Lead Opinion
In this case, we are asked to determine whether the trial judge’s decision to exclude two spectators from the courtroom during the testimony of a -witness, at the trial of Kenneth Longus, violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. In resolving that question, we must consider whether the “substantial reasons” standard for partial courtroom closures
I.
On September 28, 2006, the defendant, Kenneth Longus (“Longus”), and two teenage male friends went to Lindsay Wise’s (“Wise”) home and asked to borrow a hammer. Wise gave Longus a hammer, and he left. Soon afterward, a gun shop near Wise’s home was robbed. The attackers fought with the shop owner and took three guns from the shop. The shop owner was unable to provide detailed descriptions of his attackers because they were wearing hooded sweatshirts, and because he was restrained. The police recovered a hat left at the gun shop by one of the attackers.
The day after the robbery, Longus went to Wise’s home. Wise saw Longus show her roommate three guns and overheard Longus tell her roommate that he took the guns from a
Before trial in the Circuit Court for Washington County, the State made a preliminary motion to exclude specific spectators from the courtroom during Wise’s testimony:
[State’s Attorney]: Yes your honor, there is a witness that will be testifying. I don’t believe she is currently in the courthouse. I believe she’s at the state’s attorney’s office. Her name is Lindsay Wise. She will be testifying against the defendant here today. There has been a significant amount of almost witness intimidation going on between the uh [sic] from the defendant to Miss Wise and including the defendant’s family, specifically his father and Miss Wise’s next door neighbor, Millie Myers. As a matter of fact there was even contact with Miss Wise last night. Miss Wise, I— my concern is that she is going to further feel intimidated. Those people are here in the courtroom. I would ask the Court to exclude them from the courtroom when she testifies only so that she can, she can tell the truth, that she can speak freely and not be further intimidated. The intimidation has been going on for quite some time your Honor. [Defense]: Your honor, I understand that Miss Wise and my client were one time boyfriend and girlfriend. I think any witness’s testimony is suspect when a person is presumed innocent and I think to remove other persons from the courtroom from listening to what you have to say can also have the [e]ffect of allowing someone to say things under oath, which are untrue, which otherwise feel comfortable saying except as being noted by witnesses. I don’t think there is any indication other than displeasure at her*441 appearance here today that she has been intimidated. I’d ask that persons who are here on behalf of my client, his family, not be excluded from this proceeding.[3 ]
The trial court deferred ruling on the State’s pretrial motion. Once trial commenced, the State renewed its motion to exclude three spectators during the trial.
[State’s Attorney]: State calls Lindsay Wise. (Pause for approximately six minutes while witness is located and enters the courtroom.) ...
([The jury was excused and] the following ensued out of the presence of the jury:)
[State’s Attorney]: Yes your Honor, the State renews its motion to exclude certain persons from the courtroom.
The Court: Specifically?
[State’s Attorney]: [The Defendant’s father, Glenn Goode,] ... Miss Millie Myers ... [and] Mr. Don-Don Norris.
The Court: Okay. Basis?
[State’s Attorney]: They have been threatening Miss Wise over a period of time.
The Court: Mr. Joyce?
[Defense]: Your Honor, with respect to the State’s motion, I will not argue with respect to Mr. Goode because I know that Mr. Goode is concerned for his son and may have had, may have had some involvement with communications with this witness. With respect to the other persons, I believe they are known to this community who know everyone involved. I don’t believe there is any evidence they threatened anyone and I believe it is improper to exclude members of the public from a trial. Trials are supposed to be open to the public.
*442 The Court: The uh—Glenn Goode, the father of the defendant—(Defendant enters the courtroom.) The defendant has now joined us. There is a motion pending, Mr. Longus, to exclude Glenn Goode, Millie Myers and Donald Norris from the testimony of Lindsay Wise.... Mr. Goode is the defendant’s father. I don’t believe that there is a particular objection from the defendant as to that individual. It’s my understanding that Millie Myers has made certain allegations regarding the defendant or regarding this witness? [State’s Attorney]: Your honor, I can tell the Court that she has facilitated phone calls from the defendant to Miss Wise so that when Miss Wise sees her phone and sees her caller I.D. she believes its [sic] Millie Myers, she answers the phone and it’s the defendant. We’ve had that happening. We’ve also had communications where the defendant would tell Ms. Myers something and Ms. Myers would then pass that message along to ... this witness, specifically comments about needing to leave town and not to testify. The Court: And as to Donald Norris?
