38 P. 547 | Or. | 1894
Opinion by
1. The questions presented for our consideration arise upon demurrer to the complaint, and hence all the allegations contained therein must be taken as true. This rule
All these acts are alleged to have been committed in pursuance of a conspiracy entered into by and between the executive committee and the members of Multnomah Typographical Union, No. 58, for the purpose of injuring and destroying plaintiff’s business, or compelling it to .submit to the rules and regulations of the association. When divested of all surplusage, the complaint simply shows that defendants have been guilty of one act of trespass, that of entering plaintiff’s premises unbidden; some ■acts by reason of which plaintiff was deprived of certain business, that of the city printing for the year eighteen hundred and ninety-three; and of some acts on account ■of which one customer, the Meier & Frank Company, has withdrawn its employment of plaintiff, and another
2. It is apparent that one purpose of this suit is to prevent strikes by the union employés of the plaintiff, or, to put it more directly, to prevent the union from calling off or interfering with such of said employes as the association is able to control through its organization. At one time, in England, it was maintained by some judges that, trades unions were illegal combinations, and indictable at common law. In Rex v. Mawbey, 6 Term R. 636, Grose, J., by way of illustration, makes use of the following language: “As in the case of journeymen conspiring to raise tiaeir wages, each may insist on raising his wages, if he can; but if several meet for the same purpose, it is illegal, and the parties may be indicted for a conspiracy.” From a review of this case it is apparent that this language was not necessary to a decision of the points made. In Hilton v. Eckersly, 6 El. & B. 52, Crompton, J., in referring to Bex v. Mawbey, says that Grose, J., “assumed the illegality of such combinations as well known law,” and further remarked that “combinations of this nature, whether on the part of the workmen to increase, or of the masters to lower, wages, were equally illegal.” But Lord Campbell, C. J., in a concurring opinion with Crompton, J.,
3. It must be understood, however, that these associations, like other voluntary societies, must depend for their membership upon the free and untrammeled choice of each individual member. No resort can be had to compulsory methods of any kind either to increase, keep up, or retain such membership. Nor is it permissible for associations of this kind to enforce the observance of their laws, rules, and regulations through violence, threats, or intimidation, or to employ any methods that would induce intimidation
4. It has been said that there is no such thing as a legal or peaceful “strike.” The term “strike” is differently defined by authors and judges. Webster defines it as “the act of quitting work; specifically, such an act by a body of workmen, done as a means of enforcing compliance with demands made on their employer.” In 24 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 128, it is defined as follows: “The term ‘ strike ’ is applied commonly to a combined effort on the part of a body of workmen employed by the same master to enforce a demand for higher wages, shorter hours, or some other concession, by stopping work in a body at a prearranged time, and refusing to resume work until the demanded concession shall have been granted, ” and again by Allen, J., in Deleware, etc., Railroad Company v. Bowns, 58 N. Y. 582: “A strike is a combination among laborers, those employed by others, to compel an increase of wages, a change in the hours of labor, some change in the mode and manner of conducting the business of the principal, or
Conspiracy at common law was a combination between two or more persons to do an unlawful thing, or to do a lawful thing by unlawful means. Where not under special contract for a definite time, a simultaneous severance of the relations between employer and employes at the instance of the employés, and where there was no preconcerted action of such employés, was never considered unlawful. Coming to the means employed, it is not unlawful for several or many employés to agree between themselves to quit their employer. As we have seen, at one time it was held to be an unlawful conspiracy for la borers to combine for the purpose of quitting simultaneously, with the ultimate purpose of raising their wages, or inducing their employer to confine his employment to certain kinds of labor, or the like; but this is not now the law, the principle underlying it having long since been discarded as inconsistent with liberty and the spirit of our free institutions. After workmen have thus combined, it is still not unlawful for them, by the use of fair means, to communicate the reasons for their design, and to signify their intention of quitting to their employer: 24 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 123; Bohn Manufacturing Company v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 233, 21 L. R. A. 337, 40 Am. St. Rep. 319; 55 N. W. 1119; Walsby v. Anley, 7 Jur. (N. S.),466; People v. Kostka, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 434; People v. Wilzig, 4 N. Y. Crim.
