[¶ 1] Riсhard H. Longley, Dorothy R. Fleming, Gloria P. Hendsbee, and Patricia A. LeBlanc (the Longleys) appeal from the summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (Somerset County, Alexander, J.) in favor of Amanda Knapp. The Longleys claim that the court erred by: (i) granting Knapp’s motion for discovery sanctions that precluded the Longleys’ use of certain testimony and exhibits in this case; (ii) granting Knapp’s motion for a summary judgment; (iii) determining that they lacked standing to seek reformation of the deed from the Town to Knapp; and (iv) denying their motion to amend their complaint. The trial court’s imposition of discovery sanctions against the Longleys did not exceed the bounds of the court’s discretion and the trial court’s determination thát the Longleys lack standing to seek reformation of the deed from the Town to Knapp is correct. The court, however, erred in barring, on the theories of laches and estoppel, the Longleys’ claim оf the establishment of a public way. Additionally, a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning whether a public way was created by prescriptive use — an issue reached by the trial court despite its determinations concerning Knapp’s equitable defenses. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in part and vacate the judgment in part.
[¶ 2] This dispute involves whether a gravel road in the Town of Anson is a public way or a private drive. Amanda Knapp contends that the disputed way is her private drive. The Longleys, her neighbors, contend that the way in question is a public road, created either by the statutory method of layout and acceptance in 1905, or alternatively, by public prescriptive use.
[¶3] In March, 1996, the Longleys petitioned the Selectmen of the Town of Anson seeking a determination that the disputed way was the northern most portion of Frederick Street, a town road. The Selectmen voted to take no action on this petition, and the Town has continued to take no position on whether the disputed parcel is part of Frederick Street or otherwise a public way. The Longleys then filed a complaint for declaratory relief requesting a judicial determination thаt the disputed drive had been established as a town way by (i) layout and acceptance, or (ii) by prescriptive use. 2 Knapp counterclaimed for declaratory relief requesting a finding that a town way had never been established over her property and requesting that the Longleys be ordеred to *942 remove a utility line within her claimed property.
[¶4] Following the close of discovery, both parties filed for a summary judgment. In their motion for a summary judgment the Longleys referenced attached affidavits and materials not produced during discovery. Knapp moved for discovery sanctions based on the Longleys’ delay in producing such materiаl and, following a hearing, the court granted Knapp’s motion for sanctions and barred the use of these materials “for any purpose.”
[¶ 5] The trial court then granted a summary judgment for Knapp and shortly thereafter the Longleys filed a motion to amend their complaint to include two new counts seеking either a prescriptive easement by private use or an implied easement. Following a hearing on this motion, the court denied the Longleys’ motion to amend, issued a final judgment specifying that Knapp was the owner of the entire disputed parcel “free and clear of any claim tо a town or public way,” and ordered the Longleys to remove their utility lines from her property. This appeal followed.
I.
[¶ 6] The Longleys filed their motion for a summary judgment 28 days after the discovery period had ended. Supporting this motion was evidence — photographs and an engineering plan of thе disputed area as well as the affidavits of six individuals — not revealed during the discovery period although the evidence fell squarely within Knapp’s discovery requests. The trial court determined that the Longleys did not comply with their discovery obligations in good faith “and that said failure to comply prejudicеd Amanda Knapp’s ability to defend this case.” As a result, the court ordered this evidence “to be excluded from use for any purpose” in the present action.
[¶ 7] “It is the purpose of both the discovery rules and the pretrial conference to eliminate the sporting theory of justice and to enforce full disclosure.”
Reeves v. Travelers Ins. Cos.,
[¶8] The Longleys’ failure to provide Knapp with materials responsive to her discovery requests during the discovery period prejudiced Knapp’s ability to examine, to utilize, and to challenge relevant evidence prior to the filing of each party’s summary judgment motion. The triаl court acted within the bounds of its discretion in excluding such evidence from this case — the sanction reflected the finding of bad faith on the part of the Longleys as well as the prejudice suffered by Knapp.
Cf. Maietta v. International Harvester Co.,
II.
[¶ 9] There are three ways to establish a town road: (1) by the statutory method of layout and acceptance; (2) by dedication and acceptance; and (3) by prescriptive use.