[State’s Attorney]: Your Honor, just last night there was a communication between the defendant and Ms. Wise that was actually a four-way conversation facilitated by Don-Don Norris as well as Millie Myers and her daughter, Amy. The Court: Okay. All right. Trials are public in nature, however, in order to move things along it is sometimes necessary to restrict movement into the courtroom and the presence of certain people under the circumstances. I find that there is extraordinary cause to grant the request of the State and for the testimony of Lindsay Wise, both direct, cross and redirect____ Glenn Goode, Millie Myers and Donald Norris are removed from the courtroom, although other people are allowed back in. All right Deputy? Thank you. Bring the jury in please.
I will also note for the record that there was approximately about seven to eight minutes when the State was attempting to get the witness in the courtroom and apparently she was having some difficulty entering the courtroom as a result of all of this.
Q. When your name was called a little bit earlier, you seemed to have some difficulty coming into the courtroom, why is that?
A. Because I was scared.
Q. I’m sorry?
A. I was scared.
Q. What are you scared of?
A. Testifying.
Q. Why?
A. I’m scared of what will happen afterwards, if anything.
Q. And Ms. Wise—After this trial here today, do you intend to return home to 106 Buena Vista?
A. No ma’am.
Q. Why?
A. Scared.
Q. When you and I have talked about you coming here and testifying—Do you recall the first time that you met with Detective Brandt and me?
A. (No audible response.)
Q. Do you recall meeting with Detective Brandt in a green Chevy Lumina?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. And were you, were you inclined to testify at that time? A. No. No.
Q. Okay. Why have you had a change of heart? Why are you here today?
A. Because I have been able to work out plans. I don’t have to go home. I don’t have to go back to the previous address.
*444 Q. And part of those plans that you have made, you expect to be assisted by the State to help you relocate, is that right?
A. Yes.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Longus of robbery and second degree assault. The court imposed a fifteen year prison sentence for robbery and merged the assault count. As to an unrelated conviction for carrying a handgun, the court imposed a consecutive sentence of eighteen months.
Longus filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing, inter alia, that the Circuit Court erred in granting the State’s motion to exclude Myers and Norris from the courtroom during the testimony of the State’s witness, Wise.
This Court granted Longus’s petition for a writ of certiorari, Longus v. State,
1. Did the lower court err by ruling that a trial judge can exclude a portion of the spectators from the courtroom if the moving party offers a “substantial reason” to do so?
*445 2. Did the trial judge err by granting the State’s motion to exclude two spectators from the courtroom during the testimony of a key prosecution witness?
II.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a ... public trial.”
A public trial “ensure[s] that [the] judge and prosecutor carry out their duties responsibly ... encourages witnesses to come forward[,] and discourages perjury.” Waller,
The right to an open trial, however, is not absolute. Carter v. State,
In Waller, the United States Supreme Court established a framework for determining whether the defendant’s right to an open trial gives way to a State interest in closure. Waller,
III.
The “Substantial Reason” Test
The first question posed in Longus’s petition for certiorari asks us to determine whether the intermediate appellate court
The State responds, arguing that the substantial reason test adequately protects the rights of defendants because partial closures do not implicate the same secrecy concerns as total closures. The State directs us to the fact that the intermediate appellate court’s decision is not without precedent. Rather, as noted by the State, the Court of Special Appeals adopted the same reasoning as several of the United States Courts of Appeals and appellate courts of other states in applying the substantial reason standard when reviewing partial closures. See, e.g., United States v. Osborne,
For example, in Woods, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied “the less stringent ‘substantial reason’ test to determine whether a defendant’s right to a public trial was violated by a partial closure of the proceedings.”
We disagree with the reasoning of those courts. In our view, although a partial closure may not implicate the same secrecy issues for the public as a total closure, a partial closure does implicate the same fairness issues. We are not the only court to have rejected an analysis which requires application of a different standard depending on whether the courtroom closure was total or partial. In People v. Jones,
We believe that there is no need to adopt such an articulation of the Waller standard since Waller already contemplates a balancing of competing interests in closure decisions. When the procedure requested impacts on a defendant’s right to a public trial, nothing less than an overriding interest can satisfy constitutional scrutiny.
* * * * * *
The proponent of closure must still establish that there is a ‘substantial probability’ that the overriding interest asserted will be prejudiced as a result of an open proceeding. Trial courts are called upon to ensure that the closure is no broader than necessary and to consider alternatives to closure suggested by the parties. The breath of the closure request therefore will always be measured against the risk of prejudice to the asserted overriding interest.
