7 N.C. 57 | N.C. | 1819
Lead Opinion
This suit was instituted in the Superior Court of Law (59) for ROWAN, and removed for trial to IREDELL, where it came on to be tried, at October Term, 1817, and a verdict was found for the plaintiff and his damages were assessed to two hundred dollars. Whereupon it was contended on behalf of the Defendants, that the judgment should be arrested; for that the jury had found a general verdict for the plaintiff, and that upon the first count in the declaration, no recovery could in law be had. The case was ordered to be sent to this Court, where it was argued by It is admitted that the Plaintiff would (60) be entitled to judgment, if the declaration contained only the count which charges that the Defendants had set up a ferry and transported persons, c., for pay. But as the other count does not charge that persons, c., were transported for pay, and as damages have been given generally upon both counts, it is said the judgment ought to be arrested. By the acts of 1779, ch. 10, 1784, ch. 14, the Plaintiff, as the owner of a ferry, is bound to keep boats, c., in good repair for the transportation of travellers, c., and is subject to high penalties *49 for any neglect in this respect. As a compensation for doing what these acts of Assembly require at his hands, he is permitted to take pay according to the rates fixed by the County Courts. Now it is a matter of indifference to the Plaintiff, whether the Defendants transport people and carriages across the river for pay or without pay; the effect is the same to him; he is injured, his profits are diminished, whilst the obligation upon him to keep up his ferry remains the same.
But it is said, it would be a hard case if no person were at liberty under any circumstances to set his neighbor across the river in a private boat, unless it be for the private use of the owner of said boat. It certainly would be a hard case, if such were the law. But it is clear that in such a case, an action would not lie. When, however, it appears that the owner of such a boat opened a way on each side of the river, sufficient for carriages, c., to go to the place where the boat (61) is kept, that posts with signboards are erected on said roads, directing travellers the way to a free ferry, and by all these means injuring a neighbor who has an old and established ferry, and who is bound by law to keep it up, a special case appears, *50 in which the Plaintiff is undoubtedly entitled to recover. It is further said, that the setting up of such ferries is for the public good. That portion of the public who pass them may think so: but the disinterested part of the public, can think nothing for their good which brings destruction or injury to an individual: and that such destruction or injury must follow, is certain, when we reflect upon the obligations which the Plaintiff is under to keep his ferry in good order, for the transportation of travellers when called upon. Connected with these considerations, is the strong fact, that by the law, the Courts, and they only, are authorized to grant to individuals the privilege of establishing ferries. This privilege has not been granted to the Defendants in this case. We need not enquire what were the motives of the Defendants in setting up this ferry; whether they intended to benefit the public, injure Long, or finally benefit themselves, is altogether immaterial.
There are no authorities advanced against the opinion now given. The case of Blisset v. Hart (Willes, 508), mentioned in the argument of this case, was an action brought for an injury similar to the one now complained of: in that case, there were many counts in the declaration, and yet in neither was it charged that the Defendant had received pay for the transportation of travellers. I am of opinion, that upon the facts charged in the first count an action can be sustained, and that judgment should be rendered for Plaintiff.
Addendum
The first count in the Plaintiff's declaration charges the Defendants with having opened a road, established a ferry, and transported persons and carriages across the (62) river, so near to the Plaintiff's ferry as to cause him to lose a great portion of the gains, profits and benefits of his ferry. This count does not allege that the Defendants took any pay or toll for transporting persons or carriages. The law gives this action, not because the Defendants have derived a benefit, but because the Plaintiff has sustained an injury, in *51 consequence of the act or acts of the Defendants. The ground of the action is the consequential injury which the Plaintiff has sustained: whether the Defendants have been gainers or losers by the transaction is not to be enquired into. Blackstone in 3 Com., 219, says, "If a ferry be erected on a river so near another ancient ferry as to draw away its custom, it is a nuisance to the owner of the old one. For, where there is a ferry by prescription, the owner is bound to keep it always in repair and readiness for the ease of the king's subjects; otherwise he may be grievously amerced. But setting up a trade, mill or school near another, is not a nuisance, although the custom be diverted from the original establishment; because a multiplication of such establishments is beneficial to the community at large, and the owners are not by law subject to any fine if they desist from or shut up such establishments."
Laws 1779, ch. 10, declares, that any person who owns a public ferry and refuses to keep it up for the rates allowed by the County Courts, shall for every offence, forfeit fifty pounds. Laws 1784, ch. 14, requires the County Courts to take bonds from the owners of ferries, in the sum of five hundred pounds, conditioned to keep good boats and proper hands to transport persons and carriages; and declares that any person detained for the lack of such boats and hands, may warrant and recover from the owner; and subjects such owner to actions for all injuries done and property lost by any lack of care at his ferry. Laws 1764, ch. 3, is cumulative, and does not repeal the common law remedy. In consequence of the law having thrown so many penalties upon the owner of a ferry, he shall not be molested in his benefits. I am of opinion (63) that judgment should be rendered for the Plaintiff.
TAYLOR, Chief Justice, concurred.
Cited: Smith v. Harkins,