246 F. 803 | 5th Cir. | 1917
In this case the undisputed facts necessary to its consideration are these: The Pancoast-Morgan Company was adjudicated a bankrupt on June 3, 1915. At that time it was occupying a store in San Antonio rented from C. N. Lontos, by a written lease, at a monthly rental of $550, payable in advance, the lease running from March 1, 1913, to October 31, 1922. On June 25, 1915, the trustee was elected, and the same day the landlord filed his proof of debt for the rent due for the month of May, 1915, and claimed a lien, under the belief that it was all he was entitled' to. On July 30th, he filed an amended claim for rent, including the month of May, and for the balance of the contract year, to wit, up to March, 1916, and asserted a lien upon the personal property contained in the leased premises, by virtue of the laws of Texas, for the full amount. At the same time he notified the trustee that he would consent to the sale of the leasehold or the subletting of the premises for the balance of the contract year. On July 31, 1915, the property of the bankrupt, on which the landlord claimed a lien, was sold by the trustee under order of the referee for $12,100, free of all liens, and the sale was subsequently confirmed. On the day of sale, by agreement between the trustee and the landlord, the premises were leased to the purchaser of the goods without prejudice to the rights of either party. The trustee objected to the amended claim of the landlord on the grounds: First, that the rent to accrue in the future was not a fixed liability, owing at the time of bankruptcy; and, second, that the claim was barred because not filed within 30 days after the occupancy of the premises by the bankrupt ceased. The referee ruled in favor of the trustee and disallowed the claim for all rent to accrue after August 1, 1915. On review the order of the referee was affirmed, and a judgment to that effect entered by the District Court. From that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
In the matter before us we are not concerned with the first-mentioned class of cases, as the laws of Texas give the landlord a lien on the personal property contained in the leased premises for rent for the balance of the “current contract year.” Article 5490, Revised Statutes of Texas of 1911; T. L. Marsalis & Co. v. A. J. Pitman, 68 Tex. 626, 5 S. W. 404. It is clear, therefore, that the first ground of objection raised by the trustee to the landlord’s claim is untenable.
As the landlord was entitled to payment in full out of the proceeds of the personal property in the leased premises, it follows that the judgment appealed from must be reversed, and appellant awarded judgment on his amended claim, subject to the deduction of such amounts as he has already received by virtue of the orders of the referee and his agreement with the trustee.
■Reversed.