5. It is claimed in this case that the means employed by defendants were not permissible, and, being violative of the rights of plaintiff, it is entitled to an injunction to prohibit their continuance. This brings us to the gist of the controversy. The statute provides (Hill’s Code, § 1898): “If any person shall, by force, threats, or intimidation, prevent, or endeavor to prevent, any person employed by another from continuing or performing his work, or from accepting any new work or employment; or if any person shall circulate any false written or printed matter, or be concerned in the circulation of any such matter, to induce others not to buy from or sell to or have dealings with any person, for the purpose or with the intent to prevent such person from employing any person, or to force or compel him to employ or discharge from his
6. The more serious phase of this case, and the one which demands special attention, is the alleged boycott of plaintiff in its business, inaugurated for the purpose of so-handicapping it as to compel submission to the rules and regulations of the union. Every person has a right to-require that he be protected in his property rights. ‘ ‘ The-labor and skill of the workman, or the professional man, be it of high or low degree, the plant of a manufacturer, the equipment of a farmer, the investments of commerce, are all in an equal sense property. If men by overt acts of violence destroy either they are guilty of crime”: Ray
The cases principally relied upon by plaintiff to sustain the injunction in the case at bar are Brace Brothers v. Evans and Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union. In each of these cases the acts complained of were most aggravated and virulent. In the former case the plaintiffs were proprietors and managers of a steam laundry, with a large and lucrative business. Circulars were issued alleging abusive treatment of the employes by plaintiffs, and asking all persons to cease patronizing them. This was followed by several other circulars, similar in character, some of which had printed thereon in large letters “Boycott Brace Brothers. ” A sign was placed on a building in large letters: “Headquarters Brace Brothers Boycott Committee.” Men followed plaintiffs’ wagons in buggies having banners attached to the harness on each side of the horse containing “BoycottBrace Brothers” in large letters. Persons visited plaintiffs’ agents, and requested them to cease acting as such, and, upon their refusal to do so, circulars were distributed denouncing them, and asking the public to boycott them. Men were
7. Has plaintiff herein brought itself within the purview of the doctrine of these cases, or, in other words, does it show such threatened and imminent injuries to its business and property as will result in its irreparable detriment and loss? The allegations of the existence of a conspiracy between the officers and members of Multnomah Typographical Union, No. 58, to compel the plaintiff to submit to the dictation of the union upon pain of being boycotted in its business must be taken as true for the purposes of the demurrer. The first overt act, as before stated, was the entry of the executive committee upon the premises of plaintiff without leave or license, and ordering the union men to cease work under penalty of being dealt with according to the laws and regulations of the union. If this was a wilful aggression upon plaintiff’s rights, it would constitute trespass, for which an action would lie sounding in damages. It must also be taken as true that through the wilful and malicious acts of the conspirators plaintiff lost the city printing for eighteen hundred and ninety-three, the Meier & Frank Company business, and will lose that of Mason, Ehrman & Company, all valuable business. These acts were committed within a space of about ten months, and constitute a grievance not to be lightly considered, but we cannot agree with counsel that plaintiff is remediless in a court of law. The direct cause of the loss of the city printing is definitely alleged, and
8. The allegations of the complaint that “the said president and executive committee have notified plaintiff that it had resumed its work of destruction with renewed vigor and malice against it, and this time will make war on it to the knife,” and “said president and committee notified plaintiff that it now intended to resume its attacks upon it, and fight it to the death,” and such amplified averments as, “so the plaintiff says, that in-pursuance of said unlawful combination and conspiracy, from time to time it has been unlawfully and maliciously interfered with by the said officers and members of said union in its business, and has been subjected to continual secret assaults in influence brought to bear by them in order to injure and destroy its business, and that its patrons have been continually ’harassed, and both impliedly and expressly threatened by them with boycott if they continued to give business to the plaintiff, and that other trade union associations have been enlisted and persuaded by said union to take part in the crusade against it. * * * The very nature of the attacks made on plaintiff render it impossible to trace them fully, or to control them. That they are insidious, made in secret, or at all events without the knowledge or presence of the plaintiff when made, and few of the instances come to' its knowledge except through their injurious effects, as to which plaintiff in many cases is left to infer the cause. * * * Enough instances have come to its knowledge in which the said officers and members of said union have been pursuing their malicious, unlawful, and fraudulent course to demonstrate that it has • been kept up persistently, and has been widespread in the
9. The authorities all agree that a court of equity will not hesitate to avail itself of the extraordinary process of injunction, when the circumstances of the particular case require it, in order to protect rights of property against irreparable damage done by wrongdoers. Such process, however, should be issued with great caution and circumspection. Baldwin, J., in Bonaparte v. Camden, etc., Railroad Company, 1 Baldwin, 205, Fed. Cas. 1617, says: “There is no power, the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuing of an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity, that never ought to be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages. The right must be
Affirmed.
The case of Cate v. Murphy, 39 Am. St. Rep. 6S6, presents an interesting example of a lawful combination among employers, assisted by certain classes of dealers, to keep down wages. Continental Insurance Company v. Board of Underwriters, 67 Fed. 310, and Bohn Manufacturing Company v. Hollis, 21 L. R. A. 337, 40 Am. St. Rep. 323; Queen Insurance Company v. State (Tex.), 22 L. R. A. 484; State v. Phipps, 18 L. R. A. 657, are additional cases involving the same principle. The Bohn case is criticised, and said to be a bad precedent, by the supreme court of Indiana in Jackson v. Stanfield, 36 N. E. 345. —Reporter.
Mr. Justice Brewer, in the Debs case, — U. S.-, uses the following luminous and expressive language to the same effect: “* * * but we maybe permitted to add that it is a lesson that cannot be learned too soon nor too thoroughly that under this government of and by the people the means of redress of all wrongs is through the courts and at the ballot-box, and that no wrong, real or fancied, carries with it legal warrant to invite as a means of redress the co-operation of a mob, with its accompanying acts of violence.” See also the cogent statements of Judge Baker of Indiana in the case of Lake Erie Railway Company v. Bailey, 61 Fed. 494: “The court recognizes the right of any man or number of men to quit the service of their employers, and it recognizes the right of men to organize, if they deem it expedient, to better their condition. The court also recognizes the hardships in the life of the average working man, the scanty wages which they often receive, their long and arduous hours of service, frequently
To the same effect generaUy see Reynolds v. Everett (N. Y.), 39 N. E. 72, deeided the next day alter this opinion was filed.—Refobtbb,
Tn Lucke v. Clothing Cutters’ Assembly, 39 Am. St. Rep. 421, 19 L. R. A. 408, 77 Md. 396, an assembly of the Knights of Labor was held liable in damages for procuring the discharge of a nonunion workman hy threatening to interfere with his employer’s business. A similar ease is Morris y. Bricklayers’ Union, 23 Weekly Cincinnati Law Bulletin, 48, where plaintiff xeeoyered a substantial judgment against a union and some of its members for boycotting him. The case was appealed to the supreme court of Ohio and affirmed, though no opinion was handed down. Jackson v. Stanfield, (Ind.), 36 N. E. 345, and Crump v. Commonwealth, 10 Am. St. Rep. 395, are additional examples of the same kind.—Repoetee.