Id. (citations and quotations omitted). Other courts have also extended the Waller analysis to partial courtroom closures. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cohen,
Recently, in concluding that the right to a public trial applies to the jury selection process (the voir dire of prospective jurors), the United States Supreme Court in Presley v. Georgia, — U.S.-,
*451 [t]here are no doubt circumstances where a judge could conclude that threats of improper communications with jurors or safety concerns are concrete enough to warrant closing voir dire. But, in those cases the particular interest, and threat to that interest, must be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered.
- U.S. at -,
In the present case, as in many cases, see, e.g., Woods,
The “overriding interest” test is the substantive core of the Waller standard. The other three prongs of the Waller test address procedural issues—the scope of closure, additional factors the trial judge must consider, and the findings the trial judge must make to support the closure. Although Waller addressed a total closure of a suppression hearing to the public, the defendant’s interest in openness is nonetheless implicated in both a partial and a total closure. For this reason, we shall continue to apply the United States Supreme Court’s substantive standard, as articulated in Waller, to partial closures as well as total closures. Thus, we decline to apply the less stringent “substantial reason” standard when evaluating partial courtroom closures. We therefore hold that the standard announced by the United States Supreme Court in Waller, requiring that the party requesting closure demonstrate an overriding interest that will likely be prejudiced if the hearing is not closed, applies to both total and partial courtroom closures.
Further, we adopt the reasoning of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Tinsley, that “we are not persuaded that the distinction between a ‘substantial reason’ and an ‘overriding interest’ is a particularly meaningful one” because “ ‘a word like ‘overriding’ is really not a calibrated measure of the gravity of an interest; [rather,] it reflects a conclusion that a particular interest ... is sufficient to justify the degree of
In our view, the problem with adopting a “substantial reason” test is that any less stringent or relaxed standard fails to adequately protect the defendant’s interest in an open trial. The Waller test, in requiring an overriding interest, demands by definition that the State’s interest in closure outweigh the burden on the defendant’s right to a public trial. By contrast, an interest may be “substantial” but also less important than the burden on the defendant’s right to an open trial. By maintaining the Waller standard of overriding interest, we ensure that the interest advanced in favor of closure will outweigh the defendant’s right to openness in every closure, whether full, temporary, or partial. Further, by applying the Waller standard to partial courtroom closures, we guarantee that courtroom closures comport with the requirements of the
IV.
Application of the Waller Factors to a Motion to Exclude Two Spectators from the Courtroom During the Testimony of a Key Prosecution Witness
To decide whether the trial court properly granted the State’s motion to exclude Myers and Norris, we apply the four Waller factors to the facts of this case and determine whether the State, as the moving party, met its burden of proof in establishing an overriding interest in closure.
Overriding Interest Likely to be Prejudiced
A "witness’s legitimate fear of testifying in open court, or the witness’s legitimate fear of testifying in front of specific individuals in the courtroom, may present an overriding interest in the partial closure of the courtroom. See Tinsley,
In the present case, the dispute does not turn on whether witness intimidation could be an overriding interest, but rather on whether the State sufficiently proved that intimidation occurred and would have caused the witness to change her testimony in this case. Longus argues that the State failed to show an overriding interest warranting closure. In Longus’s view, the State did not allege that Myers or Norris threatened the witness. Rather, the State only alleged that Myers and Norris facilitated Longus’s communications with the witness. Also, although the witness was slow in making her way into the courtroom, the witness was present and testified in the case. According to Longus, the witness’s presence and willingness to take the stand indicates that Myers’s and Norris’s presence would not have prevented her from testifying truthfully. Finally, Longus maintains that the court may not rely on a proffer from an attorney when determining whether to exclude spectators, but rather should only rely on witness testimony or other relevant evidence.
In response, the State asserts that the “extraordinary cause” for closure found by the trial judge is analogous to an overriding interest. In this case, according to the State, Wise’s reluctance to enter the courtroom supported the trial judge’s decision to exclude Myers and Norris. Further, the State asserts that the partial closure was narrowly tailored because it was temporary and limited to the individuals that allegedly threatened the witness. In addition, the State points out that Longus failed to advance any alternatives to the exclusion of Myers and Norris. Alternatively, the State contends that Longus conceded to its proffer when he did not dispute the facts of the proffer or request a voir dire examination of the witness.