See Avaunt v. Town of Gray,
*943
[¶ 10] Laches is the omission to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time and under cirсumstances prejudicial to the adverse party.
See A.H. Benoit & Co. v. Johnson,
[¶ 11] The Longleys enjoyed unrestricted use of the disputed way for years until Knapp asserted her private ownership of the way. Under these circumstances, the Longleys had no reason to seek declaratory relief to assert their right to use this way to access their property; they used the disputed way under the reasonable assumption that it was a public road and sought judicial relief only at that time when they were excluded from using the way. We cannot say that the Longleys’ failure to assert their right to use the disputed way was either unreasonable or unexplainable and we thus hold that the application of laches in this case is inappropriate.
[¶ 12] Similar reasoning guides our determination that the Longleys are nоt barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel from asserting that the disputed road is a town way. The doctrine of equitable estoppel “bars the assertion of the truth by one whose misleading conduct has induced another to act to his detriment in reliance on what is untrue.”
Anderson v. Commissioner of Dep’t of Human Servs.,
[¶ 13] In the instant case, the trial court determined that the Longleys are equitably estopped from asserting that the disputed way is a town way. The record does not contain clear and convincing proof that the Longleys were silent “when the circumstances would impel an honest man to speak.”
Milliken,
III.
[¶ 14] The Longleys argue in the alternative that a public way was created by prescriptive use. The requirements for the creation of a public way by prescriptive use parallel those for the creation of a’ prescriptive easement.
See Comber v. Plantation of Dennistown,
[¶ 15] The Longleys produced affiants who swore that the Town maintained the disputed way from at least 1930 to the early 1990’s. The Longleys claim that the Town plowed the way during the winter, erected and continues to pay for a street light located on this disputed area, and erected a fence to prevent persons from going onto the property now owned by Knapp. Additionally, these affiants testified that the disputed way was used repeatedly by the public to visit the Longleys and to access property north of the Longleys.
[¶ 16] A party is entitled -to a summary judgment if no genuine issue of material fact exists and if the party, on the basis of the undisputed facts, is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
See North East Ins. Co. v. Soucy,
[¶ 17] Record evidence cited in the Longleys’ Rule 7(d) motion raises a material issue of fact as to whether a public easement by prescription was created over the disputed way. Conflicting evidence exists as to whether the use of the disputed way was limited to persons not generally separable from the public. Additionally, the Longleys have produced evidence of activity by the town facially incompatible with Knapp’s claim of private ownership of the way, namely the Town’s erection of a street light and fence on the way and regular plowing of the way. The character and continuity of use required to create a prescriptivе easement is a factual issue that, if in dispute, as in this case, should not be resolved by a summary judgment.
See Roy v. Buckley,
IV.
[¶ 18] The property claimed to be owned by Knapp was conveyed to her by Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. in 1994 by a deed description including the disputed area. A year later the Town released some outstanding tax' liens using the same description as contained in the Citicorp deed. The Longleys argue that the court erred in its determination that they lacked standing to seek reformation of the deed given by the Town to release tax liens on Knapp’s property. In order for a party to have standing to bring an action seeking to reform a deed, a party must have been a party or privy to the original deed and must show that the mistake was mutual as between the original parties to the deed.
See Jones v. Carrier,
V.
[¶ 19] Finally, the Longleys аrgue that the trial court erred in denying their
*945
motion to amend their complaint to include their claim that they enjoyed a private or implied easement over the disputed way. Generally, in the absence of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory tactics, or unfair prejudice, courts should freely allow an amendment to a complaint.
See
1 Field, McKusick
&
Wroth, Maine Civil Practige § 15.3 at 802-03 (2d ed. 1981);
Smith v. School Admin. Dist. No. 58,
[¶ 20] The trial court, in its decision to deny the Longleys’ motion to amend, may have considered the fact that a summary judgment had already been entered, and thus may have been disinclined to allow the amendment. We thus vacate the order dеnying the Longleys’ motion to amend to provide the trial court with an opportunity to reconsider the motion in light of the present posture of this case.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded for farther proceedings consistent with the opinion herein.
Notes
. The Longleys named the Town as the defendant and Knapp as a party-in-interest defendant.