Robert LONG, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Robert E. Pyle, Lake Alfred, and Frank C. Alderman, III, Fort Myers, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Davis G. Anderson, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
BOARDMAN, Judge.
The question presented for our consideration is whether a warrantless search and seizure of aрpellant's residence without his presence or permission constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure. The underlying question is whether this case falls under the exigency or emergency doctrine exception.
The facts are basically that оn January 28, 1974, a Fort Myers police officer *36 was dispatched to the local hospital. Upon arrival he was informed by a doctor that a young girl was suffering from an overdose of medication and in order to counter-act the drugs it was a dire necessity to obtain a sample of them. The officer was also informed that another young girl had given the patient the drugs. The officer immediately went to pick up this other girl at a local school. Upon locating her, she advised the officer she had taken the pills (drugs) from a house (appellant's) where she had been baby-sitting. This young girl was beginning to show overdose symptoms. Together they proceeded to the premises. Upon arrival, they discovered no one was home. Thereupon they entered the premises where the young girl led the officer to a bedroom closet and pointed out to the officer a blue bag in which the drugs were loсated. The officer then rushed this young girl to the hospital together with the drugs in order that both girls could be treated. Later that same day a search warrant was obtained and executed to search the residence of appellant. Additional drugs were found thеrein, and appellant was arrested.
Appellant was charged with four counts of possession of a controlled substance and one count of possession of paraphernalia, contrary to Florida Statutes, Section 893.13. Following entry of а not guilty plea, appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence which he contended was the fruit of an unreasоnable search and seizure. After full hearing, including briefs, the trial judge denied the motion. Thereupon, appellant withdrew his plea оf not guilty and entered a negotiated plea of nolo contendere to Counts 1, 2 and 3, reserving the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress and the state agreed to nol-pros counts 4 and 5. Appellant was thereafter adjudged to be guilty and sentenced to serve three years on counts 1, 2 and 3 in the state penitentiary.
Appellant contends that this casе falls outside the emergency doctrine because the victim was not on the premises where the drugs were located. We hаve fully analyzed appellant's contention, but reject it on the rationale of our sister court in Webster v. State, Fla.App.4th, 1967,
... The right of police to enter and investigate in an emergency, without an accompanying intent either to seize or arrеst, is inherent in the very nature of their duties as peace officers and derives from the common law. United States v. Barone, ... [2d Cir. 1964,330 F.2d 543 ]. The рreservation of human life is paramount to the right of privacy protected by search and seizure laws and constitutional guaranties; it is an overriding justification for what otherwise may be an illegal entry. It follows that a search warrant is not required to legalize an entry by police for the purpose of bringing emergency aid to an injured person. Frequently, the report of a death рroves inaccurate and a spark of life remains sufficient to respond to emergency police aid. As a general rule, we think an emergency may be said to exist, within the meaning of the "exigency" rule, whenever the police have credible information that an unnatural death *37 has, or may have, occurred. And the criterion is the reasonableness of the belief of the police as to the existence of an emergency, not the existence of an emergency in fact. Wayne v. United Statеs, 1963,115 U.S.App.D.C. 234 ,318 F.2d 205 ; Davis v. State, 1964,236 Md. 389 ,204 A.2d 76 ; compare Miller v. United States, 1958,357 U.S. 301 ,78 S.Ct. 1190 ,2 L.Ed.2d 1332 .
The police officer in our instant case properly acted within those guidelines based upon Webster, supra, and the casеs cited therein. He certainly acted upon credible information the doctor's statement that it was an absolute necеssity that the nature of the drugs be determined and identified in order that he could administer the correct antidote. The record clearly shows that the officer did not have an accompanying intent either to seize other contraband or arrest appellant at the time the second girl led him to the appellant's residence. His sole purpose was the preservation оf human life. It is reiterated that the second young girl was beginning to experience overdose symptoms. As we interpret the language in Webster, supra, there is nothing therein which indicates to us that it is a necessary and essential element in order for the exigency rule to apply that the victim must actually be on the premises where the drugs were located. There is no dispute between the parties that an emergency existed. The fact that the victim was confined to a hospital and not in the premises of the appellant does not render the rule inapplicable.
As stated, the trial court sentenced appellant to serve three years in the penitentiary after finding him guilty of the offenses charged in Counts 1, 2 and 3. Under our ruling in Haddon v. State, Fla. App.2d, 1975,
The judgment is
Affirmed, but the case is remanded for proper sentencing.
HOBSON, Acting C.J., and SCHEB, J., concur.