The Court of Special Appeals, in upholding the Circuit Court’s decision, pointed out that the State identified the individuals who had communicated threats or helped to communicate threats, that Longus essentially stipulated that
At the outset, we note that the Court of Special Appeals erred in relying on Wise’s testimony, which was given after the spectators were removed from the courtroom. We have said that “[a]n appellate court may not provide a post hoc rationale for why the trial judge would have closed the trial” based on information presented to the trial judge after the closure. Carter,
“When the question is whether a constitutional right ... has been violated,” as in the present case, “the reviewing court makes its own independent constitutional appraisal, by reviewing the law and applying it to the peculiar facts of the particular case.” Jones v. State,
This Court and the intermediate appellate court have, in the past, been reluctant to uphold the total closure of a courtroom “on nothing more than a proffer from the State.” Carter,
Similarly, in Holt,
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the role of proffers in determining whether spectators may be excluded in Guzman v. Scully,
The problem with the trial judge’s reliance on the proffers in the aforementioned cases is not that the judge considered the State’s proffer in rendering its decision. Rather, the common problem is twofold: first, the court relied on proffers containing generalized allegations rather than specific factual information; and second, there was no evidence supporting
It may, however, be appropriate to evaluate the amount of evidence required in support of the proffer and the level of findings needed to support an overriding interest in closure in light of the scope of the closure. Drummond,
In Tinsley,
In the present case, the State’s proffer contained specific allegations about contact between the witness, Myers, and Norris. Most of the specific allegations, however, were not of threats. The State alleged that Myers and Norris helped Longus make contact with the witness, but did not offer any information about what was said. The State’s most serious specific allegation was that Myers and Norris relayed messages that Wise should leave town and not testify. Although this communication might have an ominous undertone, depending on the context, in this case there was no context provided to distinguish this statement as a threat rather than a misguided suggestion on evading the trial court’s subpoena power.
Although the defense acknowledged that Myers and Norris were displeased at Wise’s appearance in court, this does not demonstrate that Myers or Norris made any threats against Wise. Further, even if the statements made by Myers and Norris were implied threats, there is no indication that Myers or Norris threatened to act in any way. Rather, if the statements were implied threats, the source of any threat, apparently, was Longus. The State did not allege that Myers or Norris threatened to act on Longus’s behalf, but rather that Myers and Norris put Longus in touch with the witness, or delivered messages to the witness from Longus. Similarly, an admission of wrongdoing by Goode, by not opposing Goode’s exclusion, does not taint Myers or Norris. Although Wise was delayed in entering the courtroom, there was insufficient specific information of threats to show that her delay was due to her fear of testifying, or that she would have been unwilling or unable to testify if Myers or Norris remained in the courtroom.
Finally, based on the trial transcript, the trial judge clearly acted prematurely in removing the spectators, without the
Further, it does not appear that Longus was afforded an opportunity to respond to the specific factual allegations proffered by the State before the trial judge ruled on the motion to exclude Myers and Norris. The transcript of the proceedings reflects that, initially, after the jury was selected and sworn, the State made a motion to exclude spectators on the ground that “[tjhere has been a significant amount of almost witness intimidation[.]” The trial judge held the matter under advisement. When Lindsay Wise was called to testify, the State renewed its motion, supported by general allegations about threats from Myers and Norris. The trial judge then asked Longus to respond. Longus opposed the State’s motion, giving a general response to the State’s allegations. Subsequently, trial judge asked the State to provide any further basis for the exclusion of Myers and Norris, after which the State offered specific factual allegations about the reason for exclusion. Essentially, the State pointed out that prior to trial there had been conversations between Longus and Lindsay Wise, initiated by Longus, and facilitated by Myers and Norris. In addition, the State asserted that Longus had Meyers relay to Wise “comments about [Wise] needing to leave town and not to testify.” At that point, the trial judge ruled on the motion, but, before affording Longus an opportunity to respond to those specific factual allegations. The trial judge, in ruling on the motion, stated that “in order to move things along it is sometimes necessary to restrict movement into the courtroom and the presence of certain
At a minimum, the trial judge should have afforded Longus an opportunity to respond to the specific facts proffered by the State before ruling on the motion, or conducted an evidentiary hearing. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we hold that the State did not present an overriding reason, in support of partial closure, that was likely to be prejudiced, and therefore the trial judge abused his discretion in excluding Myers and Norris from the courtroom, in violation of Longus’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. See Pasteur v. Skevofilax,
Scope of Closure
In the case of intimidation, it may be proper to limit closure only to the testimony of the witness who expressed fear, or only to exclude the individuals who presented the threat, or both. Frost,
Consideration of Less Restrictive Options
Even if the trial judge fails to exhaustively state and dismiss a list of alternatives, this is not an error “where the record was sufficient to support closure of the courtroom and where defense counsel did not advocate for any less restrictive options.” Frost,
We distinguish, however, defense counsel’s option to advocate a less restrictive alternative from defense counsel’s failure to request a voir dire of the witness. We reject the Court of Special Appeals’ assertion that Longus conceded to the State’s proffer by failing to request a voir dire examination of the witness. Presenting evidence in support of the State’s overriding interest in closure is the State’s burden. Waller,
Findings on the Record
In this case, Longus did not dispute that the trial judge made findings on the record about why Myers and Norris were excluded and the factors on which the trial judge relied in making the decision. The trial judge’s findings, however, did not adequately support closure based upon an overriding interest that was likely to be prejudiced and the court never made findings of fact utilizing the appropriate standard. The express purpose of the requirement that the court make findings adequate to support closure allows the “reviewing court [to] determine whether the closure order was properly entered.” Waller,
Remedy
The denial of the constitutional right to a public trial is a “structural defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” Watters v. State,
The appropriate remedy for a violation of the right to an open trial is to remand for the purpose of conducting a new trial. Carter,
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS IS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN CONFORMANCE WITH THIS OPINION. WASHINGTON COUNTY TO PAY THE COSTS.
