that “retail” funds, being open to the public, give participants the benefits of competition. A pension plan that directs participants into privately held
A helpful amicus brief filed by the Investment Company Institute tells us that the average expense ratio of institutional-share classes in equity funds in 2009 was 1.09%, which is higher than that of any of the retail funds offered to the participants in Exelon’s Plan. (The ICI calculates the average expense ratio of retail equity funds at 0.76%.) Likely the professional investors who negotiate for these investments are getting something extra for the money, but this expense ratio is not compatible with plaintiffs’ belief that institutional shares always have lower expenses. Meanwhile, institutional investment vehicles come with a drawbаck: lower liquidity. The retail funds that Exelon offers allow daily transfers. Participants can move their money from one vehicle to another whenever they wish, without paying a fee. In retirement, they can withdraw money daily. Institutional trusts and pools do not offer that choice. It is not clear that participants would gain from lower expense ratios at the cost of lower liquidity.
Plaintiffs treat the situation as one in which Exelon, whose retirees have more than $1 billion in the Plan, could exercise “buying power” by negotiating lower fees in exchange for a promise to place more money with a given investment manager, while demanding the same retail services (such as daily transfers) for which mutual funds charge their normal expenses. Alternatively, plaintiffs contend, Exelon could use its “buying power” to insist that mutual funds charge a capitation fee (an annual flat price per investor) in lieu of expenses as a percentage of capital under management.
Now it isn’t clear to us why mutual funds would offer lower prices just because participants in this Plan have pension wealth that in the aggregate exceeds $1 billion. Exelon can’t commit thаt sum, or any portion of it, to any one fund without abandoning the arrangement under which the participants themselves choose where their money will be invested. The expenses of retail funds derive in large measure from the need to deal with investors one at a time: to receive and mail small checks, to print and mail individual prospectuses and account statements, frequеntly to exchange modest sums from one fund to another, and so on. Expenses per dollar under management necessarily are higher if the average account is $100,000 than if it is $100,000,000. Hertz gets a fleet discount from General Motors when it orders 10,000 cars at a time, but Hertz does not secure fleet discounts for members of its # 1 Club to buy their own GM cars; retail transactions occur at retail prices. So too with retail transactions in mutual funds.
Likewise it isn’t clear to us why participants would view a capitation fee as a gain. A flat-fee structure might be beneficial for participants with the largest balances, but, for younger employees and others with small investment balances, a capitation fee could work out to more, per dollar under management, than a fee bеtween 0.03% and 0.96% of the account balance. (The same holds true if plaintiffs’ argument is limited to fees of the Plan’s own record-keeper; flat payments per participant may help some participants but hurt others,
Even if a restructured means of covering a fund’s costs would benefit participants, it is not something that Exelon could achieve. Mutual funds are regulated under the Sеcurities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Company Act of 1940. These statutes, and their implementing regulations, require mutual funds to treat alike all investors holding the same. class of shares. See 17 C.F.R. §. 270.18Í-3. So the sponsor of a mutual fund could not agree with Exelon to offer a special deal (lower expense ratios, capitation fees rather than expеnses paid from account balances) while giving participants the same rights as retail investors. And it could be hard to establish a separate class of shares, limited to Exelon. That might run afoul of the 1940 Act’s rule against senior securities,
Pension plans’ sponsors could get around these limits by creating in-house or captive mutual funds, which then would have only one class of shares and one set of rights. But captive funds run into the sort of problems we discussed above. They offer less choice (participants would have 1 or 2 options, nоt the 32 Exelon currently offers); they also are less liquid, less diversified, and may be harder to value. And a captive fund also would be smaller, so the expense ratio per dollar under management could be higher, especially if the fund had some expenses that do not vary with the amount under management. (The cost of writing a registration statement and prospectus, for example, is largely fixed, so the smaller the fund the larger this expense looms as a percentage of invested capital.)
■ Plaintiffs’ theory is paternalistic. They appear to believe that participants should prefer captive funds, even with loss of liquidity, and should not be allowed to invest in the funds from the Fidelity Group that Exelon’s Plan now offers. According to plaintiffs, participants like thеse mutual funds ■ for “the wrong reasons,” such as advertising. Since the seminars that Exelon offers have not dissuaded the participants from continuing to commit what plaintiffs call mistakes, they want the judiciary to force Exelon to make these investments impossible. Hostility to advertising has a long history, reflecting a belief that advertising is costly and thus must drive price up; but available data suggest that advertising promotes competition, which drives price down by more than the costs of the ads. See, e.g., Lee Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. & Econ. 337 (1972); Craig A. Depken II & Dennis P. Wilson, Is Advertising Good or Bad?, 77 J. Business S61 (April 2004); John Rizzo, Advertising and Competition in the Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry, 42 J.L. & Econ. 89 (1999).
For current purposes, it does not matter whether advertising is good or bad; all that matters is the absence from ERISA of any rule that forbids plan sponsors to allow participants to make their own choices. Far from reflecting a paternalistic approach, the safe harbor in
This concludes our discussion of the merits. Plaintiffs have filed a second appeal, No. 10-1755, from the district court’s award of some $42,000 in costs to Exelon. 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 24405 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 11, 2010). The district court relied on
One court of appeals has rejected this line of argument, and none has accepted it.
Quan v. Computer Sciences Corp.,
Decisions in this circuit could be read both to support and to rеject the conclusion in
Quan.
Compare
Nichol v. Pullman Standard Inc.,
Both the rule and the statute give the district judge discretion to decide whether an award of costs is appropriate. Plaintiffs did not succeed on any issue in this litigation, so the award could not run in their favor under Hardt’s standard. Doubtless
Affirmed