Loomis v. . People

67 N.Y. 322 | NY | 1876

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] The prosecutor was induced to place his money upon a game of hazard upon the assurance of Lewis, one of the prisoners, that he was to win, and he would have his money back, or that in case of loss other money would be procured upon a check which Lewis claimed to have in his possession, and paid in place of that lost.

It is evident that the prisoner Lewis and his confederate Loomis conspired fraudulently and feloniously to procure the money of the prosecutor, and by means of a trick and device succeeded in converting it to their own use. Upon the facts proven, the question to be determined is, whether a case of larceny is established. The jury have found that it was the intention of the prisoners to convert the money without the consent, and against the will of the prosecutor, and that he did not intend to part with his property. I think that the conclusion at which they arrived was abundantly warranted by the evidence, and the conviction of the prisoners can be upheld upon well-established legal grounds.

It is contended that the conviction was erroneous, because the prosecutor voluntarily parted with his money, not expecting to receive back the same bills, but others in their place, and hence the crime was not made out. It must be conceded that, in order to established the offence of larceny, there must be a trespass, and without this element the offence is not complete. (1 Hawk. Pl. Cr., § 1, p. 108; 2 Russ. on Crimes [5th Am. ed.], 95; McDonald v. The People, 43 N.Y., 61; Hilderbrand v. People, 56 id., 394.) Even although the owner is induced to part with his property by fraudulent means, yet if he actually intends to part with it, and delivers up possession absolutely, it is not larceny. (People v. Smith, 53 N.Y., 111.)

In this case, considering the circumstances, it cannot be deemed, we think, that the prosecutor intended to part with the possession or the ownership of the money. It was handed over for a particular purpose, with no intention to loan it, or absolutely to surrender the title, and it was only in case of its loss that other money was to be procured upon the check, which the prisoner Lewis claimed to have in his possession. The prosecutor then had parted with no absolute right to the same, nor transferred any title to the bills before the contingency of the loss occurred, and the use of the money was but temporary, and for a specified object. Certainly, when it appeared that no loss had happened, the temporary possession was at an end, and to all intents and purposes the money reverted to the prosecutor. The alleged loss, brought about by the criminal and fraudulent conduct of the prisoners, could not change the title, or in any way transfer the ownership to them. They did not thereby acquire any right, and it cannot seriously be questioned that at this time, if not before, the prosecutor would have been justified in taking the money forcibly, or could have maintained an action for the recovery of the same identical bills. It was his money, and the conversion of it by the prisoners, before it was won, was without a semblance of lawfully authority, and, as the jury have found, with a felonious intent.

It was a clear case of larceny, as marked and significant in its general features as if the prisoners had wrongfully seized and appropriated it when first produced. The form of throwing the dice was only a cover; a device and contrivance to conceal the original design, and so long as there was no consent to part with the money, does not change the real character of the crime. While the element of trespass is wanting and the offence is not larceny, where consent is given, and the owner intended to part with his property absolutely, and not merely with a temporary possession of the same, even although such consent was procured by fraud, and the person obtaining it had an animus furandi, yet as is well said by a writer upon criminal law:

"It is different where, with the animus furandi, a person obtains consent to his temporary possession of property, andthen converts it to his own use. The act goes farther than the consent, and may be fairly said to be against it. Consent to deliver the temporary possession is not consent to deliver the property in a thing, and if a person, animus furandi, avail himself of a temporary possession for a specific purpose, obtained by consent to convert the property in the thing to himself and defraud the owner thereof, he certainly has not the consent of the owner. He is, therefore, acting against the will of the owner, and is a trespasser, because a trespass upon the property of another is only doing some act upon that property against the will of the owner."

In the case at bar there was no valid agreement to part with the money absolutely, and no consent to divest the owner of his title. It was passed over for a mere temporary use at most, and the legal title remaining in the owner, the conversion of it by the prisoners within the rule cited was larceny. The reports are full of familiar illustrations of this rule, as a reference to some of the leading cases will show.

In Hildebrand v. The People (supra), a fifty-dollar bill delivered to the prisoner to pay ten cents and return the change, was kept by him, and it was held to be larceny. It was intended that after taking out the ten cents other money should be exchanged, and to this extent and for this purpose the prisoner had lawful possession of the money. In that case, as here, the money was not absolutely parted with, but surrendered for a specific purpose and the custody temporarily transferred. It is true that in the case last cited, the delivery was held not to be complete until the change was returned, but that does not alter the principle when there was but a temporary possession, as there was no transfer of the ownership. (See, also, McDonald v. ThePeople, supra.) Nor does it change the aspect of the case, when by trick or device the owner is induced to part with the custody or naked possession of property for a special purpose to one who receives it animus furandi, and still means to retain a right of property. (Smith v. The People, 53 N.Y., 111.) In Rex v.Horner (1 Leach, 305), where the prosecutor was decoyed into a public house and money obtained from him for the purpose of playing at cards, and appropriated by the prisoner, it was held that if there was a preconcerted plan to obtain the money, and ananimus furandi, it was felonious. This case is analogous and directly in point, and it is difficult to draw any distinction between the case cited and the case at bar, as there was quite as strong ground for finding the felonious intent in the latter case as in that cited. In Rex v. Robson (R. R., C.C., 413), where there was a plan to cheat the prosecutor out of his property under color of a bet, and he parted with the possession only to deposit it as a stake with one of the confederates, the taking was held to be felonious. This case is directly in point, and as a decision by the twelve judges is entitled to great weight. The cases referred to without citing others which bear in the same direction are sufficient to sustain the conviction, and the cases which have been cited as upholding the principle that there was no such parting with the property as to constitute larceny, do not, I think, go to the extent which is claimed. After a careful examination, without considering them in detail, suffice it to say, that perhaps a single exception (Reg. v.Thomas, 9 C. P., 741), which was a nisi prius decision, and is criticised in the opinion in Hildebrand v. The People, they are all clearly distinguishable from the case now considered, and the weight of authority is decidedly in an opposite direction.

There is, to be sure, a narrow margin between a case of larceny and one where the property has been obtained by false pretences. The distinction is a very nice one, but still very important. The character of the crime depends upon the intention of the parties, and that intention determines the nature of the offence. In the former case, where by fraud, conspiracy or artifice, the possession is obtained with a felonious design, and the title still remains in the owner, larceny is established. While in the latter, where title, as well as possession, is absolutely parted with, the crime is false pretences. It will be observed that theintention of the owner to part with his property is the gist and essence of the offence of larceny, and the vital point upon which the crime hinges, and is to be determined. Although the present case is on the border line, yet it is quite clear that it was, as the evidence stood, a fair question for the jury to decide as to the intent of the prisoners feloniously to take the money, and as to the intention of the prosecutor to part with the ownership of the same.

These questions were fairly submitted by the judge to their consideration, and as there was no error in the charge, or in any other respect on the trial, the conviction must be affirmed.

All concur; RAPALLO, J., absent.

Judgment affirmed.