106 S.E. 481 | N.C. | 1921
STACY, J., took no part in the decision of this case. *147 The General Assembly of North Carolina, at its regular session, 1919, passed an act entitled "An act to submit to the voters of Brunswick County the question of the location of the county-seat, and to provide county buildings," same being chapter 263 of the Public-Local and Private Laws of 1919. Under this act the board of elections of Brunswick County was authorized and directed to submit to the qualified voters of the said county the question of whether the county-seat should be located at Southport, Bolivia, or Supply. It was provided in said act that in the event no one of these places received a majority of the qualified votes of Brunswick County in said election, then under this statute a second election should be held for a choice to be made between the two places receiving the highest and the next highest votes.
In the first election Bolivia received 624 votes, Supply, 562, and Southport, 406; and it appears that 474 registered voters did not vote in said election. No one place receiving a majority of the qualified vote, a second election was ordered to be held between Bolivia and Supply. In this second election Bolivia received 754, Supply 370, votes, and it appears that 1,003 registered voters cast no ballot.
The returns of said election were duly canvassed and the result declared by the board of commissioners of Brunswick County on 5 July, 1920, said board declaring and designating Bolivia the county-seat of Brunswick County.
This action of the board of commissioners of Brunswick County in declaring and designating Bolivia as the county-seat is attacked by the plaintiffs on the ground that a majority of the qualified voters resident in Brunswick County did not cast their ballots in favor of Bolivia either in the first or second election. It appears from the allegations of the complaint that 754 qualified votes were cast in the second election for Bolivia, the same being a majority of the qualified votes polled, but less than a majority of the total number of registered voters in the county.
The whole case presents the question as to whether it was necessary for Bolivia, in the second election, to receive a majority of the qualified vote as cast, or the vote of a majority of the total number of registered voters in said county, in order to be declared the county-seat.
The court then held that before Bolivia could be declared the county-seat of Brunswick it must have received the favorable vote of a majority of the qualified voters resident in said county, whether all of them actually voted or not.
The action was brought to enjoin defendants from declaring Bolivia the county-seat of Brunswick County, or to take any action whatever for the purpose of effecting a removal of the county-seat from its present *148 location at Southport. Upon the foregoing ruling, the court gave judgment for the plaintiffs, citizens and taxpayers of Brunswick County, enjoining the removal of the county-seat. Defendants appealed. After stating the case: The only question necessary to be considered is whether a removal to Bolivia could take place, under the terms of the statute, unless a majority of all "the qualified voters of Brunswick County" had actually voted in favor of the same at the polls, or whether a majority of those who voted at the election was sufficient to authorize the removal, and the decision of this question turns on the meaning of the word "voters" as used in the statute. If the words "qualified vote or voters" is equivalent to "qualified electors," the judgment of the court below is correct, as Bolivia did not receive a majority of the qualified electors, or of the qualified votes of the county, when the word "vote" is taken in the sense of the registered vote, or list of registered electors.
There may be, and perhaps is, apparent conflict in the authorities elsewhere, but in this State, and by this Court, the meaning of the words a "majority of the qualified voters of a county" was finally settled long ago, and that meaning must now prevail with us. In R. R. v. Comrs.,
We do not agree that the use of the word "vote" instead of "voters" should make any difference in the result. It means substantially the same thing. The words "vote" and "voters" are inaccurately used to express what is manifestly the meaning as heretofore held by us. "Vote" is the choice expressed at the ballot box, "ballot" the means by which it is expressed, and "voter" the person who expresses it. The proper or more exact word, perhaps, would have been "electors" instead of "voters" or "vote" in the phrase "a majority of the qualified voters," or "vote." But the intent and meaning of the Legislature is just as clear with either word, and the legislative will is not to be disappointed by the lack of rhetorical or verbal accuracy, if the meaning and intention are plainly disclosed. 36 Cyc., 1114-1127. But, without the aid of any authority or decided case, we are of the opinion that it was intended by the Legislature that all of the "qualified electors" should be counted in ascertaining whether a majority of those entitled to vote, and called "qualified voters" or "qualified vote" in the act, had actually voted.
The judgment of the court directing a permanent injunction was correct.
Affirmed.
STACY, J., having been of counsel, took no part in the decision of this case. *151