HARRELL, J., concurs and dissents.
BATTAGLIA, MURPHY and ADKINS, JJ., dissent.
Notes
. A total courtroom closure occurs when "all persons other than witnesses, court personnel, the parties and their lawyers [are] excluded” from the courtroom. Woods v. Kuhlmann,
. The charges against Longus were: Count 1: Robbery with a deadly weapon; Count 2: Robbery; Count 3: Theft of $500 value or more; Count 4: Assault, first degree; Count 5: Assault, second degree.
. By opposing the State’s motion to exclude Myers and Norris, Longus preserved his claim for appellate review. See Robinson v. State,
. Longus also argued in his brief to the Court of Special Appeals that the Circuit Court erred in denying his request for a continuance to obtain an additional defense witness. This issue, however, was not raised in Longus’s petition to this Court.
. The Sixth Amendment expressly grants criminal defendants the right to a public trial. Waller,
. Waller,
. Ip v. Henderson,
. Butler v. Smith,
. We can assume that the State has a compelling interest in promoting the safety and security of its witnesses and in assuring that witnesses who testify are free from intimidation or retaliation. Accordingly, "[i]n some instances, the safety of a witness will certainly be an overriding interest, especially in cases involving ... witnesses whose lives have been threatened.” Ip v. Henderson,
. Under some circumstances, it is obviously unnecessary for the trial judge to conduct a voir dire examination or factual investigation beyond what is immediately apparent in the courtroom before excluding a spectator. For example, if a spectator’s outburst disrupts the proceedings, the trial judge may exclude the spectator from the courtroom without violating the Waller standard. The court has an overriding interest in maintaining order in the courtroom and "protecting the integrity of legal proceedings,” and may reasonably exclude a spectator who causes a disruption. Robinson,
In addition, in cases where the courtroom closure was inadvertent, unlike the circumstances in the present case, courts have determined that such a courtroom closure may be so limited in scope or duration that it is deemed de minimis or trivial, and not in violation of the Sixth or First Amendment guarantees to a public trial. See Peterson v. Williams,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring and dissenting.
Although I agree with Judge Murphy’s dissent insofar as it prefers the “substantial reason” test to the “overriding interest” test, I join the judgment of the Majority opinion because, on this record, the State failed to meet its burden to demonstrate a substantial reason to exclude Norris, if not Myers also, solely by proffer of the prosecutor. Maj. op. at 455,
For these reasons, I join the judgment of the Majority opinion.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
For the reasons stated by the Court of Special Appeals in Longus v. State,
As to Ms. Myers, the prosecutor stated:
Your Honor, I can tell the court that [Ms. Myers] has facilitated phone calls from the defendant to Miss Wise so that when Miss Wise sees her phone and sees her caller I.D. she believes its Millie Myers, she answers the phone and it’s the defendant. We’ve had that happening. We’ve also had communications where the defendant would tell Ms. Myers something and Ms. Myers would then pass that message along to uh this witness, specifically comments about needing to leave town and not to testify.
As to Mr. Norris, the prosecutor stated:
*467 Your Honor, just last night there was a communication between the defendant and Ms. Wise that was actually a four-way conversation facilitated by Don-Don Norris as well as Millie Myers and her daughter, Amy.
At that point, Petitioner’s trial counsel had the opportunity to object to the prosecutor’s proffer and/or to request that the Circuit Court voir dire Ms. Wise. The record shows that Petitioner’s trial counsel neither objected to the proffer nor requested a voir dire. Under these circumstances, I dissent from the holding that Petitioner is entitled to a new trial on the ground that Ms. Myers and Mr. Norris were also excluded from the courtroom during Ms. Wise’s testimony.
Judges BATTAGLIA and ADKINS have authorized me to state that they join in this dissenting opinion.